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CHAPTER I
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE STUDY OF URBAN OUTPUTS 
Introduction
The task of this study is to arrive at a systematic view of the urban 
political system and its allocation of public resources through expenditures. 
It is necessary to focus upon policy literature from three allied subfields 
of political science: (1) state policy analysis, because of its advanced
state of development and ultimate consideration in later explanatory models;
(2) urban policy analysis, in order to note major concerns and elaborate 
upon variables of major interest to this study, the question of varying 
political structures, their correlates, and their performance over time; 
and (3) the study of municipal expenditures as measures of urban performance.
Following a focus upon relevant literature, an examination of the 
present theoretical basis for policy analysis will be necessary, includ­
ing an overview of models presently employed, their use, and possible 
alternative models considered. Following is a description of hypotheses 
and research proposals to be employed, a presentation of findings, and an 
integration of these findings into the body of policy research.
State Policy Analysis; Toward Testable Models
Actual policy analysis in political science has been incorporated 
in the field of comparative state politics previous to the evolution of 
a comparative urban framework, and in fact many of the breakthroughs made
at the state level are yet to be applied to urban policy analysis. For 
this reason it is necessary to focus upon the effects of Easton's plea 
for systematic policy analysis, first on the state, then on the urban 
fields.
Early Comparative Research in Comparative State Policy
Research in state policy analysis during the fifties and early six­
ties tended to set the framework for testing the relationships outlined by
1
Easton in 1954, as linkages between various political systems concerns and 
the ecological (socio-economic) environment were at last considered. Main 
political system concerns were interparty competition, turnout, and appor­
tionment (which was never particularly useful as an explanatory device and 
virtually eliminated from study following Baker vs. Carr). Lester Mil- 
brath attempted to explain covariation between the first two variables:
Political interest tends to rise in an environment 
with competitive parties, not only because more 
stimuli are available for consumption, but also 
because interest rises with increasing conflict.
Furthermore, in a close contest, voters are more 
likely to perceive that their votes count, and 
thus they are more likely to cast them.3
This atmosphere of competition was found (1958) to have definite socio­
economic roots, with significant correlations found between competition 
and wealth, urbanism, and industrialization.^ For the most part, however, 
this formative period in state policy analysis was marked by attempts to 
connect political system characteristics with state policy outcomes. Tho­
mas Dye points out that prior to the groundbreaking of 1963, two studies 
stand out in their establishment of this linkage.
In his Southern Politics, Key finds that states 
with loose multifactional systems and less con­
tinuity of competition tend to pursue conservative 
policies on behalf of upper socio-economic interests.
In states with cohesive and more continuous factions 
more liberal policies are pursued in behalf of less 
affluent interests. Duane Lockard observed that 
. . . two party states in contrast to one party 
states . . . received a larger part of their reve­
nue from business and death taxes, spent more on 
welfare services . . . and were better apportioned.^
These studies are noteworthy for their comparative nature as well as for
their substantive policy conclusions. Each, however, is regional in scope.
They serve as interesting transition points between impressionistic case
studies and systematic comparative analysis. Dye indicates that to this
point (including these works) no "controlling" of "economic" for the effect
of "political" variables, or "political" for "economic effect" is performed.&
This failure to root out spurious causation is taken up by state policy
studies of the following generation, considered next.
The Systematic Study of Comparative State Politics
Thomas Dye (1966) was probably the first to attempt a model^ for the 
general policy process under the rubric of state systems analysis. Dye 
categorizes "model" for his purposes as " . . .  an abstraction or represen-
O
tation of political life." Major linkages to be considered become clear 
as Dye phrases the question "Do systems characteristics mediate between 
socio-economic inputs and policy outputs?"^ Here Dye sets the context of 
much policy work in both the state and urban fields, as he outlines an 
empirical model rather than a normative or prescriptive model. In other 
words, only determinants of a particular policy are examined. Dye makes 
a strong case for an economic approach, i.e., determining public policy,
paralleling economic growth,and the need for societal (governmental) 
regulation. In the study of comparative politics economic development 
is a key explanatory variable in studying governmental system types and 
p o l i c i e s . S u c h  a comparative approach is desirable, Dye argues, for the 
fifty states. Basically the Dye approach will test the viability of the 
arrows in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1.— The Dye Policy Model
NK
Policy
Outcomes
Socio-Economic
Variables
Characteristics 
of the 
Political System
Probably the first analysis to implicitly make use of the comparative
approach offered by Dye took place three years prior (1963) with Dawson
and Robinson's "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare
1 ?
Policies in the American States." This study was the first truly compara­
tive state policy study. Their conclusions set into motion the battle of 
the arrows of Dye's model. The question is "Are socio-economic influences 
more important in policy determination than political system variables?" 
Dawson and Robinson concluded that the former are more important, at least 
in the area of welfare policies.
Thomas Dye's work shows conclusions which parallel those of Dawson 
and Robinson, suggesting that " . . .  system characteristics have relatively
little independent effect on policy outcomes in the s t a t e s . D y e ' s  
validation is accomplished by the use of multiple partial techniques, show­
ing the percentage of explained variance first controlling for all political 
variables, then all socio-economic variables,
Ira Sharkansky's Spending in the American States further utilized the 
methodological advances made in the middle sixties. Sharkansky's dependent 
variables were government action variables (output variables) measuring 
state spending. Government spending was found to be inversely related to 
population, industrialization, and density. Sharkansky concluded that gov­
ernmental (system) variables seemed to have little independent effect upon 
expenditure levels, except for the "assignment" variable, which operationa­
lizes the amount of expenditures implemented at the state versus local level. 
Also a strong incremental effect was discovered, that is, the previous years 
expenditure tended to be the base predictor of a given expenditure.^^
Sharkansky, working with Richard Hofferbert in "Dimensions of State 
Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,"^® written in 1969, demonstrated 
the further methodological sophistication of factor scoring techniques, 
allowing for a parsimonious analysis of political and socio-economic dimen­
sions of p o l i c y . 17 This work merits further discussion because the tenor 
of previous findings is challenged.
Because we deal with factors and not isolated 
variables, we can speak with improved precision 
of which "dimensions" of policy correspond to 
what "dimensions" of politics and economics.
In a methodological note the authors confront possible criticisms
that (1) they are using factor analysis in lieu of theory, and (2) their
factors do not truly make sense. After demonstrating the validity of their
methodology, Sharkansky and Hofferbert arrive at a series of factor scores 
for use as socio-economic (input in the Sharkansky terminology) system 
characteristics, and expenditures (outputs). The two environmental factors 
are "affluence" and "industrialization." The two political system factors 
are "professionalism-local reliance" and "competition turnout." The former 
suggests that states making heavy use of intergovernmental assistance have 
judicial and legislative institutions that are less well-developed than 
average.18 The latter factor, "competition/turnout," is self-explanatory. 
When output, or policy measures, are factor analyzed the dimensions emerging 
are labeled "Welfare-Education" and "Highways, Natural Resources." The 
authors, at this point, were able to proceed with an analysis of the inter­
relationships of these three sets of factors. They found "Welfare-Education" 
to be dependent upon Competition/Turnout, while the Highway-Natural Re­
sources measure was dependent upon economic factors.1^
The significance of this study can be summarized by the author's 
statement:
The single most important finding of this article 
may be its emphasis upon multidimensionality in 
state economics, politics, and public policy.
There is no single answer to the question "Is 
it politics or economics that has the greatest 
impact upon public p o l i c y ? " 2 0
Sharkansky operationalizes yet another element of his public policy 
model. Outputs (expenditures) are related not so much to environmental 
variables, but with actual effects (in a cause-effect sense) or as Sharkan­
sky labels them, policy impacts. In this study actual measures of public
service impact are the dependent variables, such as actual teacher-pupil
21
ratios, percentage passing Selective Service mental exams, etc. However,
his findings indicate that there are no significant relationships between 
spending items as independent variables and service measures, and Sharkansky 
even adds the time dimension albeit without empirical verification, to his 
conclusion.
The data here only warn that gross levels of spending 
do not reflect service levels, and that gross increases 
in spending are not likely to produce early gross 
improvements in service.22
Richard Hofferbert was the first to systematically analyze the dynamics 
of policy change, working from the premise that states are becoming increas­
ingly similar over dimensions of ecology (socio-economic environmental
23
variables) and actual policy. Hofferbert gives great attention to the 
"black box" labeled "system variables," a concept which he wishes to broaden 
to include the decision-making process of policy makers. Hofferbert suggests 
that the reasons for the states becoming more alike through time lie in the 
communications between state policy makers and the advent of massive inter­
governmental aid and concludes that as states develop to a certain point, 
leaders are allowed more lattitude, and it is in the perceptions of policy
makers that policy analysts should look for unexplained variance in policy
24
dependent variables.
Thomas Dye (1972) summarizes this phase of the study of state 
policy. All possible models of the policy process are eliminated from con­
sideration save the following two (see Figure 1-2). In other words, 
the only questionable relationship is between system and policy. Dye 
goes on to note that his analysis suggests eight propositions, para­
phrased here.
Figure 1-2.— Two Hypothetical Policy Models
Environmental Model
System
Environment Policy
Hybrid Environmental Model
System
Environment Policy
(1) When government taxing, spending, and service levels are studied 
as dependent variables, economic development, especially per capita personal 
income, rates as the single most important environmental variable.
(2) Federal grants-in-aid help free state and local governments 
from environmental (ecological) dependence.
(3) While wealth and education have maintained a high level of 
predictive significance, industrialization is receding in usefulness. It 
takes federal governmental action to reduce such environmental determinism.
(4) While early literature suggested the importance of political 
system variables such as interparty competition, malapportionment, and 
voter participation, one now can see these as, at best, intervening vari­
ables between the environment and policy; in fact, such political variables 
can often be viewed as products of the environment.
(5) While the theories of pluralism suggest that the political 
variables mentioned above are important as policy determinants, it seems 
impossible to consider the effect of these apart from the fact that compe­
titive states are also high in turnout.
(6) The same can be said of reformism as of pluralism, for as it is 
associated with higher taxing, spending, and service, so is it associated 
with wealth and urbanization.
(7) Multivariate analysis shows that environmental variables explain 
the most variance, followed by reformism, then pluralism.
(8) Environment can affect policy both directly and indirectly
26
through system characteristics.
10
Expansion of the Policy Model
Two studies are worthy of note in which independent variables are
indicators of political system effects and characteristics. The first
work deals with the latent function of the state, at least in an economic
system such as that of the United States, in which the governmental system
is charged with reallocating resources misallocated by economic forces.
Brian F. Fry and Richard Winters, in "The Politics of Redistribution,"
attempt to measure policy outputs, with political system variables as main
27
independent variables. The authors note that previous research has found
that "levels" of spending are more related to socio-economic than to
political system variables, and posit that other dimensions of policy
analysis might show a strengthening of the
arrow as discussed by Dye.
To examine this proposition empirically our study 
shifts attention to the allocation of the burdens 
and benefits of state revenue and expenditure 
policy across income classes. In redirecting 
analysis to allocations rather than levels of 
state revenue and expenditures, we focus on a 
province we believe to be more predictively
political.28
The success of the Fry and Winters effort depends upon a successful 
operationalization of the dependent variable, or a devising of a measure 
of comparative redistributive impact. The dependent variable was calcu­
lated as follows.
(1) Compute amounts paid (revenue) and amounts received (benefits)
29
by income class.
(2) Calculate ratio of benefits received to revenues paid out to
on
each class.
Political System Policy
11
The previous computation is somewhat limited by the fact that only 
national figures are used as the base for allocation scales described in 
note 30.
Independent variables used here are median family income, industriali­
zation, urbanization, and other socio-economic indicators, with the addition 
of the Gini index of income inequality. Political independent variables 
include participation, democratic vote, interparty competition, and legis­
lative inducements to participation. As a gesture to more traditional 
analysis, malapportionment variables are included, as are three measures 
of elite behavior.
Findings indicate that the authors* initial hypothesis is confirmed, 
that is, in predicting redistributive policies political system indicators 
prove more useful than socio-economic indicators. Percent of explained 
variance is 50 percent for all states, and 66 percent for non-southern 
states.31
Another Political System Policy arrow is tested in
Jack Walker’s "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States." 
Here the attempt is to "focus on one of the most fundamental decisions of 
all, whether to initiate a program in the first place." A state which
receives a higher "innovation" score indicates a tendency to respond to
32
policy innovation. Both socio-economic and political system variables
are useful in explaining the innovation score variation. Furthermore,
one political system variable stands out indicating that states with
higher "urban representation" tend to adopt new programs
because they are bigger, richer, more urban, 
more industrial, have more fluidity and turnover 
in their political system and have legislatures 
which more adequately represent their cities.33
12
This last variable, an apportionment measure, Walker points out, has
previously proven insignificant in indicating expenditure patterns.
Walker adds the observation that operationalizing the black box of the
actual policy making process (the decision makers) depends on the micro
environment of policy choice. State leaders often choose to compete only
regionally. Thus Walker concludes
Emerging from this study is the picture of a 
national system of emulation and competition.
The states are grouped into regions based on 
both geographical contiguity and their place 
in the specialized set of communication channels 
through which flow new ideas, information, and
policy cues.34
Walker's study highlights the complexity of comparative policy studies, 
and presents a viable rationale for the use of a regional explanatory 
variable, not merely to indicate environmental similarities, but also to 
indicate micro boundaries for the perceptual environments of actual policy 
makers.
State Policy Analysis: Conclusions
Although early indications seemed to cast doubt upon the validity 
of political variables as having a meaningful effect upon actual policy, 
later expansions made by Walker and Fry and Winters show the value of 
political indicators when basic dependent variables are developed, in this 
case, redistribution and innovation, which demonstrate a residual of expla­
nation beyond mere socio-economic determinism. This, coupled with the 
dynamic element added by Hofferbert and Walker, which notes behavioral 
dimensions of policy based upon choice making by decision-makers in light 
of regional norms, provides inspiration to the hypothesis Implicit in all
13
political policy study: that political system variation is connected to
policy output. Unfortunately, neither the advances described above nor 
the methodological developments described previously have been adequately 
adapted to the study of urban policy.
Ethos and Urban Politics
A good part of the political system-related urban policy analysis 
takes root in the provocative "ethos" thesis which Edward Banfield and James 
Q. Wilson resurrect from Richard Hofstader's The Age of Reform^^ and develop 
in their City Politics.
The ethos theory is envisioned by Banfield and Wilson as an explana­
tory construct. Electoral decision-making is the dependent variable, with 
the electorate dichotomized into two camps, each with a culturally deter­
mined world view, labeled "private regarding" or "public regarding," The
latter group is noted for its tendency to put the perceived well-being of
the community first when voting or otherwise entering politics, while the 
former acts on cue from a narrowly conceived notion of personal or primary 
group benefit.37 Accordingly,
The Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle class style of 
politics, with its emphasis on the individual to
participate in public affairs and to seek the good
of the community "as a whole" (which implies among 
other things the necessity of honesty, impartiality, 
and efficiency) was fundamentally incompatible with 
the immigrants' style of politics, which took no 
account of the community. 38
Although assimilation into American society seems to ameliorate 
Jewish private regardedness, groups other than Protestants and Jews retain 
their ethos through the third generation. Banfield and Wilson contend that
14
this split often summarizes other political cleavages, such as political
parties, the haves and the have-nots, and the suburb and central city battle
lines. Private regarding citizens tend to look to politicians for favors
and patronage, and are tolerant of "corruption," while public regarding
39citizens are usually concerned with honest and "efficient" government.
Banfield and Wilson also tie the emergence of the "reform" movement 
to the reformers desire to return control of local political institutions 
to elites with a public regarding outlook. Businesslike management of 
resources was sought. Reform manifestations usually include nonpartisan 
elections, the council manager form of government, at-large elections, 
large city planning expenditures and widespread civil service coverage of 
local government employment, or in general, all things associated with a 
dismantling of machine government. Thus ethos is introduced as a concept 
capturing much of the underlying cleavage and conflict of urban politics, 
lying near the heart of the reform movement, and having certain regular 
manifestations in systems of local elections and personnel management.40
The proof of the actual existence of the ethos as formulated here 
must be found in the attitude structure of the populace. Banfield and 
Wilson in "Public Regardedness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," 
undertake, with little concern for the ecological fallacy,41 an examination 
of citizen voting behavior in a variety of wards and precincts in local 
elections in selected cities. Elections with subjects that Banfield and 
Wilson presume have easily discernable determination of "who benefits" are 
subject to analysis. The authors utilize as independent variable "percent 
ethnic" composition of voting precincts, and as dependent variable "percent 
yes" votes cast on various expenditure and bond i s s u e s , c o n c l u d i n g  that:
15
. . . voters in some income and ethnic groups are 
more likely than voters in others to take a public 
regarding rather than a narrowly self interested 
view of things.43
It is not only income, but ethnicity that underlies this phenomenon, and 
this stems from "participation in a subculture that is identifiable in 
ethnic and income terms.
Although the ethos concept has not been without criticism as indicat­
ed later, Banfield and Wilson's basic hypothesis is self-substantiated in 
"Political Ethos R e v i s i t e d . H e r e  the ethos theory is again confirmed, 
mainly in reaction to methodological shortcomings inherent in their previous 
work. First, all concern with historical foundations for the "ethos" is 
disclaimed; secondly, the ethos' are renamed "unitary" and "individualist," 
paralleling the prior public and private regardedness patterns. Then the 
ethos assumptions are tested by a survey sample in Boston, and conclusions 
follow those at the higher level of aggregation in their previous work. 
Individualists possess a localistic ethos; unitarists possess a "holistic" 
ethos, with Anglo Saxon Yankees and Jews tending toward the latter, and 
ethnics the former, with Jews somewhat less unitaristic than Yankees.
It is the suggested relationship between ethos and form of government
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which is mentioned in City Politics, then left largely undeveloped, that 
took root in urban policy analysis inspired by the Banfield and Wilson 
research. Their contentions about specific ethnic referenda results are 
left largely unchallenged.
Ethos and Urban Governmental Forms
Wolfinger and Field attempt to test what they consider a major hypo­
thesis of the Banfield andWilson work, that " . . .  a number of political
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forms and policies are a manifestation of each e t h o s . I n  making such
an investigation they discuss the need to clarify some hazy implications
of the Banfield and Wilson work, (a) Is the independent variable class
or ethnicity? Banfield and Wilson interchange the two repeatedly, (b) If
the immigrants created an ethos of "private regardedness" in response to
conditions here, shouldn't this ethos vary with region of the country, or
to the differing sets of experiences encountered in different areas?49
In particular, since the quality of the immigrant 
experience differed from region to region, it 
appears that a particular level of foreign stock 
population, in, say California or New York might 
produce different levels of private regardedness 
in two places.50
The authors cite Kessel, Schnore and Alfred, and Cutright^l as sub­
stantiating the ethos theory, but accuse them of ignoring "region." Wolf­
inger and Field take as their independent variables (1) percent foreign 
born; (2) class, percent white collar, median income, and education; and
(3) region, in their testing of the viability of "ethos" as explaining 
governmental forms. Dependent variables are shown in Table 1-1.
The study included all cities over 50,000 (1960), (n = 309) except 
Washington, B.C. They conclude that there is a "public regarding" syn­
drome in some American cities, but that relationships between all indepen­
dent and dependent variables disappear when cities are examined "within 
regions." No strong case can be made in any case for any structural "pri­
vate regarded" ethos, as private regarding forms do co-occur with the regu­
larity of public regarding forms. As a vdiole, Wolfinger and Field conclude 
that whatever is left of the ethos theory can be considered a regional arti­
fact. In any case, the Banfield and Wilson thesis is characterized as in 
need of revision.
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Table 1-1.--Wolfinger and Field's Ethos Categories of Political Structures
Political Structures Private Regarding Public Regarding
Form of Government Mayor Manager
Type of Ballot Partisan Non Partisan
Method of Electing Councilman Wards At Large
Size of Council Districts Small Large
Civil Service Coverage Less More
City Planning Expenditures Low High
Urban Renewal Low High
Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler attack such a dismissal of the 
ethos theory. Another dimension is here added, that of actual behavior 
of cities.
It is our thesis that governments which are products 
of the reform movement behave differently from those 
which have unreformed institutions, even if the 
socio-economic composition of their populations may
be similar.54
Methodologically two vast improvements can be seen in the Lineberry and 
Fowler study: (1) reformism is viewed as a "continuous" independent vari­
able, and (2) specific testable hypotheses are offered concerning the find­
ings of the dependent v a r i a b l e . S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the hypothesis is offered 
that "reformed governments differ from their unreformed counterparts in 
their responsiveness to socio-economic cleavages in the population.
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Dependent variables are taxes and expenditures. Lineberry and Fowler con­
clude that the linkage from socio-economic inputs to expenditures and tax 
outputs is clearer in unreformed cities. According to the authors, the 
cleavages and demands of the urban political system are more readily trans­
lated into policy outputs (as shown in taxing, spending figures) in unre- 
formed than in reformed cities. The idea that the occurance of such 
forms is an artifact of region is dismissed out of hand. One cannot, 
according to Lineberry and Fowler, control for region for it represents a 
potpourri of cultural and historical factors. In any case there has been 
a not so subtle shift of emphasis between these two pieces, and both repre­
sent A takeoff from the Hofstader Banfield and Wilson discussions. Whereas 
Banfield and Wilson establish an ethos underlying urban political cleavages, 
Wolfinger and Field do not so much detract from its viability as an expla­
natory construct as they imply, but establish its causal roots in regional 
variation in the United States. Lineberry and Fowler fail to address either 
the ethos existence or its causal roots, but establish the fact that gov­
ernmental forms and personnel policies mentioned by Banfield and Wilson,
and later Wolfinger and Field, are structural manifestations of the ethos
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respond differently to the urban political environment.
Governmental Form as Dependent Variable
A body of urban policy investigation seeks to establish a systematic 
relationship between characteristics of cities and use of political struc­
tures. Phillips Outright in "Non-Partisan Electoral Systems" makes use 
of two sets of independent variables: (a) the state political system,
and (b) social class and religion of the city, with the dependent variable
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the partisanship of local community electoral systems (cities over 25,000 
1963). Outright finds that weak party attachments in one party states 
are associated with non-partisanship. When state environments showed a 
competititve party structure the social variables of the cities became 
a determinant factor in the incidence of reformed structures. The 
social and economic indicators of cleavage operated most fully in combina­
tion (high on both indicators), and only when one indicator was low was 
there a significant variation in non-partisanship indicated by the other. 
Thus the action of the independent variables (state political environment) 
and (social and economic cleavages) seems somewhat interactive. Outright 
concludes :
. . . non-partisan elections are associated with 
several structural conditions: (1) overwhelming
voter support to one party; (2) weak voter attach­
ment to either party; (3) lack of an economic base 
which encourages class based organizations and 
class alignments to political parties; and (4) lack 
of a religious base adequate for religious cleavage 
to adequately support political parties. Where these 
conditions occur, non-partisan systems have won over­
whelming support in the absence of these conditions 
the ride of reform has had noticeable less effect.
Further, where these conditions combine, a one party 
system may become relatively permanent features on 
the political scene.60
John H. Kessel adds the independent variables of city size and city 
growth rate, grouping cities into (a) 10,000-25,000 population; (b) 
25,000-250,000; and (c) cities over 250,000. The advent of the council- 
manager form is latest in time and is associated with the reform movement. 
Kessel found that in population growth and governmental form, the manager 
city tends to be "growing," the mayor cities stable, and the commission 
form is found in those cities declining in population. Also, the manager
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cities (much like Cutright’s non-partisan cities) tend to occur in states 
with either one party or weak two party structures. Measures of class 
cleavage show an association with the mayor council form. Here percent 
foreign born taps those people most likely to utilize unreformed struc­
tures. Again conclusions as to economic base and governmental form are 
similar to O u t r i g h t . Kessel concludes in a programatic vein:
. . . given the adoptions and abandonments of 
the past fifty years each governmental form will 
be most frequently found in that environment which 
is congenial to it.63
Alford and Scoble likewise view a city as tending toward the form
of government most suitable to its needs, though many times insurmountable
obstacles may exist in the state legal environment. Like Kessel, cities
over 25,000 (1960) are studied. Independent variables are: (1) social
heterogeniety of the population; (2) class composition; and (3) population
growth and mobility.^4 with cities expected to favor a professionalized,
managerial, reform government with increases in the three above, Alford
and Scoble summarize:
White, Anglo Saxon, Protestant growing and 
mobile cities are highly likely to be manager 
cities; ethnically and religiously diverse, 
but non-mobile industrial cities are likely 
to be mayor-council cities. The commission 
form is associated with declining population, 
low mobility, a low white-collar composition, 
and a low educational level and low ethnic 
and religious diversity.
Thus Alford and Scobles' conclusions, using government form as dependent
variable, parallel those of Outright and Kessel, as do Schnore and Alford
in a similar study of American suburbs. Here higher proportions of foreign 
born are found in mayor-countil cities^^ and the tendency of suburbs is 
to possess manager forms of government.^7
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Governmental Form and Output
Governmental forms can be considered as intervening variables, 
much in the vein of Lineberry and Fowler, when one wishes to treat some 
manifestation of governmental output as dependent variable. There are 
obvious problems in finding meaningful operational definitions of output. 
Two studies have attempted, albeit on a limited population of cities, to 
study expenditure levels of cities in relation to governmental structure 
independent variables. Edgar Sherbenou, in examining Chicago suburbs, 
found that reformed structures provided a more classically "efficient" 
translation of resources into expenditure o u t p u t , w h i l e  Bernard Booms, 
studying cities in Michigan and Ohio, finds a similar "efficiency."^®
Richard Cole uses a valuable methodological treatment of the struc­
tural variables listed by Banfield and Wilson and Wolfinger and Field. 
Cole uses the governmental form variables as independent variables, while 
treating the personnel items (employees covered by civil service, per 
capita city planning expenditures, and per capita urban renewal requests) 
as d e p e n d e n t . T h e  author, rather than utilizing a "continuous" index 
of reformism (e.g., Lineberry and Fowler), divides the concept into four 
control groups ranging from least to most reformed, and performing an 
analysis of variance technique^^ finds: (1) political structure is a
very weak predictor of public policy and while region is of slightly 
greater predictive significance, it too is of minimal importance in pre­
dicting the behavior of the dependent variables. Cole concludes that a 
very complex model is necessary in accounting for urban policy outputs.
In a study similar in concern to that of Lineberry and Fowler,
Terry Clark sought to add the dimension of community decision-making
22
centralization to a model testing performance of reformed versus unre­
formed structures and variation in budget expenditures for a sample of 
fifty-one American c i t i e s . I n  order to operationalize concepts of 
"decentralized community structure," Clark, in a methodological first 
for basically aggregate studies, utilized questionnaire data. His find­
ings show similarities to those of Lineberry and Fowler. Decentralized, 
or "pluralistic"^^ structures of decision-making are found in ethnic, 
industrial cities, which tend to spend more than their centralized counter­
parts.^^ The most important single explanatory variable in the Clark 
study is percent Catholic, as Catholic cities show correspondingly higher 
expenditures on all items.
Clark's analysis highlights the fact that "public regarding" ethos, 
reformism, and centralization of decision-making structures all tap the 
same dimension, and that pluralistic structures tend to occur in unreformed 
cities.
Decentralized decision-making was positively 
associated with economic diversification and 
population size . . . and negatively associated 
with index of reform government.'
Thus the elements of contention from both the reform literature 
and community power literature, can in a sense be fused into a single set 
of concerns: the incidence and performance of "efficient" versus basically
"democratic" ethos. What appears lacking in the literature is systematic, 
comparative, aggregate studies, especially with inclusion of the time 
factor in dealing with policy outputs.
One can note, however, the overriding interest in the effect of 
reformed versus unreformed structures. The existence of the two corresponding
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ethos is unquestionable; gauging their importance begets controversy; 
however, measures of output are lacking in sophistication. Unfortunately, 
comparative, systematic studies of urban policy, containing the temporal 
aspect discussed above, lack consideration of political indicators.
Thus the Banfield and Wilson thesis that ethos is a useful explana­
tory device underlying the urban political system is not challenged by 
the ensuing study of urban forms and policy. Wolfinger and Field merely 
jab at any prior cause other than regional variation. Other works make 
a clear case for the existance of reformed and unreformed governmental 
structures according to the social and political environment of the area. 
Where cleavages exist (social, religious, and economic) and state environ­
ments show strong two party competition, also an indicator of socio­
economic cleavage, then the mayor-council form predominates. Though not 
as efficient in the "business" sense as the manager form, mayor-council 
cities are more "efficient" as translators of environmental conditions into 
policy. (Here one cannot necessarily refer to the former as demands, or 
truly compare policy on any other than a gross level.) However, when one 
attempts even a rudimentary breakdown of policy items beyond mere per 
capita expenditures (Cole) structural variations lose much explanatory 
signifigance.
Municipal Expenditure Analysis
A great deal of analysis has taken place concerning the determinant 
factors of municipal spending. However, since the bulk of such literature 
has been done by economists Inclusion of political explanatory variables.
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especially those germane to the effects of governmental forms, has been 
extremely light.
The determination of factors underlying comparative state and muni­
cipal spending has been labeled "the aggregate approach" in the analysis 
of all budgeting decisions. Meltsner and Wildavsky characterize this 
approach as its objective
. . .  to develop an empirical theory of the determi­
nants of municipal expenditures using multiple re­
gression analysis. The theory as such is therefore 
contained in the choice of the independent variables 
which, when their effects are added together, purports 
to explain much of the variance in city expenditures 
from one city to another.78
Meltsner and Wildavsky further claim that inherent in aggregate 
expenditures studies are three assumptions:
(a) Per capita wealth is converted into demands 
for public services.
(b) The service demands filter through a seive 
known as politics.
(c) The expenditures incurred satisfy these
demands.79
It is the contention of this volume that the summation offered by
Meltsner and Wildavsky lumps aggregate studies into a model resembling
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that of Thomas Dye (discussed previously in this chapter). The impor­
tance of political variables is limited, and tangential to the bulk of 
economic expenditure literature, which, if subject to any "model" seems 
fit for classical economic public choice models, rather than those of 
Easton and Dye (see Chapter 2). This section will consider the literature 
of local government finance, with greatest attention given the literature 
most germane to this study: those works including political variables
and/or those utilizing time series approaches.
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General Studies: Determinants of Metropolitan Expenditures
Any analysis of public expenditures must take note of Solomon
Fabricant's Trends of Government Activity in the United States Since
1900. Although the scope of the Fabricant study far exceeds the demands
of this section, his systematic comparative method was indeed trend-
setting, as was his choice of three main explanatory variables of income,
urbanization, and population density, with personal income the best single
predictor (Fabricant’s expenditure variables were broken down into per
capita expenditure per functional category, as well as total per capita
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operating expenses). Fabricant's study dealt with all levels of govern­
ment expenditure (federal, state, and local); however, his consideration 
of local government expenditures is somewhat weakened by his aggregation 
of local expenditures to the state unit of analysis. Changes in the wealth 
variable over time are offered as the major determinant of variation in 
this local expenditure variable. He concludes:
. . . the chief cause of rising per capita 
expenditures would be rising income. Greater 
urbanization and the "passage of time" would 
add a little. Increased density would subtract 
a little.83
The limiting factor in the Fabricant work is obviously the lack of 
sophisticated data management techniques, for temporal analysis is limited 
to speculation based on comparative correlation coefficients, and actual 
measures of the dependent variables are by statewise averages.
Seven years later Harvey Brazer attempted a similar study to 
Fabricant's, utilizing a narrower scope of concerns (local government 
expenditures only) with a consideration of individual cities; Brazer 
utilized 462 cities with populations of 25,000 (1950). The results
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of this study set the tone for much continued work, as Brazer found a 
difficult time accounting for the tremendous variations he encountered,^^ 
but utilizing the Fabricant independent variables he found a like corre­
lation between them and functional expenditures. Also added were popula­
tion growth, and proportion of the city's share of the total metropolitan
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area population.
Stevens and Schmandt, analyzing, like Fabricant, state aggregates 
of local expenditures add region as an independent variable. Revenue 
raising was also explicitly added to the model, as was consideration of 
revenue sources. Utilizing 1957 data^G the authors concluded:
(1) Total revenues, property taxes, and state aid 
form a cluster of interrelated variables that 
tend to move in the same direction.
(2) Wealth (ability to pay; median income) is a 
critical determinant of per capita revenue.
(3) State aid to local governments declines as 
size and density i n c r e a s e .87
Stephens and Schmandt further note that the Pacific region is charac­
terized by high income and revenue; the mountains have the highest property 
tax and locally raised revenue, while New England is most dependent upon 
property tax and least on state aid. Further, total revenue and property 
taxes manifest a curvilinear relationship to population size, with lowest 
revenue per capita in medium sized counties. Wealth and state fiscal 
policies appear as more influential determinants of revenue patterns than 
demographic characteristics.®®
Kurnov again makes use of the state by state aggregate analysis, 
and in an expansion of the Stephens and Schmandt findings adds per capita 
federal aid, while considering urbanization without density. Also new is
27
89
Kurnov's inclusion of the state pupil-teacher ratio as an output measure.
A year later Fisher, utilizing the same set of dependent variables (aggre­
gate local expenditures at the state level) expands on the Kurnov inclu-
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sion of the federal aid variable. Further methodological sophistication
is indicated by his use of multiple p a r t i a l e . Fisher discovers a high
negative association between expenditure levels and the percentage of low-
income families in the state, which suggests to him the hypothesis that
there is a political resistance to increased government expenditures
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among low income persons. (This seems an exceptional example of bizarre 
conclusions from preliminary data analysis). Also, and of great importance 
is his note that multiple partials show the greater importance of demo­
graphic factors than beta coefficient analysis had indicated.^3 Fisher 
also included two socio-political variables: (1) an index of party compe­
tition, and (2) percent of those over twenty-five with less than five 
years of school, and finds that
The two socio-political variables contributed less 
to the levels of correlation obtained than did the 
economic and demographic factors, but show indications 
in expenditures for highways, sewers, and health and
hospitals.94
Although somewhat crude in his assessment of "political" considera­
tions, Fisher was nonetheless the first writer in either economics or 
political science to merge expenditures and at least one legitimate poli­
tical measure (interparty competition). This data is, unfortunately, 
collected at state aggregate levels. In this group of general expenditure 
determinant studies only Brazer has utilized individual city expenditures.
Others studies cities in this manner, but on regionally restricted popu-
, 95
lations.
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The most exhaustive study to be here considered is Roy W. Bahl's 
Metropolitan City Expenditures, which attempts a temporal analysis of 
198 central cities of areas defined by the census as standard metropolitan 
statistical areas. (This unit of analysis allows use of the ratio of 
central city to outside central city population). Bahl's dependent vari­
ables are the usual functional per capita breakdowns, but percentage dis­
tributions across each city's total are also given some consideration, 
albeit outside any predictive model.
Bahl's major concern is with time dimensions^? of change, as for 
either 1950 or 1960 alone results fit into patterns similar to those
no
found by Brazer. Bahl, however, does explain somewhat more variance in 
1960 than 1950. Regression coefficients, however, remain quite similar. 
Outstanding in the Bahl analysis is his conclusion, based upon both years 
data, that
. , . the single most important indicator of the 
level of city government spending is per capita 
intergovernmental revenue. The comparisons also 
reveal that the more densely populated cities 
with higher median family incomes spend signifi­
cantly more. Also, there is general consensus 
that the capacity to finance, the degree of 
poverty, and the level of demand for public goods 
interact to create higher levels of municipal 
spending.99
When actual changes in dependent variables are subject to regression 
analysis, certain functional expenditures, especially fire, police, and 
highway expenditures, show interesting correlates of change. Variables 
valuable as explanatory units include changes in the ratio of central 
city to metropolitan area p o p u l a t i o n , i n c r e a s e s  in population density,101 
and population change. However, a large portion of the variation over
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time may be subject to price level changes. (Analysis of percentage
102
distribution changes could help negate this problem),
Bahl concludes by noting the importance of certain explanatory 
variables not incorporated to any extent in research previously cited 
in this chapter, notably the question of central city^-metropolitan area 
relationships and intergovernmental aid effects. These variables, along 
with others of singular importance, demand more detailed treatment.
Additional Explanatory Variables; Metropolitan Expenditures
As was noted previously, the trends in expenditure analysis litera­
ture cite wealth, density, and income, and Bahl's in depth analysis shows 
these three to indeed be of continuing use. Also useful is population 
size. Findings seem to indicate no tendencies toward economies of scale. 
Berolzheimer gave early indication of this in 1947 with his conclusion 
that there is a relationship between population size and municipal expen- 
citures.103 Richard Spangler finds a significant relationship between 
rate of population growth and per capita expenditures, and hypothesizes 
that growth, rather than lending to an economies of scale condition, 
actually manifests a disruptive effect, inhibiting e f f i c i e n c y .
Intergovernmental Aid and Expenditures
Probably the first major dissatisfactions with the initial four 
part Fabricant-Brazer model of expenditure analysis came from Sacks and 
Harris in 1964. Their suggestions were not so much to alter the model as 
to add aid factors to the linear equation. They hypothesize that the 
greater the intergovernmental flow, the higher the combined state and 
local expenditures. Again aggregated state totals are analyzed. Sacks
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and Harris find their hypothesis most applicable to welfare and highway 
spending. They suggest adding (1) federal aid; (2) state aid; and (3) fed­
eral and state aid to Fabricant*s m o d e l . B a h l  and Saunders seek to 
apply the federal aid variable to analyze the change component for state 
aggregated state and local spending, and after attempting to locate various 
explanatory variables to add to the Fabricant-Brazer model conclude;
The results of this study reveal that changes in 
per capita federal grants to states is the only 
factor which significantly affects changes in 
state and local per capita spending when data from 
48 states are included in a five variable model.
Morss soon pointed out a major flaw in the consideration of inter­
governmental aid as depicted by the above authors.
One purpose of this study is to point out a 
new variable, which, when used by itself or in 
conjunction with other variables, will contri­
bute substantially to the explanation of inter­
state differences.107
The variable Morss writes of is per capita state and local tax 
collections, by state. When this variable is used as na estimator it 
accounts for 72 percent of the variance. This contribution helps pre­
diction, but as variables underlying the taxation variable are left un­
specified, the cause of explanation receives little help. Morss' other 
contribution, however, is quite useful.
In short, it appears that the federal aid variable 
is significant in explaining variations in state 
and local expenditures only because the lower 
level governments are required to spend all the
federal aid they receive.108
Morss' criticism raises methodological problems, as pointed out 
by Pogue and Sgontz, as they suggest that the same variables enter into 
both sides of the equation. That is, aid is used to predict to a large
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extent its own implementation. They note the biasing effect upon regression 
coefficients which occurs when parts of dependent variables are analyzed 
as independent v a r i a b l e s . P o g u e  and Sgontz agree with Morss in their 
assessment that per capita aid is not a valuable explanatory variable in 
municipal expenditure analysis.
John Osman, reaffirms the explanatory validity of intergovernmental 
aid if considered as a "stimulator" of local spending, as in a state by 
state analysis he discovers that state and local expenditures increase for 
a given function more than intergovernmental aid to that function.
Urban-Suburban Governmental Fragmentation
Early expenditure studies began a trend of investigating covariations 
between the nature of the central city-metropolitan area relationship and 
its effect upon municipal spending. Hawley found an inverse relationship
between per capita expenditures and the proportion of people living outside
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the central city, as did Brazer.
Probably the greatest contribution made to the expenditure model by
those investigating fragmentation is provided by a group of Syracuse
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University scholars, notably Woo Sik Kee and Alan Campbell and Seymour 
S a c k s . B o t h  studies employ a city by city analysis, utilizing a 
sample of 36 SMSA's. Dependent variables examined are educational and 
non-educational per capita spending. Valuable explanatory variables be­
come: (1) the ratio of owner occupied homes; (2) ratio of central city
to total metropolitan population; and (3) the amount of taxes collected 
at the local level (percentage of local to total state and local).
Kee concludes that the tax assignment variable underlies much expenditure 
deviation.
32
The results of this analysis suggest that the 
key to understanding the expenditure variations 
of the nations central cities is the role of the 
states in delegating responsibility to local
units of government.116
Campbell and Sacks greatly elaborate on the Woo discoveries. An 
analysis of taxation patterns finds the central city burdened with physi­
cal deterioration and a need for noneducational services, and note that 
state aid patterns differ markedly according to the recipient (city or
suburb). Cities receive more noneducational aid per capita and suburbs
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more educational aid. Again, the prime indicator in understanding city 
by city variations is the tax assignment variable, which can be understood 
in terms of expenditure responsibility, or as usually operationally de­
fined in central cities, responsibility for welfare.H®
It is the local expenditure assignment and the 
amount of state aid that determines, in part, 
the other assignment variable, tax assignment.1 "
Other intergovernmental aid variables rate consideration.
It is clear that the intergovernmental flow of 
funds, as measured by state and federal aid, has 
a stimulative effect upon state and local fiscal 
behavior.120
While stressing the importance of assignment variables, and criti­
cizing previous researchers for its omission,121 the authors also address 
the Brazer-Hawley hypothesis, labeled by Bahl as the "exploitation hypo­
thesis," that the greater the proportion of a SMSA outside a central city, 
the greater the exploitation of the central city. Campbell and Sacks 
claim that the phenomenon is more complex than mere "exploitation."
For if the central city has its noneducation 
expenditures and taxes increased because of the 
burden of services imposed upon it by the size 
of its outside area, the outside area also has
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its level of noneducation expenditures and taxes 
influenced by the relative size of the central
city.122
Campbell and Sacks thus caution upon empirical reliance on evidence 
to document the alleged "exploitation" of the central city by the suburbs.
William Neenan, in a case study of Detroit, found "exploitation" by
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analyzing benefits to the central city, whereas Auld and Cook,
and Ramseyl^^ criticize the limited parameters of Neenan's work, notably
his exclusion of some suburban communities from the analysis and his
ignoring of Michigan revenue sharing distributions from wealthy suburban
communities to Detroit. Neenan later defends his approach, but notes the
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difficulties in a systematic analysis of the issue.
The nature of the exploitation, if any, is attacked on the comparative
analytic dimension by Bahl by operationalization of concepts indicative
of the urban-suburban financial relationship, most notably the nature of
the central city as a central shopping district for the metropolitan
area, in which case, the central city could receive compensation for
other losses associated with suburbanization.
In general, the larger the value of the 
employment-population ratio (city employment to 
city population), the greater the extent that 
non-residents of the central city commute to 
work . . . .  Among city comparisons of per 
capita retail sales reveal the degree to which 
the central city serves as a major shopping 
facility within the SMSA.127
It must be concluded that the nature of the central city to sub­
urban relationship is of great substantive Importance to an understanding 
of municipal policy. Bahl found changes in municipal expenditures from 
1950-1960 " . . .  significantly and positively correlated with the changes
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in the employment-population ratio and per capita retail s a l e s , B a h l  
labels suburban interaction as "contact," and finds such "contact" re-
1 OQ
lated to a drain on municipal expenditures.
It would appear then, that three major additions to the basic 
Fabricant-Brazer model can be found in the literature: (1) the incidence
of federal and state intergovernmental aid to cities; (2) the tax assign­
ment from state to local governments: and (3) the urban-suburban relation­
ship. The seventies may well render the first addition inapplicable, with 
the changing grant structure and implementation of revenue sharing; however, 
it must be considered in expenditure analysis to that time.
Municipal Expenditure Literature: Evaluation
The contribution of expenditure determinant studies toward an 
understanding of municipal financial behavior has drawn mixed reaction, 
usually dependent upon the parameters of what the investigator wishes to 
explain. As a theoretical foundation for the entire budget making pro­
cess and public decision-making model, systematic expenditure analysis is 
of marginal explanatory value, as Wilensky indicates
The present set of studies do not, and in their 
present form cannot, provide relevant answers to 
many of the crucial issues which most concern public 
finance economists and policy makers . . . .  While 
this information (provided by determinant studies) 
has been of limited use, primarily because it fre^ 
quently tells us little about the underlying struc­
tural relations, the studies have provided us with 
a first approximation of the important variables.
Wilensky further points out that all determinant studies seem to focus
on operating expenses, which implies a twofold assumption justifying
the omission of capital expenditures. (1) It is assumed that the ratio
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of capital to operating expenses is the same for all cities, and (2) also
assumed is a "nonsubstitutable" relationship between capital and operating
expenses. Neither assumption can truly be demonstrated to be factual,
and the problem is not readily soluable. The investigator can merely
recognize the limitation and hope for randomization of the uncaptured
effect of unaccounted capital outlay.
Wilensky often noting the difficulties of using single estimating
equations which sum complex socio-economic p h e n o m e n a , s u g g e s t s  a more
theoretical groundwork prior to investigation.
The problems . . . require a positive theory of 
public expenditures. In other words, a theory 
which explains why expenditures are as they are 
rather than what they should be.^^^
Also needed, Wilensky continues, is a recognition of political institu­
tions and their role in expenditure variation.^33 xhe wedding of models 
utilizing true political variables valuable to the concerns of urban poli­
tical analysis, most notably the variation in performance of reformed ver­
sus unreformed municipal structures, as measured by expenditure analysis, 
is necessary. Aside from the limited operationalization (mentioned 
earlier) of the Lineberry and Fowler study, only two works have focused 
upon expenditures as a measure of output of varying municipal structure.
Urban Government Structure and Expenditure Analysis
The first study to be viewed is in the determinant expenditure 
patterns, with political variables the main control variables. Booms 
examined cities between 25,000 and 100,000 population in Ohio and Michi­
gan using as dependent variables functional expenditure outlays (fire, 
police, sanitation, highways) and local department Increase. The major
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control variable is form of government. (No measure to test the possible 
spuriousness of governmental form, such as regional control, as employed 
by Wolfinger and Field, is used). Booms concludes that (a) the form of 
government does have an effect upon the level of per capita expenditures, 
and (b) if one accepts an equality of output per expenditure dollar, city 
manager cities are more efficient than their unreformed counterparts. 
Reformed governmental institutions provide the same level of service out­
puts at lower per capita costs than their unreformed c o u n t e r p a r t s . 134 
Booms in essence tests two hypotheses; (1) the form of city government 
has an important effect upon per capita expenditure level; and (2) the 
manager is more efficient (see above). Using basic analysis of variance 
techniques. Booms concluded that manager cities and mayor cities are not 
from the same population.1^^ Booms? contribution is valid, but notably 
lacking in an inclusion of independent variables used in determinant 
studies, and the relative importance of political versus economic vari­
ables cannot be gauged,
Chester Rogers enlarges the model as discussed above, and is the
only writer to integrate expenditure level dependent variables into the
1
Dye-Easton scheme described earlier. Two sets of independent variables 
are used, political system variables and environmental variables. Rogers 
notes the literature^^? which links governmental form to socio-economic 
conditions, and accepts this linkage as prior to expenditure output ana­
lysis.
The socio-economic variables utilized are basically the wealth, 
density, population, and central city indicators common to determinant 
studies. Four political variables used are: (1) governmental form;
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(2) type of ballot; (3) type of election; and (4) administrative centrali­
zation. Measures of impact are: (1) fire insurance rating; and (2) plan-
ning expenditures. Rogers' analysis is limited by exclusion of all 
techniques other than a comparison of means, controlling by categories of 
relevant independent variables. Whereas Lineberry and Fowler employed 
correlational data to create a reformism indice, utilizing interval levels 
of measurement, Rogers conservatively restricts his governmental vari­
ables to nominal categories. The only "controlling" possible is therefore
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tabular, and much information inherent in the data is left unused.
Whereas Booms had found form of government to be significant in
determining governmental performance, utilizing no socio-economic controls,
Rogers finds the opposite. He concludes.
In summary of the relationship of the political 
variables to policy it can be said that they have 
no impact . . . .  Where initial examination seemed 
to support the hypotheses, when relevant environ­
mental variables were controlled for, the relation­
ship disappeared.140
Rogers concludes that although his analysis showed no "arrow" from poli­
tical system to output, expansion to include other political indicators 
should take place before "abandoning" Dye's model. He suggests inclusion 
of "interest group" community power i n d i c a t o r s , w h i c h  are hard to 
collect on a systematic and comparative scale.
Certainly no justification for the importance of political system 
variables can be gleaned from the Rogers study, and Booms omission of 
socio-economic controls leaves his conclusion that structure is signifi­
cant in doubt. Richard Cole (described earlier) reaches conclusions simi­
lar to Roger's with output data other than expenditure levels. Lineberry
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and Fowler's conclusion was based upon a slightly different conceptual 
scheme, as they tested reformism as it affected translation of environ­
ment into policy. It appears as if methodology, at least in part, de­
termines conclusions.
Aggregate Policy Analysis; Beyond Mindless Empiricism
The question remains: Is the tradition of analysis utilizing re­
gression techniques to explain budget variation indicative of what Wildav­
sky and Meltsner label "mindless e m p i r i c i s m ? T h e y  suggest a connecting 
of available findings to information useful to the policy maker.
Aggregates like per capita income and level of 
taxation must be connected to individual behavior 
if the research is to be instructive . . . .  To 
know how and why participants make decisions and 
to discern the objective explicit or implicit in 
their actions is to place oneself in a better 
position to make policy recommendations.143
Meltsner and Wildavsky*s alternative, the "individual approach," offers 
the theoretician little choice. The reformation needed to operationalize 
full individual choice models within the urban environmental setting 
simply rules out systematic analysis, and therefore eliminates any hypo­
theses testing concerning major independent variables. It will be the 
position of this volume, however, that within the aggregate approach 
there is ample room for consideration of the behavioral component in bud­
get determination. As discussed previously within the context of state 
policy analysis. Jack Walker, in his concern with innovation, stressed 
the time factor in comparing state policy, and injected the decision-making 
component, as he noted the tendency of state policy makers, in personal 
contacts with one another, to adopt similar policies. If such dimensions
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can be added to the urban policy process, perhaps some of the criticisms 
expressed by Meltsner, Wildavsky, and Wilensky can be answered.
Critics have also focused upon the lack of theoretical underpinning, 
most notably in the expenditure studies of economists. The basic Dye 
model, usually employed by political scientists, must also be challenged, 
however. Chapter II will focus upon various model building alternatives 
in testing of comparative municipal output, with basic independent vari­
ables both environmental conditions and governmental structure variations.
A testing of those still unanswered questions incurred by the "ethos" 
debate will be undertaken. The time dimension should further encourage 
consideration of economic models already well suited to studies of rates 
of change.
Table 1-2 shows the components of state and local policy studies.
One must conclude that consideration of any new model must lie in an en­
largement of present findings in municipal policy literature. A perusal 
has indicated a limited use of dependent variables whenever policy outputs 
are considered, and a similar lack of inclusion of political independent 
variables when policy outputs as measured by various expenditure measures 
are viewed. No study has focused upon the differences peculiar to reformed 
versus unreformed structures as they face different environmental challen­
ges, for instance, the decaying, possibly "exploited" aging of central 
cities as urbanization reaches into the seventies. The advantages of a 
factor analytic approach, such as taken at the state level by Hofferbert 
and Sharkansky, are not utilized. In short, the systematic, comparative 
study of urban policy output over time, with respect to more normative 
concerns, is at a quite limited stage of development.
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Table 1-2,--Comparative State and Urban Policy Studies
Study Temporal Behavioral
Dimension
Decision-
Makers
Political
Independent
Variables
Expenditure
Dependent
Variables
State
Dawson-Rob ins on X X
Dye X X
Sharkansky X X X
Sharkansky-Hofferbert X X
Sharkansky X X X
Hofferbert X X X
Fry and Winters X X
Walker X X X
Urban Policy
Wolfinger-Field
Lineb erry-Fowler X X
Cole X X X
(limited)
Clark X X
(limited)
Municipal Expenditure
Fabricant X X
(limited)
Brazer X X
Stephens-Schmandt X
K u m o w X
Fisher X X
(limited)
Bahl X X
Woo X
Campbell-Sacka X X
Booms X X
Rogers X X
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CHAPTER II
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR URBAN EXPENDITURE RESEARCH
There appears to be an inexplicable gap between the more abstract 
"theorizing" of empirical theorists and the more concrete forms of "theory 
building" by empirical investigators. Empirical analysts of the urban 
political system seem for the most part to have adopted the Dye-Easton 
approach: a view casting measurable "functions" of political processes
as a linear combination of two segments. While the first segment views 
policies as basically determined by societal conditions, the second places 
some cause in the structural make-up of the governmental unit. This chap­
ter will investigate the viability of this approach in examining changes 
in functional expenditures over time, especially the differing behavior of 
varying governmental forms. Also the applicability of recent trends in 
concept development concerning "political economy" and competition will be 
examined.
Theoretical Groundwork: Systems Theory and
Structural-Functional Analysis
The major inputs to systematic conceptualization of the political 
process are twofold: (1) systems theory in the tradition of David Easton
and (2) structural functional analysis as put forth by Almond and Powell. 
Prior to a discussion of the different nuances of the above approaches one 
must consider the pioneering work of Talcott Parsons.
Parson's work centers around the fundamental question of system 
survival over time. A social system, in surviving, must perform the
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following functions: (1) goal attainment; (2) adaption; (3) pattern
maintenance anJ (4) integration. In essence a system must maintain social
regularity in a changing environment. A comparison between systems can be
1
made relative to the performance of the above functions.
David Easton's concern is more specifically the "political system," 
the output of which is the "authoritative allocation of values."^ Inputs to 
the system are the demands and supports generated in the political environ­
ment. The conversion of demands into "authoritative allocations" occurs
within the decision making structures, or "black box." A simplified version
3
of the political system as conceptualized by Easton is shown in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1.— A Simplified Eastonian System
Feedback
Demands
^(Outputs) Authoritative 
Decisions
(Inputs)
Supports
In comparative research, therefore, the task is to identify the 
inputs and forces that shape and change them, to trace the process through 
which they are transformed into outputs, to describe the general conditions 
under which such processes can be maintained, and to establish the relation­
ship between outputs and succeeding inputs to the system. Dynamic elements 
of the system are captured by the concept of "feedback," which is essential 
regulative and highlights the concern of Easton's work, which is the persis­
tence of political systems over time as they respond to "stress in their
environments. « 4
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Almond and Powell are more concerned with specifying points of analy­
sis in comparing system behavior, and advocate examining systems according 
to their performance of basic requisite functions.^ In essence the Almond- 
Powell conceptualization is an enlargement upon the Parsonian scheme.
Functions can be divided into; (1) capabilities, (2) conversion, and
(3) system maintenance and adaption functions. The latter refers to the 
relationship between the polity and socialization of its members, and is 
beyond the present concern. A political system's "capabilities" are its 
support. Conversion functions are those necessitated by the aggregation and 
articulation of "interests" and are actual actions of governmental structures 
as they perform rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication.& The 
main concern of this analysis centers upon capabilities functions, especially 
as performed by differing conversion structures. These capabilities functions 
are fourfold: extractive, distributive, regulative, and responsive.^ The
first two merit closer examination.
In characterizing the extractive capability we can 
first consider the amount of resources which flows 
into the government at various levels (national, 
state, local.) The support aspect of extraction 
can also be ascertained--the ratio of extractions 
levied to those obtained, and the willingness of a 
population to provide resources under different 
sets of circumstances.8
Varying structures of government, as viewed in such a structural
functional framework can be compared relative to their taxing efforts.
Likewise, expenditure levels are subject to similar evaluation.
The most relevant measurements of distributive 
capacity must involve the quantity and importance 
of the objects distributed, the areas of human 
life they touch, the particular sections of the 
population receiving various benefits, and the 
relationship between individual needs and govern­
mental distribution to meet those needs.9
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William Mitchell offers a slightly varied structural-functional 
viewpoint, more in the tradition of Parsons. Four functions are "requisite":^®
(1) authoritative specification of systems goals
(2) authoritative resource mobilization
(3) integration of the system
(4) allocation of costs
The structural-functional approaches of Parsons, Almond and Powell 
and Mitchell are most frequently applied to the development of the nation­
state's political system. Much the same type of analysis, albeit with a 
narrower range of functions could well be applied within urban parameters, 
and there is no reason to slight the developmental process. As Mitchell 
has suggested:
the analysis of capabilities also enables us to 
explain and even to predict cycles of short range 
and long range change in response to various kinds 
of environmental pressures.^
Systems and Structural Functional Analysis: Contributions
Toward a Hybrid Urban Model
Although major theorizing has considered the developing nation­
state, minor deviations of Easton's model have guided organization of dis­
parate empirical research in the urban field. Morgan and Kirkpatrick 
successfully apply a systems framework to arrange a diverse amount of urban 
research. They note the use of systems analysis (Eastonian) in separating 
the political from the non-political in examining policy outcomes and feed­
back and in relating the political system to its environment. Also noted 
is the failure of systems analysis in general to deal with power and influ­
ence and its problem of operationalization,^^
Brett Hawkins likewise sees the Eastonian system as a valid organi­
zational device. (Figure 2-2).
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Systems analysis holds that cities can be 
scientifically described and classified in much 
the same way as other phenomenon in the broad 
class "social systems".13
More specifically Hawkins notes the use of systems as a device for viewing
city government:
an interrelated set of structures and processes 
that encounter environmental stimuli and respond 
with "outputs" of goods services and deprivations.
15
Figure 2-2 shows Hawkin's model of urban politics.
14
Figure 2-2.— Hawkin's Model of Urban Politics
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Hawkins,, like Morgan and Kirkpatrick, utilizes "systems" as a 
valuable secondary level organizational level. In actuality, however, the 
use of a systems paradigm in guiding singular research efforts has not 
occurred. The reasons for this reflect the fact that such a paradigm 
(the use of which lies in comparative research) involves operationaliza­
tion of such a wide range of concepts across such a wide spectrum of subject 
areas as to become all but impossible. The limited Dye model employed at 
the state level represents a level of analysis actually valid only as a 
starting point, and can scarcely be called an operationalization of the 
most rudimentary Eastonian system.
Phillip Coulter criticizes the Dye systems approach for a weakness 
in operationalizing variables, especially in relating socio-economic 
cleavages to policy. The causal link between a cleavage and a policy is 
suspect, as is the notion of expenditure as a measure of policy. He suggests 
that one cannot truly consider expenditures as indicators without knowledge 
of within city distribution. Coulter makes a plea for a return to case 
s t u d i e s . W h i l e  this criticism is valid, a return to isolated analysis is 
not the necessary response. The position taken in this chapter is that the 
main explanatory power of "systems theory" as a research paradigm lies in 
consideration of the "time" dimension, and the relation of political outputs 
to a changing environment, especially in conjunction with some operationali­
zation of the decision making process, albeit in "model" form only.
At the local level even less application has been made of structural 
functional than of systems analysis. Kirkpatrick has noted the usefulness 
of systems and structural-functional analysis as an heuristic tool, while 
noting the plaucity of the use of these paradigms for applied research.
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One can only speculate that many of the same reasons prevent both, with 
the former's concern for political development adding to its cumbersome 
fit upon urban political reality. It would seem, however, that performance 
of certain particular urban functional requisites can serve as a meaningful 
gauge of "outputs." Also, Almond and Powell's "capabilities functions," 
notably extractive and distributive can provide wider parameters in which 
to observe the aforementioned systems phenomenon. Such an approach would 
provide the comparison of different "types" of political systems with regard 
to changing environments with respect to the performance of certain urban 
functions (captured by expenditure data).
Two other paradigms merit analysis, however, before a working model 
can be constructed. The above discussion of extractive and distributive 
capabilities leads to a body of policy theory known as "public choice 
analysis," and the basic urban policy literature, notably that which examines 
reformed versus unreformed structures and electoral systems suggests a need 
to examine the effect of a competitive political environment upon functional 
outputs of the system as well as the relationship between competition and the 
extractive and d' .utive capabilities of a local political system. Two 
collateral rese .1 areas therefore merit consideration and inclusion in a 
workable model of municipal expenditures over time: the literature of
economic public choice models and that dealing with electoral competition 
and strategies of those bidding for office.
Public Policy and Economic Models
The study of public policy, which borrows concepts from economics, 
has undergone major theoretical enlargement since 1968 with numerous and 
largely unoperationalized implications for the study of urban policy.
58
The seminal work under this new rubric, now known as "public choice" 
analysis was done by Curry and Wade.^® Policies are determined by bargain­
ing among competing political actors, who are faced with indifference 
curves (functional representations of whatever combinations of two goods,
X and y, are available), Curry and Wade develop an expansion of the thesis 
which relates budget considerations directly to the macro decision-making 
process of the community. Tullock and Buchanon have developed a typology 
which compares citizens relative to their preferences for increased public 
goods or lesser tax s h a v e s . T h e  local political party becomes important 
as the broker which enuciates this choice. Here one can begin to confront 
the Coulter criticism: How does a cleavage become a policy? Parties be­
come significant actors in the scheme.
Policy is visualized as a series of supply-demand contacts between 
the voter (or in economic terms, the consumer) and the competing political 
parties (the supplier). When an exchange relationship occurs, it is assumed 
to be at mutual advantage to all actors concerned. The exchange is formaliz­
ed within the "market" context, which is characterized by:
(a) rules of the system (i.e., the Constitution)
(b) system properties
(c) actors within the system
And Actors are conceptualized as:
(a) beneficiary interest group members
(b) fiduciary interest group members
(c) politicians
(d) spectators
A portion of basic economics must be discussed in light of this 
renaissance of "political economy". Two concepts primia facie to the 
Curry-Wade thesis are production possibility curves and community indifference
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curves. These concepts are important as summary indicators of a political 
community's economy, in terms of what is possible and what is preferred.
The concern here is with the community's "choice," or indifference, within 
the parameters of what is possible. The term "indifference" is employed 
to indicate a degree of "slack" in a community's preferences between two 
items. That is, a city may be willing to lose a certain amount of one 
"good" before demanding an increase in another. One could visualize, on 
the local government level, the following situation as shown in Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-3.--Community Indifference Curve
Police
A
Good A = Police
Good B = Parks, Recreation
Parks
B
In this ideal case, the society deems parks and police as equally important,
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Since the assumption (Figure 2-3) is that more of each service (taken 
by itself) would be desired, the curve slopes downward and to the right.
As the curve extends in either direction from the origin it tends to flatten
p 1
out, as a saturation point when one or the other service is approached.
In this case once a society with the above preferences confronted a situation 
with an excess of police per capita with literally no park area, that society 
would be willing to give up quite a few police for even a small addition to 
the park budget. Any combination of two services could be desired in different 
amounts by different communities. The possibilities of providing such distri­
butions, however, must be confronted before preferences can be enacted.
The indifference curve indicates what benefits 
the individual or community would like to achieve.
But what the community can achieve is a different 
matter.
The graphic device which demonstrates the above is known as the "production-
possibility curve," which:
represents the alternative quantities of x and y 
which can be produced by a given resource endowment 
fully used and combined in the most technologically 
productive manner.23
A particular subset of the above is germane to this study. As Samuel-
son points out the United States is a "mixed economy" with both public and
private sectors.24 On the urban level government expenditures and taxation
represent the "political" segment of the economy as opposed to the "private."
Therefore, every urban political system confronts the following production
possibility curve shown in Figure 2-4.
The community's ability to utilize totally public (no private econony)
and totally private (no government economic activity) is reflected by the
values of the X  and Y intercepts of Figure 2-4. The shape of the curve
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below illustrates, at least for a given society under present conditions, 
the greater efficiency of a mixed economy. A straight line would indicate 
a condition in which any shift of relative public and private spheres would 
not change the actual amount of goods and services possible.
Figure 2-4.--Production Possibility Curve: Mixed Economy
Public Goods 
X
Private Goods
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Another concept introduced to public policy analysis by Curry and 
Wade is the "budget line" (Figure 2-5) which demonstrates the choice of 
public versus private spending by the aggregate citizenry.
Figure 2-5.--Budget Line
Taxes
Private Resources
When the community preference curve, production lossibility curve, 
and budget line are combined, one can obtain a summative picture of a 
political community's aggregate economic picture. (Figure 2-6).
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Figure 2-6.— Public-Private Community Economy
Public
Private
The above community has chosen a 50% public and a 50% private expenditure 
p a t t e r n . T h e  dotted line's intersection with the tangency point with the 
budget line, production possibility curve and community preference (indifference) 
curve indicates an ideal equilibrium reached at a half private, half public 
economy.
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Curry and Wade offer a set of assumptions about the process by which 
a community reaches its "equilibrium point."
(1) The community seeks a particular combination of 
public and private goods.
(2) The community seeks a particular combination of 
public goods and a "particular combination of 
private goods."
(3) The community prefers a greater collection of 
goods to a lesser one.
(4) The resources of a community and the state of 
its technology are fixed in the short run but, 
when fully developed, permit the attainment of
a more preferred position than if any productive 
factor were under utilized.
(5) Legislature social institutions, rules, and 
processes exist to facilitate the full use of 
resources and technology and the democratic
rating of priorities.27
From the above assumptions it is clear that the urban political 
community, in its choice of public versus private economies, manifests an 
aggregate "public choice" subject to the analysis under relevant independent 
political and socio-economic variables. Such a mode of analysis would pro­
vide a powerful measure of the scope of the local political system, as the 
more "public" the economy, the further the reach of the local political 
system into the economic sphere of the community. In Easton's terminology 
the boundaries of the political system have increased relative to the econo­
mic system, for the political system acts as an interchange between the 
social system and the environment. For meaningful analysis one must measure 
outputs of the system over time. As Easton indicates:
There is little validity for continuing to consider 
the outputs as terminal points. They are, rather
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part of a continuous chain of activities, soon 
to be identified as a feedback loop, in which inputs 
and outputs each directly or indirectly effect each 
other . . . All systems seek to adapt constructively, 
at least to some extent, by using, acting upon and 
shaping the conditions to which they are exposed.28
Easton has pointed toward the need of considering the political 
system's interaction with its boundaries. The system under consideration 
can, in effect, be shrunken and e x p a n d e d .29 In the case of this analysis 
the boundaries under consideration will be the interaction of the political 
and economic systems. Changes in the public/private distribution over time 
can shed valuable light upon the reaction of a society's extractive and dis­
tributive functions to a changing environment. One political independent 
variable, the competitiveness of the political environment will be especially 
valid in this regard, as indicated below.
Public Choice, Electoral Competition, and Public Policy
The operationalization of political ethos, and group competition is 
difficult in a systems framework. The literature concerning community 
power, political structures (reformed versus unreformed) and the local 
political climate suggests a one dimensional view of urban systems. At 
one extreme are pluralistic, competitive, group oriented political cultures: 
at the other are more middle class, elite dominated, non-competitive cul­
tures. (Figure 2-7)
The range is labeled "public-private" because, verbally, the compe­
tition between groups in a "contested" electoral atmosphere is "public" while 
a noncompetitive elite system is "private" especially if "political" deci­
sions arc public decisions. The previous discussion of public choice models.
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in which the enlargement of political spectrum is considered in economic 
terms, suggests the following unidimensional representation (Figure 2-8).
Figure 2-7.— A One Dimensional Representation of Urban Political Cultures
Pluralistic Competitive 
Elections
Active Interest Groups
Elitist
Non-Competitive Elections 
Middle Class 
Groups Inactive
Public Political Process Private Political Process
Figure 2-8.--A Hypothetical One Dimensional Political-Economic Solution
Expanded Political System Contracted Political System
Public Economy Private Economy
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The previous suggests grounds for investigation of the relationship 
between the degree of political competition (representative of the "political" 
pole and the proportion of the economy in the public sphere.
Public Goods and Bargaining: Electoral Competition and Duopoly
Politics in its Eastonian "authoritative allocation of values" conno­
tation deals with a revealing and ordering of social preferences. When such 
a process is viewed under the rubric of economic analysis, a possible "ideal 
type" is a market allocation of social goods and services to citizens much 
as a business "free market" would to consumers. The nature of competition 
for government office by parties can be likewise paralleled to competiting 
firms. Political parties are the mechanisms which translate cleavages (if 
any) into policy choices. In the United States the predominance of the two 
party system has historically been viewed as a "market system" offering 
choices to the voter, and democratic only in the sense that the voter is
given some leeway. The choice is "imposed upon" the voter under this rubric
30
rather than the citizens' will being tapped and translated by the party.
A one party system is analagous to a monopoly, with the American two party
31
system a "duopoly," with subsequent deviations from a pure market state.
The pure market state is known as "Pareto Optimality," defined by 
Riker as:
. . . for a given allocation (of goods) in 
comparison with all other allocations, none of 
the other possible ones is at least as good for 
everybody and better for some. Thus if an allo­
cation is Pareto Optimal, no alternative alloca­
tion can improve things for everybody. Any improve­
ment for one must come at the expense of another.3%
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Pareto Optimality represents a difficult consideration because of the
hazy nature of "public goods" consumption. As Samuelson notes:
Public goods are goods which are enjoyed in 
common in the sense that each individuals' 
consumption of such a good leads to no sub­
traction from any other's consumption of that
good.33
Riker also points to inadequacies in the discussion of Pareto Optimality 
as a plausible ideal type, noting that individual preference ordering would 
tend to lead away from a Pareto-Optimal system of public goods allocation 
and must be buttressed by the concept of "bargaining."
Another basic assumption to this mode of analysis is that of voter 
rationality. The prime exponent of electoral competition in terras of 
aggregate voter rationality is Anthony D o w n s . A c c o r d i n g  to the Downsian 
framework, if elections are held under perfect rationality assumptions 
with each competing party would strive for Pareto Optimality (the most 
appealing strategy) an election would be as efficient a method of attaining 
this condition as "the m a r k e t . T h e  basic Downsian model makes use of 
two axioms :
(1) Citizens are preference ordering in terms of public policy.
(2) Candidates' main (only) goal is to be elected.36
The result, according to Stokes, is a unidimensional model.
The root idea of Downs' model is that the alter­
natives of government action on which political 
controversy is focused can be located in a one 
dimensional space . . .  At least for illustration 
Downs interprets this dimension as the degree of 
government intervention in the economy. Each 
voter can be located on the scale according 
to how much government control he wants and 
each party according to how much control it 
advocates.
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Hence Stokes suggests that electoral competition involves the actual size 
of the "public sector," Nevertheless such a unidimensional space, in terms 
of withholding economic goods, is "a priori" constrained. It provides,
38
in absence of individual voter preference curves, a useful conceptual device.
Downs views government spending or withholding of spending as a device within
the two party context, in which parties bargain with the electorate.
The government is likely to adopt any act of . 
spending which, coupled with its financing, is 
a net addition of utility to move voters than
it is a subtraction.39
Thus the offering of public goods, while a viable strategy in competi­
tive, pluralistic, local cultures, could prove a liability in an environment 
in which the electorate could be characterized an homogeneous middle class 
"elitist" culture. The latter non-competitive situation would seem to indi­
cate an appeal to a smaller "public sector." A thorough investigation of 
the urban political process must include a testing of the viability of the 
public choice theorists, electoral competition models, and the relation 
between the two, as well as their connection with the traditional policy 
studies described in chapter one.
Toward a Context of Discovery
Although existing evidence from related studies within the subfield 
of urban policy analysis offers fruit for hypothesis-testing (one could 
merely add the time dimension to the Lineberry-Fowler thesis), further 
propositions can be derived from the purely theoretical pieces discussed in 
the preceding section. Thus the basis for this study is hybrid, drawing 
from untested speculative propositions, as well as a rather disparate body
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of research. The next task in the construction of a workable model must 
be a formulation of testable propositions, later, pending their acceptance 
or rejection, to be cast as interrelated verified statements. Hence, to a 
large degree theory is being built, and a particular "theory" is not being 
tested. As Blalock writes;
It would be highly misleading to suggest that 
theories are first arrived at by a deductive 
process and then tested. The actual process is 
much more fluid than this and undoubtably always 
involves an inductive effort. One formulates 
the best theory he can in the light of existing 
evidence. He then should formalize this theory 
in order to spell out its implications.40
One must first offer testable prepositions, and Blalock suggests a research 
strategy of mathematical formalization of verbal propositions followed by
41
a confrontation of error and finally, the influence of causal relationships.
The desired end result will be a "theory" relative to the subject
matter at hand, or in the case of this study, a theory limited in initial
scope, tying the varyi'ng behavior of cities to differing governmental forms.
Utmost care must be taken so as to arrive at the conclusions which will
add to the above by means of a process which transcends a mere "fulfilling
of prophecy" syndrome. In other words, there must always be an implicit
null hypothesis underlying the entire investigation at each attempt to
link dependent with independent variables. When propositions have been
thus preferred, then proved, bits of theory begin to evolve. "Theory"
in this case defines the parameters of the intent of the investigation, or
municipal expenditure variation. As Sjoberg and Nett point out, theory
refers to a set of logically interrelated "propo­
sitions" or "statements" that are "empirically
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meaningful: as well as to the assumptions the 
researcher makes about his method and his data. 
Thus there are three dimensions to theory in 
science: (1) The broad logical structure, or
the form; (2) The generalizations or propositions 
concerning the patterning of the empirical world 
(the specific content,) and (3) The assumptions 
regarding the scientific method and the nature 
of the data.42
It is clear that Sjoberg and Nett, like Blalock, regard theory construction 
quite apart from the classical "reconstructed logic"43 mode which Kaplan 
describes:
In reconstructed logic, accordingly, theory will 
appear as a device for interpreting, criticizing, 
and unifying established laws, modifying them to 
fit data unanticipated in their formulization and 
guiding the enterprise of discovering new and more 
powerful generalizations. To engage in theorizing 
means not just to learn by experience, but to take 
thought about what there is to be learned.44
While Kaplan is appealing to a strategy of scientific investigation grounded
in an expansion of baisc "covering laws" to include propositions logically
imbedded in the present state of knowledge, the crux of this investigation
must necessarily procédé aldng a course more in the "Contextualist" basis
of i n q u i r y . T h e r e  is simply no existent body of theory from which to
46
derive covering propositions, but there exists a wide range of "theoriz­
ing," (as opposed to theory) from which one can gain a range of plausible 
speculation and derive a scattering of propositions which can, after opera­
tionalization and verification, be combined so as to present a useful pic­
ture of the urban political economy.
Hence, Chapter II has sought to offer a wider theoretical framework 
within which to examine city expenditure as public policy. Complex new
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parameters have been added to any potential analysis. Indeed, new measures 
of city policy are suggested. The position adopted here is that the basic 
questions raised by urban policy analysts need to be approached in much 
a different manner than has heretofore been attempted. First under the 
widened theoretical perspective outlined in this chapter; and secondly, 
with primary emphasis on changes over time. Chapter III will outline 
the research strategy proposed to complete such an analysis.
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the deductivist model."
^^See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 
the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962) for a discussion of the effect of an established 
"paradigm" within which the scientist must work.
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MODEL: HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
While Chapter II developed the theoretical parameters within which 
to approach the research gaps outlined in Chapter I, the purpose of this 
section is to build a public choice model of community environment and 
expenditures, accompanied by a casting of verifiable verbal propositions 
which will outline the boundaries of the volume. Also, these statements 
will be translated into a form relating measurable indicators of control, 
independent, and dependent variables. While general methodological con­
siderations will be discussed in depth, detailed analysis of the specific 
techniques employed will accompany later chapters.
The Development of Research Questions: Three Groups of Hypotheses
Prior to the actual construction of a workable model, there must 
be a concise statement of testable propositions derived from both the 
previous expenditure and policy studies, as well as those derived from 
the theoretical literature detailed previously. Furthermore, the above 
need to be framed in operational terms and implemented by the use of the 
best available indicators. The approach will involve a general topical 
hypothesis under each heading and the develppment of operational inde­
pendent and dependent variables.
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Governmental Form and Government Expenditures; The Temporal 
Dimension and the Dye Model
The major research questions left unanswered by the policy 
literature deal with testing the findings highlighted by Lineberry and 
Fowler, but in a context of the reaction of cities with reformed or un­
reformed structures to changes in their socio-economic environment. The 
question is not "Are reform governments different?" but "Do they react 
differently?"
Figure 3-1.— The Classic Policy Model: Environment, Political System
and Policy
PolicyEnvironment
Political System
Figure 3-1 depicts the classic model for policy analysis as pri­
marily developed by Dye in which the researcher seeks to determine the 
variation in the dependent variable which can be attributed uniquely to 
variations in the political independent variables. This model, however, 
assumes that the analyst is interested in isolating "unique" variance and 
specifying the nature of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables within the variance left "unexplained" by the socio­
economic variables which are tacitly considered "prior" to both political 
structure and output measures. Rather than a process of "arrow testing" 
(Figure 3-1) which tests the relative importance of political versus non­
political factors in determining policy, the focus of this investigation 
will be a comparison of system performance.
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The position adopted here is that, as critics of the Dye model 
have noted,^ conditions do not cause policy. In the classical sense any 
partialling technique fails to stastically approach existent conditions. 
Rather, the covariance of socio-economic conditions and policy output is 
a proper subject for examination. Different types of political systems 
(reformed, unreformed) will exhibit different patterns of covariance.
The research question, as outlined in Table 3-1, is to examine how differ­
ent types of structures react to different types of environmental pres­
sures. In this way, prior Influences on adoption of particular structures
by differing cities removes the tautological dangers of the reformism 
2
debate. It would be of little use to discover that those cities with 
homogeneous socio-economic environments tax and spend less, take on re­
formed structures and continue to tax and spend less, thus enabling the 
inference that reformed structures bring on less taxing and spending.
If the structure is taken as a constant (control variable) within which 
the covariation between the independent variable (changes in environment) 
and dependent variable (changes in expenditure) can be analyzed, prior 
influences on structure and expenditure levels can be minimized. Table 
3-1 demonstrates a tabular representation of this general research 
strategy. The relationship between spending and environment is subject 
to analysis under reformism as a control variable.
Varying levels of measurement can be employed to gauge the basic 
control variable (reformed structure). For instance, Lineberry and Fowler
3
utilize a reformism index which they treat as an interval measure. The 
independent and dependent variables will almost always be intervally 
scaled. Whichever level of reformism measurement is employed, however.
Table 3-1.— Tabular Representation of the Major Research Areas: Reformism as Control Variable
Unreformed Government Reformed Government
Changes in
Expenditure
Level
More More 
Homogeneous Unchanged Heterogeneous 
Environment Environment Environment
More
Homogeneous
Environment
More
Unchanged Heterogeneous 
Envi ronment. Environment
Less Expend.
Same Expend.
More Expend.
GO
o
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the research approach here will be to examine the behavior of different 
types of urban political systems in response to varying pressures from a 
changing environment. The major indicators of political output will be 
the pattern of changes in trends of taxation and spending.
The first set of hypotheses is drawn from the above discussion in 
light of the traditional urban policy literature described in Chapter I.
Hypotheses ;
Group 1^
(A) Since the literature indicates a greater 
responsiveness on the part of non-reformed govern­
ments, those cities with non-reform structures 
will exhibit more response to socio-economic 
environmental change than their reformed counter­
parts, with regard to functional expenditures.
(B) Since reformed structures are more 
"efficient" than unreformed structures, increases 
in expenditures in the former will be more closely 
tied to increases in taxation.
The state policy literature indicates a possible tendency for policy 
makers, through their interaction, to follow the policy guidance of both 
regional and national policy leaders.^ This fact, when coupled with the 
"regional ethos" explanation offered by Wolfinger and Field,^ offers
other general hypotheses.
Group 1
B
(C) City expenditure patterns will tend to 
become more alike within regions over time.
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Expenditures and Public Choice Models; General Hypotheses
The research questions posed above, while effective measures of 
political system activity within the context of differing structures 
and environments, cannot tap the basic parameters of the political system: 
Its scope relative to the community economy. Theoretically, local gov­
ernments, through taxation and spending, can enlarge their economic 
sphere to Include almost all economic activity, and even with the Insti­
tutional and cultural limits placed by national, political, social, and 
historical norms, a wide room for variation exists. The basic research 
question relative to this section and derived, not from political research, 
but from public choice theory. Is:
Do different types of local political systems act 
differently by Increasing their "extractive" and 
"distributive" capabilities; more specifically, 
by enlarging their "public sector?"
Figure 3-2 shows community Indifference curves for two cities.
The curved line closer to the axes formed by the "public" and "private" 
lines Indicates the mixes of public and private economic activity possible 
for cities with smaller economies. The longer curve depicts the same for 
larger cities. Although different curves exist for different total 
economies, cities will differ within each economic group relative to their 
points on the curve. The research strategy Is, therefore, an examination 
of which kinds of social and political forces determine placement on the 
curve.
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Figure 3-2.— A Public Choice Depiction of Two Cities' Economies
Public
Private
Larger cities will have curves further from the origin.
Another set of hypotheses follows from the above discussion.
Hypotheses ;
Group 2
(A) Cities with reformed structures will 
show a tendency toward a smaller public sector 
than those with unreformed structures.
(B) As stress in the environment increases 
over time, cities will show a tendency toward 
an "equilibrium" government spending limit 
relative to their total.
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Electoral Competition and Bargaining ; General Hypotheses
The third focus of analysis involves an effort to assess the effects 
of political factors of the governmental form on policy variation by in­
cluding a measure of local political competition in the model. Again, 
concerns stem not so much from generated findings as from general theory, 
in this case a mixing of the "competition" writings of Riker and 
Ordeshook^ and the public choice theories.
Public policy research to this point has omitted any real consider­
ation of policy measures as the direct result of previous political 
activity. The view adopted here is that there is a means to gauge the 
performance of governments in terms of the conditions surrounding their 
elections and electoral climate. This enables a test of propositions re­
garding the behavior of "reformed" and "unreformed" structures and their 
relationship with the electorate.
Hypotheses;
Group 3
(A) The existence of a more competitive local 
political environment should accompany that of 
unreformed structures.
(B) The more competitive the local political 
environment, the larger the "public" sector of 
the economy. (In bargaining for votes in a 
pluralist, competitive "market," public goods 
are offered.)
(C) The less competitive the local environment, 
the less taxation (and expenditure) can be expected.
(A middle class, non-competitive environment would 
reward appeals to keep taxing and spending down
and economic activity private.) Reformed Government.
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(D) If a competitive condition exists at Time (A) 
expenditures should demonstrate an increase at 
Time (A+10). Unreformed Government.
The above hypotheses are unique in their treatment of the temporal 
dimension of the functioning political system.
The next task will be the development of a model of municipal ex­
penditure analysis through which the above hypotheses can be tested.
Figure 3-3 depicts a general working model of the changing 
political economy in relation to the changing socio-economic and political 
environment. Points of investigation (P...) demonstrate the relationship 
between the various groups of hypotheses.
Pq = Governmental Form— The basic control independent 
variable (Group 1-A)
P^ = The perceptions of and response of local decision 
makers to regional and national trends (Group 1-B)
Pg = The expansion of government into the community 
economic space and relative functional changes 
(Group 2)
P^ = The appeals made to the electorate by those holding 
and competing for office in order to attain public 
office (Group 3)
P^ = The reaction of decision makers to a changing socio­
economic environment
Generally, the dependent variable will be P^, and it can be con­
sidered a function of P^ and P^ with differing patterns exhibited for
variations of P q . In equation form . . .
For P q (reformed) Pg time (A+1) = P^-B ( Time) +  P^ (Time A) +  P^ (eq. #1)
For Pq (unreformed) Pg time (A+1) = P^-B ( Time) + Pg (Time A) +  P^ (eq. //2)
Verbally: The expansion of the Government into the urban economy
is a function of national and regional trends as perceived by decision
86
Figure 3-3.— The Urban Political System: A Temporal Model
Urban Socio-Political Environment 
Socio-Economic Cleavages
Total Urban Economic System 
Public + Private Economic Activity
Scope of Local Government Economy Activity
P4
Political Structures
Decision-Making Environment
Urban Decision-Makers
Government
Time A Time (A+1)
Role A Role B
Appeal to 
Electorate
Binding
Decisions
P3
I
Functional
Expenditures
i r :  I
Total I  
Expenditures [
I
Taxation
PI
Political Cleavages (Competitiveness)
Regional
+
National
Trends
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makers and dictated by the increasing homogeneity of the national political 
culture, enactment of appeals made at previous elections, and changes in 
the socio-economic environment. Because it is hypothesized (Group 3) that 
reformed, non-competitive structures encourage appeals for less spending, 
should be negative value for (eq. #1), while positive for (eq. #2).
This conception of the urban system is a hybrid of general systems 
and structural-functional approaches. The political system can be best 
seen in its movement into the total urban economic space, and the nature 
of this movement can best be measured by the operation of the extractive 
and distributive functions. The systems concept provides a framework in 
which to envision changes in both environment and political activity, 
whereas the functional examination offers reliable indicators for com­
parison.
Selection of Cities
The first consideration must be the choice of cities. The maximum 
number of cities was sought consistent with the availability of data.
The main source of city political and economic measures is the County and 
City Data Book.^ Data availability has increased sharply beginning with 
the volumes following the 1950, 1960 and 1970 census efforts. Prior to 
1950, information concerning cities makes analysis of this type impossible. 
The County and City Data Book includes information for cities above 25,000. 
Hence for a city to be subject to analysis from 1950 through 1970, it must 
have had a population of at least 25,000 for all three periods. Other 
sources of data include cities of 50,000 population in 1960. The criteria 
for the selection of cities for this analysis, therefore, requires a
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population of at least 25,000 in 1950 and 50,000 in 1960. These 
restrictions provide 285 cities; all cities fitting the above are in­
cluded in the analysis. Statistical analysis, therefore, will not be 
inferential, as the 285 cities represent a population of all cities just 
described. Throughout this volume tests of significance will not be 
employed, however, amounts of variance explained and unexplained by sets 
of independent variables will be given. Significance of statistical 
tests must be considered relative to other constructs and to a degree of 
explanatory power substantively significant within the contest of explana­
tion.
Selection of Variables
The initial selection of variables from the hundreds of measures 
listed in the County and City Data Book was based upon the criteria of 
usefulness, relevance to the hypotheses, and comparability. This led to 
a search for a range of socio-economic and economic descriptors suggested 
by previous research and the hypotheses of this chapter. The information 
available for the three census periods revealed a paucity of comparable 
independent and dependent variables. In order to meet a goal of maximum 
comparability the ICON (index construction) program of the OSIRIS
g
statistical package was employed. Only when variables were of absolute 
importance was the comparability criterion waived and variables unavail­
able for one time period computed for the other two. This step was 
necessary for certain expenditure items.
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Table 3-2.— City Background and Output Measures
Region
State
Geographical Region (census-4) 
Elazar's Political Culture 
(Sharkansky)
Political Process - Politization
Number of Mayors 1960-1970 
Percent Registered Voting (60) 
Percent Adults Voting (60)
City Type (1960)
Employing City - presence/absence 
Dormitory City - presence/absence 
Balanced City - presence/absence 
Central City - presence/absence 
Independent City - 
presence/absence 
Suburb - presence/absence
Political Climate (County)
Percent Democratic - President 
1960
Percent Republican - President 
1960
Percent Republican - President 
1964
Percent Republican - President 
1968
Percent AIP - President 1968
City History 
City Age (years)
Year City reached 10,000 popula­
tion
Year City reached 20,000 popula­
tion
Political Output
Size Planning Staff - 1960 
Year of First Poverty Program 
Year of First Housing Project 
Floridation Action - 
absence/presence 
Administration Floridation Action 
presence/absence 
Floridation Rejection - 
àb sence/p resence 
Date of first HUD Application 
Date of first HUD Contract
Political Culture (1960)
City Run School System (1950) - 
absence/presence 
Mayor-Council - absence/presence 
City Manager - absence/presence 
Had Partisan Election - 
absence/presence 
Number City Councilman 
Number of City Council at Large 
Percent of City Council at Large
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The aforementioned variables were combined with city background
9
variables, most of which were gathered from the Alford and Aiken and 
Binghara^^ data sets. As shown in Table 3-2, these include regional, 
historical and structural characteristics of each city, as well as 
political structure, process, electoral climate, and output measures.
Table 3-3 includes measures of the state's socio-economic and political 
environment and are included for two reasons: (1) to provide a test of
the relationship of "within state variation" to "between state variation"; 
and (2) to operationalize a behavioral dimension which captures state 
Progressivism.
Table 3-3.— State Socioeconomic and Political Environmental 
Measures For Each City
Socioeconomic Political
Affluence Factor Score - 1960 Interparty Competition
Affluence Factor Score - 1970 Innovation (Walker)
Affluence Change (1960-1970) Redistribution (Booms and Halderson)
Industrialization Factor Score 1960 Legislative Professionalism (Grumm)
Industrialization Factor Score 1970 Legislative Responsiveness (Sutton)
Industrialization Change (1960-1970)
Table 3-4 contains the census independent variable set, divided 
into socio-economic conditions, employment descriptors, housing conditions, 
and economic activity sections. All variables from the three census 
periods were subject to a five-fold expansion prior to any further analysis. 
Besides the three time periods (1950, 1960, 1970), also the change in the 
measure was computed twice (1950-1960) and (1960-1970). Table 3-6 shows 
this expansion.
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Aside from the total expenditure and selected functional 
expenditure totals each dependent variable (Table 3-5) is figured on a 
per capita and percentage of total expenditure base for functional items. 
Revenue variables, though usually employed as prior to expenditure and 
thus an independent variable, is considered "dependent" on socio­
economic and city type variables. Certain functions are considered In 
tandom only because of data availability considerations. Dependent var­
iables are expanded In the same manner as the census independent measures. 
(See Table 3-6.) While the initial dataset will include all aforementioned 
variables, those included in the working model will be much fewer. At 
all times the deletion of variables will be clearly described and justi­
fied.
Methodological Considerations
While the items in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 will be employed as displayed,
11
each of the subsets shown in Table 3-6 will be factor analyzed sepa­
rately with the outcome "reduced" clusters of variables, each independent 
of other clusters from the same group. In effect new concise measures 
are created summarizing a multiplicity of related variables. The desired
result is a simplicity of description accounting for an acceptable amount
12
of variation among the measures. Principal components of each group 
are thus obtained with the ideal a tradeoff between simplicity and ex­
planatory power. Wherever possible within the above constraints, an equal 
number of factors will be extracted from each group. The relationships 
among the factors of the different time periods will allow a concise 
description of the dimensions of change among independent variables-and
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Table 3-4.— Socioeconomic, Employment and Economic Activity Measures 
1950, 1960, 1970
Socioeconomic Economic Activity
Population Number of Retail Trade
Population Rank Establishments
Percent Black Population Retail Trade Sales
Percent Population Increase Retail Food Sales
(1950, 1960) (1960-1970) Percent Retail Trade in Food
Percent Black Population Increase Eating and Drinking Sales
(1950, 1960) (1960-1970) Percent Retail Sales in Eating
Land Area and Drinking
Density Wholesale Trade Sales
Percent Under 5 Years Old Number Manufacturing
Percent Under 65 Years Old Establishments
Median Age Value Added by Manufacturing
Birth/1000 Population Number Employed in Manufacturing
Deaths/1000 Population Manufacturing Salary and Wages
Number of Families Number Production Workers
Median Family Income Production Workers’ Salary and
Percent Below Low Income Wages
(2,000-1950; 5,000-1960; Bank Deposits (1950, 1960)
7,500-1970) Bank Demand Accounts (1950, 1960)
Percent Above High Income Aggregate City Income
(5,000-1950; 10,000-1960; (1960, 1970)
15,000-1970) Per Capita Income (1960, 1970)
Percent Under Grade School
Education
Percent Over High School
Education
Log (population)
Hospitals/1000
Hospital Beds/1000
Employment Housing Conditions
Number Civilian Labor Force Number of Housing Units
Number Employed Civilian Labor Median Rooms/Unit
Force Percent Units Under 10 Years Old
Percent Employed in Construction Number of Occupied Units
Percent Employed in Manufacturing Percent Owner Occupied Units
Percent Employed in White Collar Median Value of Owner Occupied
Occupations Units
Employee/Population Ratio
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Table 3-5.— Revenue and Expenditure Measures (1950-1960-1970)
Expenditure - City Government
Total Expenditure 
Expenditure Per Capita
Public Safety (fire and police) Expenditures
Public Safety Percent of Total Expenditure
Public Safety Per Capita Expenditure
Education Expenditure
Education Percent of Total Expenditure
Education Per Capita Expenditure
Public Welfare Expenditure
Public Welfare Percent of Total Expenditure
Public Welfare Per Capita Expenditure
Health and Hospitals Expenditure (1950, 1960)
Health and Hospitals Percent of Total Expenditure (1950, 1960) 
Health and Hospitals Per Capita Expenditure (1950, I960) 
Highways Expenditure (1960, 1970)
Highways Percent of Total Expenditure (1960, 1970)
Highways Per Capita Expenditure (1960, 1970)
Sanitation Expenditure (1960, 1970)
Sanitation Percent of Total Expenditure (1960, 1970)
Sanitation Per Capita Expenditure (1960, 1970)
City Payroll Per Capita
Number of City Employees Per Capita
Revenue - City Government
Total Revenue 
Revenue Per Capita 
Taxes
Property Taxes 
Taxes Per Capita 
Intergovernmental Revenue 
Percent Revenue Intergovernmental 
Per Capita Intergovernmental Revenue
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allow for one to compare dimensions of independent variable change 
with changes in dependent variables.
Table 3-6.— Expansion of the Census Variable Sets Into Change Measures
Original Measures Change Measures
1950 value 1960 value - 1950 value
1960 value 1970 value - 1960 value
1970 value
Factor analysis will not be performed on the dependent variables; 
any gain in parsimony will not offset a loss in the precision demanded 
here. The major dependent variable salient to the outlined hypotheses 
are spending measures relative to the communities total wealth (GNP 
surrogate). Percentage figures which tap the within-community distribu­
tion of spending are subject to separate analysis.
Control Measures; Avoiding Fallacy
Recently concern has been expressed regarding the potential fallacy 
of examining expenditure variations between cities because of the differ­
ing responsibilities of cities relative to the county in which the city 
is located. In addition, states vary in their assignment of state-local 
expenditure responsibility. The main item thus affected is school ex­
penditure. Many cities do not run their own school systems, but lie 
within independent school districts which collect revenue and administer 
schools separately. Since education expenditures are such a substantial 
proportion of total expenditures, cities within these independent districts
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will show correspondingly less total expenditure. Leibert has shown 
that although similar responsibility variation occurs in welfare, high­
ways, and hospital expenditures, the presence or absence of a city-run 
school system acts as an acceptable "surrogate" for city responsibility 
for these items. Hence, the nature of a city's school system takes on 
enormous power of explanation.
The best available indicator for the above distinction is the 
nature of the city's school system in 1950. It is safe to assume that 
few, if any, cities changed the legal responsibility for education within 
the twenty year period under consideration. This information was used to 
create a variable "presence or absence of city-run schools," coded 1 or 
0 for inclusion in these respective categories. This "dummy" variable^^ 
can be used as a control in which case cities in one category are ana­
lyzed separately from cities in the other. In certain cases this measure 
can be employed as an independent variable in multiple regression 
a n a l y s i s . H o w e v e r ,  one is in danger of falling into a pit of tautolo­
gies if utmost care is not taken in the latter case. For instance, it 
would be of little use to predict less total expenditures in cases where 
the major functional expenditure item is absent.
Here it must be noted that it is difficult to make comparisons 
between cities relative to expenditures on any functional expenditure 
breakdown because of jurisdictional differences. Therefore the major 
emphasis of this work will be on change. In a real sense cities are 
compared relative to their own past spending and fallacies of false 
comparability are avoided. Likewise, the performance of "reformed" versus 
"unreformed" structures can be accurately gauged. The problem is clear;
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since certain cities tend to adopt reform structures can differences in 
performance found at a given point in time be fairly attributed to those 
structures? Or are these structures, like their performances, indicators 
of patterns of behavior manifest by a category of municipalities? By 
measuring change only prior influences are, in effect, cancelled out.
The question is not whether cities are different, but whether they react 
differently.
Other control measures must be used to guard against inferring 
causal relationships between sets of variables at the wrong level of 
analysis. These include region and governmental form. Often statistical 
control cannot unravel tangled patterns of causal relationships (note the 
Wolfinger and Field versus Lineberry and Fowler controversy), but careful 
partitioning of variance, (accompanied by explicit theorizing) will mini­
mize commission of logical fallacies. Also included in the control 
variable set (and also available for multivariate model building) is a 
measure of the "exploitation thesis" mentioned in Chapter I— the employee- 
population ratio. Combinations of these control variables will enable 
within and between-group analysis of independent variable-dependent 
variable covariation.
Organization of the Study
The remaining chapters will focus upon in-depth analysis of the 
relationships discussed in this chapter.
Chapter IV will concentrate on isolating the dimensions of socio­
economic change from 1950 to 1970 and relating this change to the 
political, historical, and control variables displayed in Table 3-1.
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The total socioeconomic picture of the cities from 1950 to 1970 will be 
analyzed. The purpose of Chapter IV in short, will be to provide a concise 
a description as possible of the changing conditions of the American city.
Chapter V will attempt an exhaustive study of regional trends among 
dependent variable measures. The purpose here shall be to see if cities 
are in fact becoming "more alike" both nationally and regionally.
Chapter VI will test the major hypotheses of the study— the differing 
behaviors of reformed versus unreformed structures in response to the chang­
ing environment depicted in Chapter IV. Chapter VII will consist of a 
listing and evaluation of our hypotheses and will attempt to place the 
findings of this study into the perspective of relevant literature.
98
NOTES
See especially Phillip Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics 
and Public Policy: Problems in Theory and Research," in David R. Morgan
and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, eds.. Urban Political Analysis (Free Press:
New York, 1972), pp. 370-382.
2
Again reference is to the actual causes of manifestations of 
reformed structures. Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos 
and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review 
LV (1966), 306-326.
o
Robert L. Lineberry and Edmond P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public 
Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review LVI 
(1967), 701-716 utilize a reformism score which consists of 
the number of "reformed" structures a city possesses.
4
The diffusion of innovations is a present point of controversy, 
notably the rate and nature of diffusion. See Jack L. Walker, "The 
Diffusion of Innovations in the American States," American Political 
Science Review LVIXI (1969), 880-889, and Virginia Gray,
"Innovation in the States," American Political Science Review, LXVII 
(1973).
^Wolfinger and Field, p. 715-716.
^William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to 
Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1973) and the work cited in Chapter II.
Bureau of the Census, The County and City Data Book (Washing­
ton D.C.; Government Printing Office) is a compendium of selected items 
for states, regions, cities and counties published every five years.
8
See Osiris III (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Political Studies,
1973), pp. 317-347.
Q
Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and 
Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American Political Science
Review LXIV (1970),843-864 have made available background variables 
for the above study, utilized in Table 3-1.
^^Richard D. Bingham,"Federal Grants to Local Governments: Patterns
of Use and Effects of Public Housing and Urban Renewal," Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Oklahoma, 1973.
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Factor analysis has two major purposes: (1) A description of
dimensions underlying a phenomenon; and (2) Creation of new measures 
for use in later analysis. See Harry H. Harmon, M o d e m  Factor Analysis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), Chapters 1-2.
12
Principal components analysis is the method of factoring a 
correlation matrix with unities in the diagonals.
13
Roland Leibert, "Municipal Functions, Structures and Expendi­
tures," Social Science Quarterly LIV (1974), 765-783.
^^Dummy variables are dichotomous indicators indicating the 
presence or absence of an attribute. In special cases this is an 
"interval" level of measurement. See Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics 
2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 498-502.
^^Multiple regression analysis considers a number of intervally 
measured independent variables taken together to predict variance in 
an interval dependent variable. See N. R. Dryer and H. Smith, Applied 
Regression Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), chapters
5-10.
CHAPTER IV
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE 
IN AMERICAN CITIES FROM 1950-1970
Chapters I through III have established the parameters of the study 
of public choice in the urban political system. The system is constantly 
adapting itself to its changing environment. Before the changes in poli­
tical system variables can be properly gauged, therefore, it is necessary 
to fully describe the socioeconomic climate at each time period as well 
as to fully understand the nature and pattern of changes occurring within 
the.entire time period (1950 to 1970). This chapter will fully describe 
the dynamics of change in the urban social and economic environment during 
this twenty year span.
A Methodology of Social Change 
The researcher attempting an exhaustive description of social and 
economic conditions is immediately struck by a plethora of indicators; 
some are obviously crucial (percent nonwhite), while numerous others seem 
minor variations on the same social theme (median school years and per­
cent completing high school). The situation confronting a time series 
analyst is compounded by slightly differing measures at different time 
periods. The goal here is to obtain comparable measures at each of the 
three census periods, measures which encompass as wide a range of social 
and economic phenomena as possible in as parsimonious a form as possible. 
Table 3-4 contains the complete list of social and economic indicators
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collected for the study. Three variables are of paramount importance in 
light of findings highlighted in Chapter I. These are population, employee/ 
population ratio, and percent nonwhite.^ These will be included in their 
existing form in analyses of each period. Twenty-two other variables are 
available at each census. Here one must confront methodological road­
blocks and theoretical considerations which prevent arbitrary choosing of 
indicator variables from these twenty-two.
The first step is a reduction of this mass of independent variables 
by a mathematically sound criterion. There are two reasons for following 
this strategy. First, it makes little sense to choose a measure, and use 
it in "causal" terms when it could just have easily been replaced by a 
similar measure. Second, a mathematical reduction of a highly intercor­
related group of measures to a smaller, unrelated, statistically indepen-
p
dent set, circumvents the problem of multicollinearity. Since later anal­
yses will relate political consequences to social and economic causes we 
must think in terms of the usefulness of the reduced variable set of pre­
dictors in a regression equation. When regression techniques are employed 
the elements of the left side of the equation should be largely independent 
or unrelated to each other, or kept "orthogonal" to each other so that the 
effects of each variable can be gauged uniquely. The technique of factor 
analysis can be used to "reduce" the twenty-two variables to a more manage­
able set. The researcher using this technique to create new variables is 
still confronted with problems, however. He must choose between a larger 
number of variables which capture a larger amount of the variance of the 
original set or a smaller number of more parsimonious indicators which 
capture less of the original variation. Since we are looking for optimum
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comparability between time periods an equal number of factors extracted 
from each census is a further consideration. There are numerous computer 
algorithms which aid in this decision. One, Kaiser's criterion,^ stops 
extracting factors when the lambda value falls below 1.000. Table 4-1 
shows that the lambda statistic falls below this figure after five factors 
for 1950 and 1960 and six in 1970. Other options include the scree tech­
nique,^ which allows a visual scanning of the amount of variance explained 
by each factor extraction and subsequent ceasing of factoring when the 
percent of variance explained by the succeeding factoring falls off sharply. 
Table 4-1 shows this point to occur after four factors. The judgment here 
is that the additional 4 to 5 percent added by the fifth factor does not 
outway the loss of simplicity that the additional dimension would entail. 
Thus the twenty-two variables are reduced to four measures from each time 
period. The three additional aforementioned variables have been held out 
of this procedure because their implementation as distinct measures is 
desired.
1950, 1960, and 1970 Four Factor Solutions 
The resulting four factor solutions from the above analyses can be 
seen in Tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4. The solutions are quite similar; in fact 
they suggest the same labeling of each dimension. The first column repre­
sents an "Income Factor" (the higher loadings within the boxes represent 
correlations of the variable with the factor). Educational measures also 
load on this factor. In all three census periods wealthy cities with a 
more highly educated populace tend to co-occur as do poorer, less educated 
cities. In 1960 (Table 4-3) these cities also have a high proportion of 
white collar workers, whereas in 1950 and 1970 (Tables 4-2 and 4-3) white
Table 4-1.— Principal Components for 1950, 1960 and 1970 Factor Analysis of Twenty-Two
Independent Variables (employment/population ratio, population, percent non-white 
omitted from analysis): Criteria for Choice of Solutions (1-6 Factors)
Lambda Percent of Explained 
Variance
Cumulative Percent
1950 1960 1970 1950 1960 1970 1950 1960 1970
1 5.909 5.803 5.337 26.86 26.83 24.26 26.86 26.38 24.26
2 4.359 5.803 5.124 19.81 24.85 23.29 46.67 51.22 47.55
3 3.320 2.659 2.621 15.09 12.09 11.92 61.77 63.31 59.47
4 1.844 1.780 2.000 8.38 8.09 9.09 70.15 76.07 68.56
5 1.059 1.029 1.257 4.82 4.68 5.71 74.96 80.47 74.28
6 0.932 0.967 1.020 4.24 4.40 4.64 79.20 80.47 78.91
Table 4-2.—  Variraax Factor Analysis of Twenty-Two Independent Variables for 1950 (minus
population, percent non-white, employment/population ratio)
Income Age Employment Density H
Land Area
Median Family Income 
Percent Below Low Income 
Percent Above High Income 
Median School Years 
Percent Under Grade School 
Percent Over High School 
Median Value Owner Occupied Unit 
Percent Under 5 Years of Age 
Percent Over 65 Years of Age 
Median Age 
Births/1000 
Deaths/1000
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old 
Percent Retail Trade (food)
Percent Employed at Construction 
Percent Employed at Manufacturing 
Percent Employed as White Collar 
Median Rooms/Unit 
Density
Percent Owner Occupied
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
-0.01440
0.92228 
-0.78520 
0.91139 
0.75633 
-0.74042 
0.78402 
0.76574
0,04198
0.01641
0.01781
0.05576
-0.07825
0.29165
-0.10584
-0.09207
-0.16348
0.27199
-0.49548
0.10738
-0.46080
-0.00807
-0.42446
-0.03243
-0.22726
0.13798
0.39464
-0.28539
-0.29923
0.21679
0.79340
-0.90942
-0.78004
0.42739
-0.80691
0.67678
-0.01362
-0.07826
0.02096
-0.22959
-0.04945
-0.45201
0.34030
0.01547
0.01837
0.17253
0.29306
0.09803
0.34262
0.00408
-0.18140
-0.37329
0.57645
-0.69907
0.90736
-0.84839
0.58650
0.01241
0.32888
0.05176
-0.21891
0.10037
-0.15524
0.24633
0.09816
0.12695
25.04 22.56 14.17
0.30275
- 0.01120
0.04378
0.08679
-0.23829
0.28737
-0.19865
0.40942
-0.36158
-0.06306
0.24855
-0.38942
-0.00304
-0.21750
0.21900
-0.15207
0.07837
0.24161
-0.25179
"05556"
-0.74524
0.60376
.12035 
.92496 
.86427 
.85280 
.84733 
.71588 
.84552 
.76350 
.81206 
.85618 
.82641 
.46874 
.74310 
.75664 
.50567 
.62946 
.82958 
.84080 
.63257 
.50510 
.68327 
.40792
Percent of Total Variance 8.38 70.15
Table 4-3.— Varimax Factor Analysis of Twenty-Two Independent Variables for 1960 (minus
population, percent non-white, employee/population ratio)
Income Age Employment Density H
Land Area
Median Family Income 
Percent Below Low Income 
Percent Above High Income 
Median School Years 
Percent Under Grade School 
Percent Over High School 
Median Value Owner Occupied Unit 
Percent Under 5 Years of Age 
Percent Over 65 Years of Age 
Median Age 
Blrths/lOOO 
Deaths/1000
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old 
Percent Retail Trade (food)
Percent Employed at Construction 
Percent Employed at Manufacturing 
Percent Employed as White Collar 
Median Rooms/Unit 
Percent Owner Occupied 
Density
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
0.04691
0.82248
-0.64420
0.88126
0.84719
■0.67173
0.88244
0.74574
0.22199
-0.06379
0.05638
-0.08254
0.14732
0.17357
0.14776
-0.19271
-0.18473
0.50395
-0.64245
0.23367
-0.24868
-0.17068
-0.28795
0.19604
-0.25920
0.02860
0.17231
-0.24990
-0.34823
0,43360
0.85699
-0.90929
-0.90232
0.75656
-0.84786
0.63525
0.02198 
-0.11225 
0.08756 
-0.13740 
-0.03300 
-0.32196
0.02866 0.08514 0.65135
0.07364 0.45494 -0.63793
-0.02953 -0.02261 0.84811
0.83479 -0.06418 -0.32177
0.04429 -0.18401 0.21728
0.26107 0.34200 0.15907
-0.08384 -0.40117 0.34150
-0.04552 -0.35678 0.20106
-0.26609 
0.05447 
-0.12911 
-0.09116 
0.21274 
-0.34200 
0.16411 
rO.42323 
0.16366 
-0.00284 
-0.11512 
0.01003 
-0.01904 
0.05876 
0.04505 
0.05449 
0.09115 
0.03713
0.72844
0.73315
-0.49680
-0.57722
.15641 
.93748 
.84732 
.84635 
.84654 
.62744 
.91039 
.81081 
.82899 
.84023 
.86479 
.65382 
.84158 
.69886 
.43434 
.62232 
.72897 
.81429 
.61366 
.74793 
.53140 
.50298
o
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Percent of Total Variance 24.17 22.70 12.10 12.43 71.40
Table 4 - 4 -Varimax Factor Analysis of Twenty-Two Independent Variables for 1970 (minus
population, percent non-white, employee/population ratio)
Income Age Employment Density H
Land Area
Median Family Income 
Percent Below Low Income 
Percent Above High Income 
Median School Years 
Percent Under Grade School 
Percent Over High School 
Median Value Owner Occupied Unit 
Percent Under 5 Years of Age 
Percent Over 65 Years of Age 
Median Age 
Births/1000 
Deaths/1000
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old 
Percent Retail Trade (food) 
Percent Employed at Construction
0.00141
0.92098
-0.85872
0.90677
0.75760
-0.70426
0.79906
0.74203
0.18300
0.03100
-0.06427
-0.02686
0.01396
0.19077
0.02158
-0.01137
-0.28106
-0.08351
0.08568
-0.45793
-0.41179
0.26040
0.11236
-0.26068
-0.06610
0.81046
-0.88886
-0.86702
0.62784
-0.77623
0.40375
0.08142
0.13007
0.08500
-0.24780
0.28184
-0.40739
0.04641
-0.42650
-0.01351
-0.46814
-0.00067
0.11159
0.05001
0.14989
-0.14587
0.14338
-0.67571
0.53367
-0.60866
0.88007
-0.01358
0.01673
0.07819
0.16962
-0.26873
0.30663
-0.14544
0.49636
-0.17350
0.21158
0.23440
0.06672
0.18396
-0.04051
-0.03315
-0.22023
-0.08316
Percent Employed as White Collar 
Median Rooms/Unit 
Percent Owner Occupied 
Density
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
0.03779
0.05540
0.10751
0.01356
0.02336
0.42629
0.01449
0.12912
-0.16162
-0.29975
-0.11905
0.21096
-0.02892
0.44159
0.05253
-0.54341
-0.72977
-0.87988
0.64794
0.52742
.64262
.58034
.80326
.64114
.37133
Percent of Total Variance 24.98 18.97 18.84 10.38 68.51
.15464 
.92887 
.91362 
.85387 
.82827 
.62657 
.87927 
.80360 
.77839 
.84432 
.83672 
.62961 
.82651 
.68905 
.30536 
.50385 
.79147
o
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collar employment is unrelated to the wealth and education of a city. The 
second factor in each set is an "Age" factor, which ranges from cities 
with an older population and a higher proportion of deaths to a younger 
population living in new structures. Note, however, that by 1970 the age 
of the housing units has become less related to the age of the population 
than to the third factor labeled "Employment." This factor ranges from 
cities with a high proportion of the work force in construction to those 
with many employed in manufacturing. (These latter cities have a greater 
proportion of their retail trade in food.) The final factor is a housing 
factor labeled "Density." Generally this represents a dimension ranging 
from crowded rental living quarters to owner occupied private housing.
These four dimensions can be thought of as simplified measures of these 
described social and economic conditions. Later factor scores, or equa­
tions weighted by the strength of the loading of each variable on a factor, 
will be used as independent predictors in regression equations.^
The Changing Socio-economic Environment:
1950-1960 and 1960-1970
While the three factor analyses have enabled us to impose identical 
names on each corresponding factors, there have been subtle changes which, 
in fact, indicate that "Income" in 1960 taps a slightly different pheno­
menon than it did in 1950. Actually, an accurate comparison of dimen­
sionality between any two of the census periods must involve more than a 
mere exemination of varying factor loadings on relatively corresponding 
dimensions because the loadings are not correlations with exactly the same 
phenomena. What is needed is a comparison of loadings relative to exactly 
the same dimension. Tables 4-5 to 4-8 summarize the changes in each of
Table 4-5.—  Shifting Patterns of Dimensionality (1950-1960)
of 1950 Dimensions for Component Variable Set
1960 Variables in Terms
1960 Income
(50)
Age
(50)
Employment
(50)
Density
(50)
r 2
Land Area -.058 .116 -.281 .201 .136
Median Family Income .901 -.010 .223 -.068 .866
Percent Below Low Income -.788 .043 — . 406 .100 .797
Percent Above High Income .861 .013 -.048 .048 .746
Median School Year .666 .045 -.456 -.316 .753
Percent Under Grade School -.682 .271 .010 .346 .465
Percent Over High School .663 .044 -.515 -.308 .707
Median Value .738 -.050 -.083 .374 .640
Percent Under 5 Years Of Age -.341 .534 .019 -.385 .550
Percent Over 65 Years Of Age .118 -.827 -.017 .188 .698
Median Age .319 -.685 .102 .338 .696
Births/1000 -.359 .463 -.138 -.292 .448
Deaths/1000 -.209 -.776 .171 .240 .733
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old .194 .471 -.517 -.320 .527
Percent Retail Trade (food) .179 .228 .528 .080 .362
Percent Employed At Construction -.161 .253 -.641 -.226 .448
Percent Employed at Manufacturing .213 .015 .722 -;054 .570
Percent Employed As White Collar .6611 -.049 -.500 -.097 .699
Median Rooms Per Unit .110 -.193 .352 -.406 .338
Density .136 -.174 .262 .632 .517
Percent Owner Occupied .246 .198 .134 -.781 .727
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking) .098 -.208 .059 .606 .424
o
00
109
the two change periods in the manner mentioned above. This technique, 
while analogous to the Ahmavaara Matrix Transformation Analysis® is unique 
to this study and requires a detailed explanation.
The procedure has its rationale in the fact that, with orthogonal 
factor vectors (employed in this analysis), the loading of a variable on 
a factor is the correlation of a variable with that factor. The factor, 
it must be remembered, is the composite of all variables in the analysis, 
each one contributing to the makeup of the factor relative to the magni­
tude of its loading.7 A factor score is the measure obtained by actually 
"computing" the factor as a dependent variable in a regression equation 
containing the variables as independent variables with regression coeffi- 
ceints equivalent to their loadings. It follows, therefore, that the 
factor loading is equivalent to the correlation between each variable and 
the factor score obtained by such a computation. Also one can obtain the 
loadings of variables at time 2 with factors at time 1 and by computing 
the difference between the loading obtained thusly and the loading of the 
variable at time 1, one can obtain the exact amount by which the variable 
has shifted from time 1 to time 2 in terms of the factor vectors at time 
1. The loadings in Table 4-5 represent the correlations of 1960 values 
for the variables with 1950 factors. Table 4-6 represents the shifts in 
loadings between 1950 and 1960 variables on the 1950 factors, or the 
shifting patterns of dimensionality between the two census periods. The 
column in Table 4-6 shows the degree to which each variable has shifted. 
The largest shift is percent white collar (D^ = .434).® Its movement is 
away from the employment dimension toward an income dimension (-.348 to 
+.489). White collar employment became more related to what was defined
Table 4-6.- Shifting Patterns of Dimensionality (1950-1960): Changes in Factor Loadings in Terms
of 1950 Four Factor Solution (22 variables) for Component Variable Set
Variable Income Age Employment Density d 2
Land Area .044 .075 .118 -.101 .032
Median Family Income -.022 -.006 — . 048 .057 .006
Percent Below Low Income .003 .028 -.089 .057 .013
Percent Above High Income -.052 -.042 -.041 -.038 .006
Median School Year -.090 .038 -.004 .078 .015
Percent Under Grade School -.058 -.020 .002 .059 .007
Percent Over High School -.121 .101 .073 .310 .126
Median Value -.027 .041 .050 -.035 .061
Percent Under 5 Years of Age .114 -.260 .018 .024 .081
Percent Over 65 Years of Age -.019 -.082 -.061 .125 .026’
Median Age -.075 -.100 .080 .090 .030
Births/1000 -.074 .038 -.050 -.097 .018
Deaths/1000 -.090 -.004 .167 .237 .092
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old -.022 -.305 -.065 .103 .097
Percent Retail Trade (food) -.161 .130 — ,048 -.139 .064
Percent Employed at Construction .166 — . 346 -.058 .074 .156
Percent Employed at Manufacturing .195 .011 -.185 -.024 .072
Percent Employed as White Collar .489 -.233 -.348 -.143 .434
Median Rooms Per Unit -.183 -.200 -.234 .155 .152
Density .124 -.044 .016 .003 .017
Percent Owner Occupied -.082 .098 .036 .036 .018
Percent Retail Trade (eating » drinking) .047 .053 -.067 .003 .009
h-
c
For each variable the value displayed under each factor =
(absolute value of correlation of variable with 1960 factor score) - 
(absolute value of correlation of variable with 1950 factor score)
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as a 1950 income dimension. Another major shift during this time period 
concerns the existence of "percent over high school," which moved from an 
income dimension closer to a "Density" loading. Education has become 
more associated with home ownership and less with income. Subtle shifts 
in the income dimension become apparent when one scrutinizes the 1960 
analysis in Table 4-3. Education measures show a higher loading on the 
factor labeled "Income" than in 1950, but the I960 factor^ is a little 
different; in fact it is an income-white collar dimension. Table 4-6, 
in sum, shows a general movement of education measures to the suburban 
pole of the density factor as well as a redefinition of the cities' em­
ployment.
With these changes in mind one can view the shifts from 1960 to 
1970 in the same manner. Table 4-7 shows the correlations of the 1970 
variables with the 1960 vectors. Table 4-8 again measures variable shifts 
in terms of the 1960 factors. Again the variable showing the greatest 
overall shift is percent white collar; however, the shift is away from 
the four 1960 dimensions. (Note the decrease in from Table 4-3 to 
Table 4-7 of .814 to .409.)^^ The 1960 analysis does not explain 1970 
white collar employment. The 1970 factor analysis shows a commonality of 
.64 (Table 4-4) for this variable, along with a high loading on the 1970 
density factor. By 1970 white collar employment has become associated 
with suburban housing and, to some degree, with youth.
One must conclude that these four dimensions have retained relative 
stability over the twenty years, at least enough to justify their like 
labeling. Hopefully their meanings have been made clear enough to afford 
an understanding of their parameters when they are used as independent
Table 4-7.—  Shifting Patterns of Dimensionality (1960-1970): 
of 1960 Dimensions for Component Variable Set
1970 Variables in Terms
1970
Income
(60)
Age
(60)
Employment
(60)
Density
(60)
H
Land Area
Median Family Income 
Percent Below Low Income 
Percent Above High Income 
Median School Year 
Percent Under Grade School 
Percent Over High School 
Median Value
Percent Under 5 Years of Age 
Percent Over 65 Years of Age 
Median Age 
Births/1000 
Deaths/1000
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old 
Percent Retail Trade (food)
Percent Employed At Construction 
Percent Employed At Manufacturing 
Percent Employed As White Collar 
Median Rooms Per Unit 
Density
Percent Owner Occupied
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
-.036 .196
.781 -.050
-.678 .032
.845 -.056
.749 .146
-.621 .172
.840 .122
.706 . -.162
-.342 .594
.030 -.822
.158 -.762
-.387 .485
-.331 -.781
.290 .502
-.015 -.045
-.129 .317
-.287 -.101
.032 .569
-.038 .071
.008 -.410
.062 .396
.058 -.320
.240
.468
-.587
.234
-.237
-.131
.268
.159
.167
-.137
.023
.124
.087
.473
.023
.139
.351
.025
.109
-.160
.077
.151
.079
.257
.387
.189
.413
.116
-.101
-.160
-.034
.050
-.075
-.076
.110
.100
.291
.305
.838
.829
.650
.704
.582
.828
.720
.511
.705
.632
.401
.730
.565
.281
.479
.755
.409
.487
.557
.688
.355
Table 4-8.—  Shifting Patterns of Dimensionality (1960-1970): Changes in Factor Loadings In Terms
of 1960 Four Factor Solution (22 variables) for Component Variable Set
Variable Income Age Employment Density d 2
Land Area -.011 -.006 .005 .062 .004
Median Family Income -.041 -.014 -.036 .023 .003
Percent Below Low Income .034 -.025 -.054 .022 .004
Percent Above High Income -.036 -.027 .003 -.012 .001
Median School Year -.098 -.001 -.008 .041 .011
Percent Under Grade School -.051 -.002 -.040 .045 .005
Percent Over High School -.042 — .006 -.020 .025 .003
Median Value -.040 -.021 -.047 -.010 .004
Percent Under 5 Years of Age .083 -.263 .145 -.038 .098
Percent Over 65 Years of Age .001 -.087 .125 -.011 .016
Median Age -.014 -.141 -.055 .035 .024
Births/1000 .087 -.272 .013 .024 .082
Deaths/1000 -.017 -.067 .054 .032 .013
Percent Units Under 10 Years Old -.144 -.133 .151 .016 .099
Percent Retail Trade (food) -.013 — .046 -.128 .032 .019
Percent Employed At Construction .065 -.138 -.047 .055 .028
Percent Employed At Manufacturing -.258 -.078 -.041 .009 .074
Percent Employed As White Collar -.802 .505 -.309 .254 1.058
Median Rooms Per Unit — .006 -.073 -.077 -.058 .015
Density -.076 .009 .009 .018 .006
Percent Owner Occupied -.199 .054 -.134 -.007 .064
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking) .013 -.037 -.092 -.090 .028
u
For each variable the value displayed under each factor =
(absolute value of correlation of variable with 1970 factor score) - 
(absolute value of correlation of variable with 1960 factor score)
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predictors in Chapter VI. They will provide (along with population, em­
ployee/population ratio, and percent nonwhite) the social, economic, and 
demographic variables with which to account for expenditures in 1950, 1960, 
and 1970. However, a major portion of this study is concerned with ac­
counting for change during these years. Although it is easy to compute 
changes in the three separate measures, such computation becomes clouded 
for dimensions reflecting slightly different phenomena. The best possible 
research posture open to the analyst desiring concise measures of socio­
economic change is a factor analysis of all changes in the independent 
variable set.
Factor Analysis of Change
The problem of arriving at dimensions of change can be approached 
in a straightforward manner. All variables were subject to two computa­
tions: (A) the 1950 value was subtracted from the 1960 value for each
measure, and (B) the 1960 value was subtracted from the 1970 value. All 
values obtained in (A) were factor analyzed, as were those in (B). Al­
though the decision specifying the number of factors was not as clearcut 
as that underlying the choices for the 1950, 1960, and 1970 number of fac-
11
tors, the analysis was again limited to four factors for each change period 
(see Table 4-9). The amount of variance explained by these four is barely 
over 50 percent; therefore a substantial amount of variation is not cap­
tured in the four factors.
Unlike the analyses at the discrete time periods the change solutions 
do not yield dimensions susceptible to similar naming. The 1950-1960 solu­
tion yields four fairly discernable factors. The first, labeled "Age" 
ranges from cities with older populations to those with younger populations
Table 4-9.— Principal Components for Factor Analysis of Changes (1950-1960-1970)
in Twenty-Two Independent Variables (minus population change, change in 
percent of non-white, change in employee/population ratio): Criteria
for Choice of Solution (1-8 factors)
Lambda Percent of Explained 
Variance
Cumulative Percent
1950-60 1960-70 . 1950-60 1960-70 1950-60 1960-70
1 4.72510 4.01605 21.48 18.26 21.48 18.26
2 2.70991 3.33629 12.33 15.17 33.80 33.42
3 2.03600 2.67404 9.25 12.16 43.05 45.58
4 1.74818 2.00363 7.95 9.11 51.00 54.68
5 1.41681 1.22529 6.44 5.57 57.44 60.25
6 1.17814 1.08030 5.36 4.91 62.79 65.16
7 1.03524 1.01722 4.71 4.61 67.50 69.79
8 0.87916 .85962 4.00 3.91 71.50 73.70
M
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living in newer structures. The second factor is labeled "Income- 
Employment" ranging from cities with a high proportion employed in con­
struction to cities with high family incomes and higher proportions em­
ployed in white collar and manufacturing. The third, "Education-Income," 
ranges from cities with a higher proportion of poor and less educated to 
cities with a larger proportion of higher income and well educated citi­
zens. The last factor, "Density," is a composite ranging from cities with 
a larger number of rooms per unit to those with both a high Lirth and death 
rate. Table 4-10 tells us that cities tended to age, become richer, manu­
facturing, white collar cities, to become more educated with a higher 
proportion of wealthy citizens, and become denser with a higher birth and 
death rate. Each of these phenomena can be captured by a factor score 
summarizing the dimension.
Table 4-11 shows a like analysis of socio-economic change between 
1960 and 1970. The four dimensions demonstrate the different patterns of 
change present in this period. The first factor is a straightforward in­
come factor. Cities tend to become wealthier and better housed. "Education- 
Density" is a complex factor, which tells us, in essence, that cities be­
come more dense and less educated at the same time, "Age" is a dimension 
ranging from cities with a greater proportion of older people to those with 
smaller proportions. Note that the births/1,000 and deaths/1,000 changes 
are now independent. The last factor is "Youth-Employment." Cities with 
higher scores on this dimension have less birth/1,000 and less young people 
as well as fewer newer units and less employment in construction and manu­
facturing.
One reason for the factor solutions is to guard against multicol- 
liearity in the independent variable set. The relationships among all
Table 4-10.— .Varimax Factor Analysis of Change: Dimensions of Change from 1950 to 1960 (22 variables
minus population change, change in percent non-white, change in employee/population ratio).
Change 1950-1960 Age
1950-1960 Four Factor Solution
Density
Income
Employment
Education
Income
Land Area 
Density
Percent Under 5 years of age
Percent Over 65 years of age
Median Age
Births/1000
Deaths/1000
Median Family Income
Percent Below Low Income
Percent Above High Income
Median School Year
Percent Under Grade School
Percent Over High School
Percent Employed at Construction
Percent Employed at Manufacturing
Percent Employed as White Collar
Median Rooms/Unit
Percent Units Under 10 years old
Percent Owner Occupied
Median Value Owner Occupied Unit
Percent Retail Trade (food)
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
Percent of Total Variance
0.30298 0.01265
0.06837 0.25956
0.85543 -0.19895
-0.71211 -0.26415
-0.79426 -0.13803
0.06275 0.03806
1-0.65320 -0.23202
0.16488 1 0.78124j
-0.19103 -0.32142
0.02098 0.23022
0.13025 -0.28257
-0.08072 0.26465
. 0.09799 -0.13108
0.396651 -0.39983
0.12433 0.52295
0.01281 0.65800
-0.04766 -0.09244
0.71798 0.04876
0.26128 -0.21827
0.03837 0.64784
0.22894 -0.17832
-0.01628 0.24586
15.03 11.87
0.08969 -0.44511 .29813
0.32826 .39238 .33376
0.02428 0.08953 .77995
-0.26392 0.22519 .69724
-0.1.585 0.27605 .73731
0.05429 0.63506 .41164
-0.16008 0,50579 .76196
0.01997 0.26921 .71040
-0.72434 0.00899 .66459
0.75901 0.01124 .62067
0.51668 -0.06721 .36828
-0.74937 0.07533 .64379
0.64009 -0.23030 .48954
-0.02709 0.19436 .35570
-0.11969 -0.48846 .54185
-0.13736 -0.12986 .46885
0.35477 1-0.63458 .53938
0.16471 0.09283 .55362
0.40988 -0.15474 .30806
0.11695 0.30396 .52717
0.26050 -0.38204 .29802
-0.17204 -0.09900 .10001
13.44 10.66 51.00
Table 4-11 Varimax Factor Analysis of Change Dimensions of Change from 1960 to 1970:(22 variables minus
c h ange’in population, change in percent non-white, -change in employee/population ratio)
Change 1960-1970 Income
1960-1970 Four Factor Solution
Education
Density Age
Youth
Employment H
Land Area 
Density
Percent Under 5 years of age
Percent Over 65 years of age
Median Age
Birth/1000
Deaths/1000
Median Family Income
Percent Below Low Income
Percent Above High Income
Median School Year
Percent Under Grade School
Percent Over High School
Percent Employed at Construction
Percent Employed at Manufacturing
Percent Employed as White Collar
Median Rooms/Unit
Percent Units Under 10 years old
Percent Owner Occupied
Median Value Owner Occupied Unit
Percent Retail Trade (food)
Percent Retail Trade (eating, drinking)
0.25475
0.05754
0.00313
-0.07424
0.10036
-0.07937
-0.25024
0.40417
0.04672
-0.21092
-0.28758
0.02262
0.18291
■0.05424
0.70078
0.03984
-0.02878
-0.52739
0.58931
0.45469
0.12027
-0.11630
0.48218
0.14504
0.13245
0.12818
-0.14755
0.05712
-0.06350
-0.55654
0.62668
0.91928
-0.88767
0.81222
-0.36612
0.00735
-0.20114
-0.51703
-0.48310
-0.16923
1-0.83132
0.37373
-0.06494
0.12683
0.23643
-0.27298
0.33569
0.017039 
0.03946 
[-0.60650
-0.87524 -0.13241
-0.87734 0.09749
-0.04531 -0.597391
[-0.78596 -0.04682
0.12544 0.09106
0.00377 -0.00537
0.02117 -0.06238
0.16793 -0.45887
0.14914 0.38095
r 0.44380 -0.05484
0.00334 -0.56689
-0.06276 -0.46264
-0.01132 -0.08091
-0.00668 0.25492
0.47029 1-0.59791 :
-0.10651 -0.07009
0.06962 -0.02301
-0.30791 0.30685
0.16599 0132722
13.66 12.42
.40403 
.42668 
.68729 
.80358 
.80098 
.59778 
.70358 
.88664 
.80444 
.68578 
.55176 
.56413 
.49737 
.32363 
.30292 
.35670 
.29893 
.64077 
.71029 
.63614 
.19477 
-.15154
t-
o
Percent of Total Variance 14.58 16.02 54.68
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seven predictors is therefore important. Table 4-12 summarizes the rela­
tionships between the other three variables and the four factors at each 
time period. Population is generally related to density. Employee/popu­
lation ratio, although supposedly a measure of exploitation, seems more a 
measure of the unemployment in a city. The presence of blacks seems re­
lated to poverty. Although the correlations are often substantial, the 
problems of raulticollinearity has been, for the most part, avoided. (The
correlations between the three distinct variables at each time period are
12
consistently low. ) Thus the purpose of this chapter has been accomplished: 
the description of socio-economic change and the creation of a summary 
group of variables acceptable as predictors in later analysis. While mes­
ures obtained for discrete time periods will be used to predict spending 
at these times, change scores will be related to changes in spending. Chap­
ter V will provide a detailed analysis of major dependent variables over 
time, testing the hypotheses concerning regional and temporal trends in 
urban expenditures.
Conclusion
The American urban phenomena has always reflected the social and 
economic dimensions of the changing nation. Today the American city stands 
as the structural manifestation of social forces which have become gradually 
inoperative. One's point of view, however, determines whether one conceives 
of urban America as virtually static or undergoing fundamental change.
When the American city is observed in the aggregate at ten year in­
tervals from 1950 to 1970 a relative consistency becomes apparent. Four 
distinct urban phenomena have continued to occur: wealth, age, nature of
120
Table 4-12.— Correlations Between Population, Employee/Population Ratio, 
and Percent Non-White With the Four Socio-economic Factors 
from Each Time Period.
Correlation (Pearson's r) With
Year Factor Score
Population Employee/Populatlon Percent Non-White
1950 Income .0051 .2296 -.5236
Age -.0098 -.2531 .2243
Employment -.0392 .2703 -.3278
Density .4304 .1883 .1594
1960 Income .0017 .3528 -.4209
Age -.0108 -.4679 -.0295
Employment .0204 .2057 .0182
Density .4016 -.1619 .2007
1970 Income .0074 .5175 -.4457
Age .0754 .1874 .1590
Employment -.0277 .2174 -.0811
Density .3043 .2116 .2776
1950- Age .4482 -.3449 -.0329
1950 Income/Employment .2665 .5476 -.1381
Income/EducatIon .1235 .0136 -.4759
Density -.4883 .1677 .1388
1960- Income .3814 .3792 -.4578
1970 Education/Density -.3191 -.0201 .3906
Age .2316 -.1543 .0612
Youth Employment .1712 .2035 -.1282
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employment, and housing density. Their independence underlies the com­
plexity of American urbanism. Wealthy cities are not necessarily new 
(young) or old. Nor are they necessarily suburban. Rather the mix of 
these traits determines the multitude of city types. While the wealth 
of cities appears at any one observation to be an independent tendency, 
the increasing well being of cities has become tied to totally different 
social and economic developments during the past twenty years.
The year 1960 seems to be a crucial demarcation in the process of 
American urbanism. The increasing wealth of the city, once a character­
istic related to its growing manufacturing sector, has become associated 
with increasing "suburbanism," or increased home ownership and less density. 
The transformation is a dynamic one, and the changes are slowly altering 
the total urban picture. One fact has become apparent. Urbanism, when 
viewed as a process, is a changing, dynamic development which has under­
gone a basic change of direction, the end result of which has crucial 
implication for American public policy makers in future periods.
//.
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NOTES
^The rationale here is that while these variables may well co-vary 
with others in factor analysis, their meanings are so unique as to warrant 
their later use in their original form. Employee/population has been used 
as an "exploitation" surrogate, the idea being that the more workers living 
outside of a city, the more the city is exploited by suburbs.
^MuItico11inearity is the presence of a number of predictor measures 
so interrelated as to make the sorting out of the unique contribution of 
each variable impossible. Generally a correlation above .7 between two 
predictors causes problems. While regression algorithms "partial" shared 
variances, relatively uncorrelated independent variables are sought in this 
chapter.
3see Harry H. Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 82-83.
^R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970), p. 361.
^The factor scoring program is F score, OSIRIS III. See Rummel, 
Applied Factor Analysis, pp. 437-445.
Gphis technique was developed by Ahmavaara and others for the com­
parative dimensionality of different groups of people on similar items.
See Yuri Ahmavaara, "The Mathematical Theory of Factorial Invariance," 
Psychometrica.XIX- (1954), 27-38. It involves a series of matrix 
comparisons involving least squares fits of one matrix to another. The 
285 cities of this analysis are compared to themselves, in effect. This 
allows the procedure described to be implemented without approximation.
^Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis, pp. 15-21. We are speaking, 
technically, of what Harmon calls "principal component analysis." That 
is, unities are placed in the diagonals of the matrix.
®This measure.sums the squares of the difference between sets. The 
signs of loadings are, in this instance, ignored; only strength of rela­
tionship is of interest.
^The signs for "Density" in 1960 are reversed. In the future a high 
score on this factor is the same for all three census periods.
^®A decrease in the H^ (communality) tells us that the four dimensions 
"explain" less of this variable.
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^^Again the scree test was applied. The choice of four factors was 
more clearcut for 1960-1970. The 1950-1960 analysis left no obvious point 
at which to cease factoring.
12
Intercorrelations between population, employee/population, and 
percent nonwhite are as follows. For each period the first value is be­
tween population and employee/population, the second between population 
and percent nonwhite, and the third between employee/population and 
percent nonwhite. 1950 (.07, .06, -.04); 1960 (.32, -.04, .03); 1970 (.26, 
-.34, -.17); 1950-1960 (-.05, -.03, .02); 1960-1970 (.01, -.41, -.32).
CHAPTER V
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL TRENDS IN URBAN EXPENDITURES
Chapter IV outlined the changing socio-economic conditions of Ameri­
can cities. However, before a detailed causal analysis can be undertaken 
it is necessary to fully describe regional differences in dependent vari­
ables throughout the time period. This is desirable for two reasons.
First, the literature described in Chapter I highlighted the controversy 
underlying the relationship between regionalism and reform.^ While the 
position here is that region cannot be "controlled" for meaningfully, it 
may still be a powerful "predictor" of public policy. The analyst must at 
least describe the regional parameters within which he must operate. Sec­
ond, it has been hypothesized in Chapter III that expenditure patterns 
will become more alike over time, both within regions and nationally.
With the former in mind this chapter will deal extensively with the latter 
reason.
Region as an Explanatory Variable 
Region can be thought of as a predictor in and of itself. The sim­
plest way to gauge the degree to which region underlies a series of de­
pendent variables is to see what proportion of total variance can be 
accounted for by region. When cities are "grouped" by region, how much 
of the total variation can be attributed to the difference between the 
group means and the national mean? The appropriate statistic for this 
analysis is eta (the amount of total variance accounted for by the control
124
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2 2 
variable in analysis of variance). The larger Che eta value the more a
phenomenon is "regional." Prior to this computation, however, one must
partition the universe of cities by city-run or non-city-run schools. As
mentioned in Chapter III, this structural characteristic is of such
explanatory-predictive power that it must be controlled for in some fash-
3
ion if valid inferences are to be made. Here tabular controls will be 
employed. Since the Census Bureau's four-region breakdown is to be uti­
lized, this means an eight-fold partition of expenditure variables. The 
number of cities reaches as low as four in one case (West city-run schools). 
Obviously limited inferences can be made from this category.
Table 5-1 shows the amount of total variation attributable to region 
for city-run and non-city-run school systems in 1950, 1960, and 1970. The 
picture is indeed complex. The major dependent variable (per capita ex­
penditures) shows a rather marked tendency to become less regional. An­
other, per capita expenditure minus education,^ is similar in behavior.
The variables measuring within city distributions of expenditures can be 
grouped into two general categories ; those involving highways and sani­
tation functions are becoming more regional while those involving welfare 
and public safety are becoming less regional in their patterns. The lat­
ter category's behavior can be traced to increased federal vis-a-vis state 
aid influencing these functions. Otherwise Table 5-1 certainly provides 
no evidence that expenditure patterns are becoming less regional. Certain 
important summary financial measures such as expenditure, expenditure minus 
education, and revenue demonstrate, by 1970, a relatively decreased re­
gionalism. Also non-city-run school cities are generally less affected 
by region, probably because their budgets are less constrained by such 
a large portion earmarked for education.
Table 5-1.— Percent of Explained Variance by Four Census Regions for 
1950, 1960, and 1970 Expenditure Items. (Eta^)
Variable
1950
City-Run-Schools
1960 1970
Non-City-Run Schools 
1950 1960 1970
Per Capita Highway Expenditure 14.1 11.9 3.2 12.8
Per Capita Health and Hospital Expenditure 2.6 1.1 - 2.5 3.2 -
Per Capita Sanitation Expenditure — 14.3 5.4 — 3.9 2.8
Per Capita Public Safety Expenditure 26.3 9.9 13.4 17.4 5.6 21.9
Per Capita Public Welfare Expenditure 19.0 13.3 3.3 6.4 3.0 3.2
Per Capita School Expenditure 38.4 11.1 11.4 — — —
Percent Expenditure on Highways - 20.9 28.0 — 4.3 6.1
Percent Expenditure Health and Hospitals 1.5 1.0 - 4.8 5.5 —
Percent Expenditure Sanitation — 19.0 22.5 — 6.1 9.7
Percent Expenditure Public Safety 17.6 7.5 4.8 3.4 5.7 3.2
Percent Expenditure Public Welfare 18.1 12.8 5.2 5.0 2.2 3.3
Percent Expenditure Schools 24.6 10.6 16.1 - - ——
Per Capita City Payroll 22.6 11.5 10.6 15.3 11.2 9.2
Per Capita City Employees 3.8 11.6 10.7 9.4 0.7 5.6
Per Capita Expenditure (total) 31.8 9.9 6.5 10.7 5.5 7.5
Per Capita Expenditure (-ed.) 20.6 6.7 1.5 10.7 6.7 8.2
Per Capita Taxes 39.2 52.5 7.8 3.7 1.7 6.9
Per Capita Intergovemraent Revenue 5.1 4.1 2.6 28.6 13.7 19.5
Percent Intergovemment Revenue 1.7 5.6 2.5 26.3 16.1 28.2
Per Capita Revenue 30.9 14.4 7,9 12.6 5.1 6.4
ro
O'
n = 110 n = 175
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Major dependent variables are subject to a detailed within region 
analysis In Table 5-2. All regions show an Increase In the utilization 
of Intergovernmental aid, with minor deviation from national averages.
The major Increases have occurred between 1960 and 1970. The South has 
shown a marked Increase In per capita Intergovernmental ald,^ especially 
In cities with dependent school systems. In all summary Items major In­
creases have occurred between 1960 and 1970. The city-run school cities 
tend to spend more on all Items (note the consistently higher figures for 
city-run systems in per capita spending minus education). Northern cities 
show a higher predisposition to tax and spend when they run their own 
schools, but not when they have independent systems. Table 5-3 demon­
strates the degree to which cities are becoming more "alike" over time, 
both regionally and nationally. The variance for cities on the major 
variables (per capita revenue and expenditure) Is certainly not reduced.
In fact, the magnitude of the coefficient of variation (V)® Indicates that 
they are varying more. The statistic V, a measure unaffected by differing 
units of measure or the size of the mean, is the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean. The only region becoming more homogeneous is the 
South, and only in non-city-run systems. Overall, on summary financial 
indicators, there is no movement toward either regional or national 
homogeneity.
The above conclusion is applicable to functional categories as well. 
Table 5-4 shows regional means for city and non-city-run school systems 
for functional items. City responsibility for welfare and health and 
hospitals is so meager that validity of the available figures is ques­
tionable.^ One is immediately struck, however, by the burden of school
Table 5-2.— Selected Summary Financial Indicators: Trends Over Time for
City— Run and Non-City-Run Schools by Region
Year Expend!ture- City-Run Schools Non-City-Run Schools
Revenue
Measure
Northeast South Midwes t West U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1950
1960
1970
Percent Total 
Revenue
Intergovernment
.20
.18
.27
.21
.24
.27
.24
.26
.29
.21
.13
.20
.20
.21
.27
.07
.16
.21
.07
.08
.09
.15
.15
.20
.19
.16
.22
.13
.13
.17
1950
1960
1970
Per Capita
Intergovernment
Revenue
21.78
33.75
96.38
16.32
37.67
98.91
21.87
42.31
82.84
11.93
14.97
40.18
19.93
35.18
93.48
2.20
10.26
28.60
2.63
5.74
11.57
6.16
11.30
29.36
10.65
14.61
40.72
9.52
10.31
26.58
1950
1960
1970
Per Capita 
Taxes
71.87
110.39
41.30
45.02
47.41
71.82
28.17
32.79
58.78
84.59
24.70
31.90
26.16
28.05
23.43
33.11
29.51
29.35
25.62
30.72
1950
1960
1970
Per Capita 
Revenue
97.55
167.19
332.44
63.94
123.00
262.17
78.22
142.26
255.05
55.79
103.12
213.90
84.28
149.52
299.18
29.72
60.88
125.90
36.70
71.07
122.83
36.41
71.17
144.74
49.99
83.90
167.20
38.85
73.08
141.73
1950
1960
1970
Per Capita 
Expenditure
106.01
169.88
352.80
70.86
133.57
293.20
86.27
154.20
274.17
55.07
111.25
208.17
91.92
155.67
321.47
31.89
63.70
132.14
44.10
79.21
124.70
39.80
73.23
146.30
55.96
88.99
172.66
43.86
77.63
144.59
1950
1960
1970
Per Capita 
Expenditure
76.98
115.25
224.19
54.65
91.65 
265.55
59.47
101.75
186.67
54.99
111.24
208.71
67.81
106.86
213.94
31.89
59.60
124.54
44.10
77.89
124.40
39.80
73.22
146.23
55.96
88.81
172.01
43.86
76.88
143.73
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
hO
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Table 5-3. —  Trends in National and Regional Variance for City-Run and Non-City-Run-School Systems:
Coefficient of Variation* by Region for Summary Measures Over Time
Year Expenditure-
Revenue Northeast 
Measure
City-Run Schools 
South Midwest West U.S. Northeast
Non-City-Run Schools 
South Midwest West U.S.
1950
1960
1970
Percent of 
Total Revenue 
Intergovemment
.58
.55
.35
.49
.56
.53
.38
.36
.25
.21
.17
.25
.52
.55
.40
.31 
. 66 
.51
1.18
1.20
.96
.54
.51
.46
.46
.37
.31
.70
.66
.59
1950 Per Capita .65 .61 .51 .27 .64 .32 1.17 .65 .75 .95
1960 Intergovernment . 66 .75 .57 .45 .47 .92 1.30 .68 .65 .84
1970 Revenue .62 .97 .50 .37 .75 .62 1.03 .63 .86 .91
1950 Per Capita .28 .50 .31 .23 .42 .31 .66 .31 .40 .47
1960 Taxes .29 .52 .49 .33 .50 .63 .62 .48 .60 .52
1970 .35 .69 .41 .24 .46 .36 .31 .39 .58 .45
1950 Per Capita .25 .39 .28 .17 .34 .26 .61 .34 .37 .44
1960 Revenue .28 .55 .31 .23 .38 .35 .42 .34 .37 .38
1970 .35 .69 .41 .24 .46 .36 .32 .39 .58 .46
1950 Per Capita .23 .41 .28 .16 .33 .28 .57 .37 .46 .49
1960 Expenditure .28 .51 .39 .37 .37 .39 .40 .38 .38 .39
1970 .35 .69 .43 .25 .47 .40 .31 .40 .50 .44
1950 Per Capita .29 .42 .21 .16 .35 .28 .57 .37 .46 .49
1960 Expenditure .34 .48 .25 .37 .38 .27 .41 .38 .37 .39
1970 .47 .62 .27 .25 .49 .28 .31 .40 .55 .43
n 62 31 13 4 110 14" 51 72 - 38 175
V =
sd
X
Table 5-4. —  Per Capita Functional Expenditures: 
(Mean Expenditure by Region (4).
Trends Over Time for City-Run and Non-City-Run Schools
Year Per Capita City-Run-Schools Non-City-Run Schools
Expenditure Northeast South Midwest West U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1950
__
1960 Highways 12.02 14.12 21.96 13.45 13.58 9.24 11.82 13.69 13.86 12.83
1970 18.41 22.43 30.44 27.13 21.28 13.19 14.37 19.53 21.83 13.02
1950 Health 4.65 3.82 2.78 1.49 4.07 .82 2.71 2.81 1.63 2.37
1960 and 9.15 7.25 7.04 4.40 8.19 .88 6.75 4.90 2.84 4.67
1970 Hospitals — -- — — — — -- -- ”
1950 ^ m m —— — — —— —— —— --
1960 Sanitation 11.17 13.58 18.38 7.70 12.58 8.15 13.80 12.63 10.51 12.15
1970 21.46 23.47 27.96 11.44 22.42 13.49 19.16 20.85 17.16 19.14
1950 Public 14.70 10.08 11.87 12.78 13.00 8.84 9.18 9.50 12.65 10.03
1960 Safety 26.53 18.34 21.57 26.06 23.62 15.94 17.53 17.75 23.81 18.86
1970 51.62 39.92 41.26 48.34 46.98 32.34 31.11 24.31 44.76 35.49
1950 Public 13.00 2.96 1.18 .14 8.61 .64 .34 1.32 3.68 1.32
1960 Welfare 15.16 5.24 2.10 .14 10.27 .38 .20 .45 2.35 .78
1970 12.30 18.20 2.16 .21 12.33 .68 .16 .17 6.05 1.48
1950 29.03 16.21 26.80 —— 24.10 -- — •“ -- —
1960 Schools 54.63 41.92 52.44 -- 48.80 -- — -- -- —
1970 128.61 87.64 87.50 -- 107.52 -- — -- -- —
1950 Total 106.01 70.86 86.27 55.05 91.92 31.89 44.10 39.80 55.96 43.86
1960 Expenditure 169.88 133.57 154.20 111.25 155.67 63.79 79.21 73.23 88.91 77.63
1970 352.80 293.20 274.17 208.71 321.47 132.14 124.70 146.30 172.66 144.59
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
wo
* V = —ed
X
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finance undertaken by cities in the Northeast. Also notable are higher 
highway and sanitation spending in the Midwest, and higher public safety
Q
figures in the North and West, Also notable is the continuing tendency 
of city-run school cities to spend more on all functions. Possibly the 
increased responsibility and centrality of the city governments in these 
municipalities enables them to more effectively marshall resources. Co­
efficients of variation for functional items are shown in Table 5-5. Cities 
are becoming somewhat more alike, both nationally and within regions, in 
highway expenditures. Otherwise, the variations have actually increased. 
There does seem to be a peaking of variation at all levels in 1960 in 
public safety spending, with cities becoming more alike by 1970. Perhaps 
the rapid urbanization from 1950-1960 caused widely differing expenditure 
reactions which began leveling off by 1970.
Table 5-6 depicts the percentage of a city's total budget allocated 
to a functional category. Obviously there is very little difference among 
regions except the Northeast's continuing heavy finance of schools. Other 
trends are more national in scope. Over time, cities are spending less on 
highways and sanitation and more on public safety, expecially Western cities. 
The decrease in welfare expenditures is essentially due to the increasing 
nationalization of that function.
The rapid increase in public payrolls and city government employees 
is shown in Figure 5-7. The pattern is for the Northeast to have a larger 
payroll (city-run schools) while the West has a larger payroll with fewer 
employees. The latter fact suggests a more professional government em­
ployee sector in the West. The South's higher number of employees and 
lower payroll, in contrast, is consistent with the region's employment of
Table 5-5.— Trends in National and Regional Variance*for City-Run and Non-City-Run School Systems:
Coefficient of Variation by Region for Functional Expenditures, 1950, 1960 and 1970
Year Per Capita City-Run-Schools Non-City- Run Schools
Expenditure Northeast South Midwest West U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1950 Highways M  M  «■» — — —
1960 .59 .69 .29 .34 .60 .44 .58 .64 .57 .59
1970 .54 .63 .28 .27 .55 .52 .62 .44 .32 .49
1950 Health 1.19 1.30 .79 .25 1.23 .71 1.86 1.65 1.49 1.76
1960 and 1.22 1.74 1.43 1.53 1.38 .57 1.75 2.22 2.11 2.13
1970 Hospitals — — — — — — — -- -- --
1950 Sanitation 1—  ■■ —  — — — — —  — — — — — ----
1960 .48 .50 .47 .32 .53 .48 .72 .68 .56 .68
1970 .64 .53 .32 .26 .57 .68 .52 .76 .57 .69
1950 Public .28 .26 .18 .20 .31 .23 .34 .28 .30 .33
1960 Safety .28 .51 .39 .37 .37 .40 .39 .38 .38 .39
1970 .26 .44 .19 .25 .32 .32 .26 .30 .23 .31
1950 Public 1.08 1.33 .85 1.20 1.40 2.21 1.08 1.47 2.81 3.41
1960 Welfare 1.22 1.60 1.08 1.73 1.52 3.61 2.06 3.96 4.22 6.14
1970 2.44 1.76 2.22 2.00 2.37 3.18 2.87 3.75 3.22 9.18
1950 Schools .26 .60 .59 — — .47 — ---- ---- ---- ----
1960 .53 .78 .83 ---- .68 — ---- ---- ---- ----
1970 .57 1.07 1.14 ---- .80 — ---- ---- ---- ----
1950 Total .23 .41 .28 .16 .33 .28 .57 .37 .46 .49
1960 Expenditures .28 .51 .39 .37 .37 .39 .40 .38 .38 .39
1970 .35 .69 .43 .25 .47 .40 .31 .40 .50 .44
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
wN)
* V = sd
X
Table 5-6. —  Distribution of Functional Expenditures (Percent of Total Expenditures): Mean Percent by
Region for City—Run and Non-City-Run School Systems, 1950, 1960 and 1970
Year Percent of 
Total
Expenditures
Northeast
City-Run Schools 
South Midwest West U.S. Northeast
Non-City-
South
-Run Schools 
Midwest West U.S.
1950 Ml —
— •— --
1960 Highways .07 .12 .16 .13 .09 .15 .16 .19 .16 .17
1970 .05 .10 .13 .13 .08 .10 .12 .14 .14 .13
1950 Health .04 .05 .03 .03 .04 .02 .05 .06 .03 .05
1960 and .05 .04 .04 .03 .05 .01 .08 .05 .03 .05
1970 Hospitals — — — -- - -- --
1950 — — — —— -- -- -- -- -- --
1960 Sanitation .07 .12 .13 .08 .09 .13 .17 .17 .12 .15
1970 .06 .10 .11 .06 .08 .11 .16 .14 .10 .14
1950 Public .14 .16 .15 .24 .15 .28 .23 .26 .24 .25
1960 Safety .16 .16 .16 .25 .17 .27 .23 .26 .28 .26
1970 .16 .17 .17 .23 .17 .26 .26 .25 .28 .26
1950 Public .11 .03 .02 .00 .07 .01 .00 .03 .04 .02
1960 Welfare .08 .03 .02 .00 .05 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00
1970 .03 .04 .01 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00
1950 .28 .22 .28 — .25 - - -- -- --
1960 Schools .31 .26 .28 -- .28 -- -- -- -- --
1970 .35 .20 .23 .28
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
w
w
Table 5-7.— Trends in Per Capita City Payroll and City Employees Over Time : Coefficient of Variation* 
and Means for City-Run and Non-City-Run School Systems by Region
Year Public Sector City-Run Schools Non-City- Run Schools
Measure
Northeast South Midwest West U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1950 Per Capita 4.98 3.50 4.24 3.12 4.39 1.48 1.99 1.95 2.76 2.11
1960 City 8.31 6.13 7.05 5.53 7.45 2.84 3.67 3.31 4.59 3.66
1970 Payroll X 19.17 14.29 14.37 10.27 16.90 6.26 6.83 6.93 9.12 7.32
1950 Per Capita .1738 .1511 .1544 .1147 .1631 .0652 0919 .0750 .0103 .0853
1960 Government .1984 .1747 .1473 .1062 .1823 .0831 1128 .0845 .0941 .0947
1970 Employees X .2589 .2311 .1795 .1142 .2364 .1037 1250 .1010 .1073 .1097
1950 Per Capita .23 .44 .36 .28 .34 .34 .46 .44 .38 .46
1960 City .29 .63 .28 .20 .41 .41 .43 .41 .41 .44
1970 Payroll V .35 .72 .53 .72 .49 .44 .32 .44 .44 .43
1950 Per Capita .45 .45 .29 .26 .44 .40 .49 .49 .40 .49
1960 Government .26 .50 .32 .30 .37 .39 .40 .39 .39 .41
1970 Employees V .35 .58 .49 .27 .45 .35 .33 .42 .38 .39
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
w
V =
sd
X
135
blacks at very low wages. The coefficients of variation in Table 5-7 show 
increased national homogeneity for non-city-run school systems for both 
payroll and number of employees; however, the opposite is true in the city- 
run school systems. The national pattern is shown in the decreasing V s  
for the U. S. columns. This pattern has appeared concerning various other 
expenditure items and is indicative of the fact that educational budget 
responsibility is related to a tendency toward other budget responsibili­
ties which widen the parameters of local finance in these cities. Two 
other patterns are worthy of some mention, the growing fiscal heterogeneity 
of Southern city-run systems and the growing homogeneity of Southern non­
city-run systems. Table 5-7 shows this tendency, expecially for per capita 
payroll. The former can be logically traced to the diversity of approaches 
taken by Southern cities concerning support of public education. (As Table 
5-5 indicates, however, this is a national phenomenon.) The fact that 
Southern non-city-run school cities have become more alike is possibly 
attributable to the area's strong regional traditions.^
The description to this point has been of revenue and expenditure 
items not related to the community's ability to pay. The possibility re­
mains, however, that regional and national trends have taken hold relative 
to a community's spending effort. Changes in computation of dependent 
variables to assess this potential effect involve dividing each spending 
item by a measure approximating the total economic activity of the commu­
nity. This measure consists of two segments: (a) per capita income, and
(b) value added by manufacture, per capita. The latter is added because 
of the increased tax base afforded a local government by location of in­
dustry in that city. At this point in the analysis another form of the
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dependent variable is introduced, "expenditure per capita minus aid."^®
This variable which omits both federal and state grants in aid more ac­
curately gauges the actual effort of a city than does the per capita ex­
penditure measure which includes funds from other sources. These measures 
are suffixed with " . . .  GNP."^^
Table 5-8 depicts the explanatory power of regionalism for this new 
variable set. Unlike Table 5-1, region is a better explainer when cities 
do not run their schools. Generally region has become less of a factor in 
GNP expenditure effort over time (see the "All Cities" column in Table 5-8). 
This conclusion must be tempered by the trends outlined in Table 5-9. Al­
though region accounts for less diversity in 1970 than in 1960, cities are 
not becoming more alike nationally. Increased regionalism is manifest in 
increasing values for regional eta 's. Increased regional and national 
homogeneity is indicated by lower V values. Decreased regionalism does 
not necessarily mean increased national homogeneity. Actually the same 
general tendencies are present in expenditure/ability to pay measures as 
in mean expenditure items. City-run school cities are becoming slightly 
more heterogeneous in this measure, both within regions and nationwide, 
while non-city-run school systems are generally becoming more homogeneous. 
The coefficients of variation show modest increases for the former, de­
creases for the latter. No important differences occur when expenditure 
items are computed as fractions of a city’s ability to pay (Table 5-1 0) 
and compared to the mean expenditure items discussed earlier in Table 5-4. 
One must conclude at this point that no case can be made for a growing 
similarity among cities relative to their spending habits. Even the mas­
sive infusion of intergovernmental aid has not lessened regional expenditure
Table 5-8. —  Percent of Explained Variance by Four Census Regions*for 1960 and 1970 
Revenue and Expenditure/GNP Estimate Items (eta^)
Variable City-Run Schools Non-City-Run Schools All Cities
1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
Taxes/GNP 37.5 4.3 5.6 10.9 40.4 13.5
Intergovernmental Aid/GNP 10.4 3.1 5.5 17.9 7.9 7.4
Revenue/GNP 6.3 4.3 19.4 11.2 20.4 13.6
Expenditure/GNP 5.1 4.5 23.8 12.7 19.6 14.4
Expend!ture-Aid/GNP 5.7 6.3 27.7 17.2 20.3 17.1
Expenditure Public Safety/GNP 6.1 5.1 27.4 25.5 12.5
Expenditure Schools/GNP 9.6 9.3 -- —— 24.5 26.0
Expenditure Welfare/GNP 10.3 1.9 2.9 3.2 15.5 2.3
Expenditure Health and Hospitals/GNP 1.2 -- 6.1 9.0 3.9
Expenditure Sanitation/GNP 21.9 10.4 12.2 10.1 11.8 7.1
Expenditure Government Payroll/GNP 5.1 5.9 23.4 20.5 18.5 17.0
Expenditure Highways/GNP 10.0 8.9 4.8 8.5 4.6 4.0
w
•vj
* City-Run-Schools 
Northeast (n=62)
South (n=13)
(n=110)
Midwest (n=31) 
West (n=4)
V =
sd
X
Non-City-Run Schools (n=175) 
Northeast (n=14) South (n=51)
Nidw. St (n=72) West (n=18)
Table 5-9.—  Trends in National and Regional Variance (1960 and 1970) in Summary Financial
Measures/GNP Estimate: Coefficient of Variation* by Region
Year Expenditure City--Run Schools Non-City-Run Schools
Revenue
GNP
Northeast South Midwest West U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1960
1970
Taxes / GNP .3629
.6203
.4374
.6953
.4681
.4439
.3340
.2093
.4970
.6414
.7236
.4800
.5277
.3027
.3654
.3714
.5485
.5489
.5312
.4500
1960
1970
Intergovernmental
Aid/GNP
.6973
.4590
.6579
1.0001
.5774
.5420
.4707
.3182
.7122
.9710
1.0310
.7531
1.4150
1.0656
.7156
.6457
.6349
.7833
.9783
.8978
1960
1970
Revenue/ GNP .3758
.6198
.4693
.6953
.3250
.4443
.2333
.2084
.4114
.6459
.4477
.4796
.4234
.3057
.3317
.3745
.3690
.5487
.4365
.4518
1960
1970
Expenditure/ GNP .3921
.5818
.4716
.6943
.3720
.4785
.3755
.1964
.4211
.6211
.4946
.5236
.4212
.-3124
.3514
.3773
.3849
.5019
.4657
.4439
1960
1970
Expenditure . 
minus Aid/GNP
.4146
.5096
.4594
.6006
.3548
.4793
.3539
.2325
.4155
.5467
.5316
.5708
.4451
.3066
.3544
.3917
.3784
.4482
.5005
.4482
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
* V = ^
X
Table 5-10.— Trenùs in National and Regional Variance (1960 and 1970) in Functional
Expenditure/GNP Estimate: Coefficient of Variation* by Region
Year Expenditure/
GNP
Estimate
Northeast
City-Run Schools 
South Midwest West
Non-
U.S. Northeast
■City-Run
South
Schools
Midwest West U.S.
1960 Public Safety/ .3398 .3406 .2200 .2577 .3383 .3619 .3343 .2931 .3156 .3792
1970 GNP .4682 .4160 .2267 .2317 .4466 .4440 .2767 .3182 .3090 .3609
1960 Health and 1.2293 1.6096 1.2540 1.5748 1.3665 .6296 1.9180 2.2000 1.1173 2.3653
1970 Hospitals/GNP ---- — ---- - ---- ---- ---- - ----
1960 Sanitation/ GNP .4392 .4259 .5019 .3018 .5116 .5219 .8140 .6376 .6564 .7634
1970 .5222 .4497. .3016 .3891 .4944 .7073 .4671 ,5686 .8239 .6330
1960 Schools/ GNP .5288 .7288 .8225 — — .6658 —  — ---- — — ---- —
1970 .6218 1.0703 1.1683 ---- .8361 ---- - ---- - -
1960 Public Welfare/ 1.3151 1.4215 1.0655 1.6670 1.5516 3.615 2.2500 4.0714 4.1842 6.0384
1970 GNP 3.5000 1.7663 2.0789 2.3333 3.0404 3.2857 2.8000 4.3303 4.6260 8.5000
1960 Highway Expen./ .7589 .6425 .2908 .2545 .6651 .5395 .5844 .8086 .4913 .6147
1970 GNP .6288 .6984 .3877 .1437 .6388 .6187 .6099 .5395 .3903 .5452
1960 Total Expend./ .3921 .4716 .3720 .3755 .4211 .4946 .4212 .3514 .3814 .4657
1970 GNP .5818 .6943 .4785 .1964 .6211 .5236 .3124 .3773 .5019 .4039
n 62 31 13 4 110 14 51 72 30 178
w
VO
* V =
sd
X
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patterns significantly, except for the lessened homogeneity at all levels. 
Regions do show substantial differences (Table 5-11) when the major de­
pendent variables/GNP measures are compared. Notably cities in the North­
east have demonstrated that they are willing to commit a larger proportion 
of their incomes (with or without aid considered) to their public sector 
even when control of schools is taken into account. Cities in the South 
are also surprisingly public sector oriented. These differences must be 
kept in mind; whether they are products of the historical-demographic 
basis of each region or representative of regions as socio-economic group­
ings is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Conclusion
There is much continued variance in urban expenditure patterns to 
explain, and no increasing similarity to account for. Therefore Chapter 
VI will concentrate on utilizing the measures described in Chapter V to 
the expenditure variation laid out in this chapter. The use of state and 
regional progrèssivism indicators will not be employed. The hypotheses 
that suggested increased and regional homogeneity were based on tendencies 
of their decision makers to respond to regional and national trends. Since 
cities have not become more "alike," that segment of the analysis will not 
be undertaken. This chapter has sought to specify the regional parameters 
which underlie the spending patterns of American cities. While cities have 
become less regional in their fiscal behavior regarding some items, they 
have become even more regional regarding other items. Overall, though, 
cities continue to vary extensively.^^ Can region be disregarded in fu­
ture equations? Regional trends do seem less evident when cities are 
examined rather than states.
Table 5-11.— Expenditures as a Fraction of aCommunity's Ability to Pay: Mean Value by Region, 1960 and 1970.
Year Expenditure 
Measure
City-Run Schools 
Northeast South Midwest West
Non-City-Run Schools 
U.S. Northeast South Midwest West U.S.
1960
Expenditure/GNP
.051 .053 .042 .032 .050 .045 .042 .025 .030 .036
1970 .071 .068 .049 .039 .066 .063 .046 .030 .038 .045
1960
Expenditure minus
.041 .037 .031 .028 .039 .036 .034 .020 .025 .029
1970
Aid/GNP
.051 .045 .034 .031 .047 .045 .036 .023 .029 .034
1960
Expenditure
.008 .007 .006 .008 .008 .004 .004 .002 .003 .004
1970
Public Safety/GNP
.010 .009 ,007 .009 .009 .010 .009 .007 .010 .008
n 62 31 . 13 4 110 14 51 72 38 175
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The position taken here is that regional differences, though some­
times substantial, are certainly not overriding, and further analysis is 
not invalidated. Cities are not showing any tendency to allocate more 
similar portions of their economies to the public sector; nor are they 
budgeting more like amounts to functional items. The substantial vari­
ance in their behavior is subject to explanation by socio-economic and 
political differences. This explanation follows in the next chapter.
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NOTES
^The controversy here is that between Llneberry and Fowler, "Poli­
tical Ethos and the Structure of City Government," and Wolfinger and Field, 
"Reformism and Public Policy in American Cities." The latter authors had 
claimed that "ethos" or reformism lost its significance when controlling 
for region, Lineberry and Fowler retorted that regional control is mean­
ingless. The position here is that region is an important American socio­
economic fact, but is not subject to meaningful control. In short, the 
effect of region must be specified, understood, and "lived with" statis­
tically.
^Computer runs were made using OSIRIS III. Although the F ratio is 
the statistic usually employed in analysis of variance, eta square is ap­
propriate to the universe of 285 cities as the exact amount of variance 
attributable to region.
^This measure consistently accounts for 40 to 50 percent of total 
variance in most dependent variables. The decision made here is to tabu- 
larly control for this variable, although dummy variable regression em­
ployed in Chapter VI allows "one equation" to control for its effects.
^This variable is used to allow for comparability between city-run 
and non-city-ruh schools on a summary measure. It will not be employed 
extensively in later analysis.
^From both state and federal sources.
®This statistic has been employed by John Sullivan, "Political 
Correlates of Social, Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American 
States," Journal of Politics XXXV (1973), 70-84. It is not 
subject to differences in values of the mean (as is the standard devia­
tion alone) and is a useful measure of diversity.
7These measures will not be considered in the analysis in Chapter VI.
Q
These are Census Bureau regions. See 1972 County and City Data Book.
9see Daniel Elazar, American Federalism; A View From the States,
2d ed., (New York: Crowell, 1972) for an excellent treatment of the fac­
tors underlying differing policy patterns in different regions.
l^This variable is computed as follows--(1970 expend-1960 expend) —
(1970 aid-1960 aid).
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These variables are divided by what is loosely labeled a 
"GNP estimate." Gross product is the sum of all goods and services 
produced, or equivalently can be computed by aggregating the "value 
added" to a manufacture at each step with total wages paid. The compu­
tation of per capita income and value added per capita is the best avail­
able measure within the scope of this study (1950 values are not com­
puter because per capita income is not available).
^^These measures are available only for I960, 1970, and 1960-1970 
periods. Data for 1950 did not contain the per capita income variable 
necessary to compute these GNP variables.
^^Leibert,"Municipal Functions and Expenditures," of course 
suggested city-run schools as a surrogate for the "responsibility" 
of the city to finance other functions. The situation is more complex 
than mere city-state divisions of fiscal responsibility. Often city- 
county and city-district pacts cloud the meaning of a city’s budget 
(not to mention varying functional categories). Changes for each city, 
though, are subject to analysis, and this analysis of change, in effect, 
controls for different bases for functional expenditures.
.^^For a discussion of the relative importance of region, state, 
and cities, see William Lyons, David Morgan, and Michael Hall, "Multi­
level Analysis in State Politics; A  Reexamination," Department of 
Political Science, University of Oklahoma, 1974, (typewritten).
CHAPTER VI
REFORMISM AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
IN AMERICAN CITIES
This chapter will test the predictive power of the seven variable 
independent variable sets developed in Chapter IV relative to the varia­
tion in dependent variables described in Chapter V. Reformed and unre­
formed city givemments will be compared as separately functioning politi­
cal systems. While the main focus will be on the summary financial indi­
cator, "per capita expenditure minus aid," secondary concern will be 
given public safety spending. The latter is important in its primarily 
local fiscal responsibility as well as its substantive importance. Chap­
ter VI will conclude with an evaluation of the testable propositions 
offered in Chapter III.
City School System Responsibility;
The Problem of Control
Since the nature of a city's school system has been shown to have 
such a predictive effect, it must be controlled for in some way. Chapter 
V employed tabular controls; separate analyses were run for city-run and 
non-city-run school cities. This section will compare reformed versus 
unreformed cities, thus suggesting controls for reformism. One is faced 
with the prospect of comparing reformed and unreformed city-run school 
systems as well as corresponding non-city-run school systems. An 
equation would be required for each combination of governmental form 
and school system. This complication could cause a staggering number 
of equations and render inference difficult, if not impossible.
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The posture adopted here is to control for the nature of a city's school 
system by entering a "dummy variable" for the presence or absence of 
this trait into the prediction equation. This, in effect, controls for 
this phenomenon, for all other coefficients in the equation reflect a 
variable's influence controlling for the other predictors. The "refor­
mism" variable is also subject to more than one treatment. Lineberry 
and Fowler have opted for a continuous reformism score ranging from one
3
to four. The view of reformism implicit in this chapter is essentially 
dichotomous and comparative. Again both treatments will be employed in 
the following analysis; reformism will be examined as an interval pre­
dictor, the three reform characteristics^ will be summed, and tabular 
controls for reform will be implemented by dividing cities into reformed 
and unreformed categories. A relatively equal number of cities appear in 
each group when cities are labeled "reform" if they have a city manager 
and nonpartisan elections, or either of these characteristics and over 
half their councilman elected at large. This admittedly arbitrary split 
yields 121 unreformed and 164 reformed cities. The two reformism mea­
sures yield two interpretations of reformism. The continuous measure 
(Lineberry-Fowler), when used in a regression equation, tells us how much 
the dependent variable is incremented by an increase of one unit of re­
formism.^ This assumes that reformism's effect is additive, that is, 
that its effects can be added to those of other socio-economic predictors. 
While this stance will be assumed in equations treating all cities, the
approach to be employed here will conceptualize reform simply as a trait 
subject to use as the basis for comparative analysis.^ The methodologies 
issue is simply that of fitting one'e statistical control to one's
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theory. The question implicit in our theory of the political system 
is, "What differences in behavior are exhibited by reformed systems 
vis-a-vis unreformed systems?"
The other methodological caveat necessary at this point deals with 
the creation of a design which allows one to sort out the behavior attribu­
table to the operation of reformism from that attributable to causes prior 
to its existence. The point can be made simply. The literature dealing 
with the existence of various governmental forms (see Chapter I) specifies 
the city types associated with the occurrence of reformed and unreformed 
structure. Middle class, growing, homogeneous cities tend to opt for 
reform governments. When reformed governments are "compared" at one 
point in time to unreformed governments, how is one to know whether 
differences in behavior are dut to differences attributable to the struc­
tures, or is due to reform ethos prior to the existence of the structures? 
Such analyses can conclude that reformed governments tax and spend less, 
for example, but may only be telling us that cities which tax and spend 
less tend to choose reformed structures and continue to tax and spend 
less. The proper research question should not be "Do cities with re­
formed structures act differently?" but, "Do cities with reformed struc­
tures react differently from those with unreformed structures?" While 
we cannot specify exactly which differences are attributable to ethos in 
the cities prior to their choice of structures, we can control for these 
differences by concentrating on change. Such a query suggests a complex 
design. While the two structural groups merit comparison at each of the 
census periods, the major confrontation of the hypotheses developed in
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Chapter III will involve changes in independent and dependent variables. 
The changes in expenditure items can be related to changes in independent 
variables thus, in effect, for socio-economic differences which led to 
the presence of the form. If form is a viable measure by which to achieve 
a comparison of system performance, reformed structures should react 
to socio-economic change in a matter different from unreformed structure.
Characteristics of Reformed and Unreformed Cities 
The socio-economic characteristics of the two groups of cities 
are compared in Table 6-1 for each census and change period. In 1950, 
unreformed cities averaged over twice the population, had fewer non­
whites, were poorer, younger, more densely populated, and had more manu­
facturing. The same comparison can be made in 1960, although the popu­
lation difference had become smaller. By 1970, the population averages 
were still closer and the percentage of non-whites was virtually the 
same. At all time periods the employee/population ratios of the two 
groups showed little difference. When change periods are examined, how­
ever, major distinctions between reformed and unreformed cities become 
apparent. From 1950 to 1960, reformed cities grew almost three times as 
fast while the percentage of non-whites increased by twofold for unre­
formed cities. Reformed cities tended toward greater wealth, more white- 
collar employment, and less density. Similar trends continued from 1960 
to 1970, although differences in income between the two groups vanished 
in this later period. One could conclude that reformed cities are growing 
more rapidly but with a slower rate of growth among blacks than their 
unreformed counterparts. Major changes in income occurred between 1950 
and 1960.
Table 6-1.—  Socio-economic Characteristics of Reformed and Uhreformed Cities, 1950-1970: Mean Comparisons
1950 1960 1970
Socio-economic Measure X X X X X X
reformed unreformed reformed unreformed reformed unreformed
Population • 131.731 279.202 159.119 291.035 173.855 269.910
Employee/Population .400 .412 .381 .390 .391 .399
Percent Non White 11.87 8.20 13.54 11.75 16.71 16.26
Income Factor Score 0.038 -0.051 0.137 -0.186 0.046 -0.062
Age Factor Score 0.095 -0.124 0.126 -0.171 0.019 -0.026
Employment Factor Score -0.341 0.463 -0.303 0.411 -0.311 0.422
Density Factor Score -0.196 0.265 -0.064 0.087 -0.089 0.121
1950- 1960 1960-1970
Socio-economic Measures of Change
X X X X
reformed unreformed reformed unreformed
Percent Change in Population 34.72 12.74 11.35 5.065
Percent Change in Employee/Population -.018 -.021 .009 .009
Percent Change in non White 1.67 3.21 1.68 3.66
Change Factor 1* -0.048 0.065 0.002 -0.002
Change Factor 2* 0.169 -0.229 0.037 -0.051
Change Factor 3* -0.008 0.011 -0.093 0.125
Change Factor 4* -0.311 0.421 0.183 -0.247
VO
'Change Factors
1950-1960
1 Age
2 Income/Employment
3 Income/Education
4 Density
1960-1970
Income
Education/Density
Age
Youth Employment
Reformed
Unreformed
(n=164)
(n=121)
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The two groups can likewise be compared relative to expenditure 
trends. The dependent variables to be stressed in this chapter are 
expenditure minus aid, the best summary expenditure item indicative of 
a city's own effort, and expenditure on public safety, the largest func­
tional budget item as well as that item consistently increasing as a per­
centage of total expenditures and that item most likely to reflect social 
and economic change. Both expenditures will be measured in two ways.
The first is a simple per capita figure; the second reflects the two 
items relative to the community's economic base, (these are again 
suffixed -GNP). Table 6-2 depicts the consistently higher per capita 
expenditures within both expenditure categories for unreformed structures. 
The GNP measures highlight additional phenomenas, however. While the 
two groups committed virtually the same amounts of their economies to 
the public sector in 1960, unreformed cities were substantially more 
"public" in 1970. Increases from 1960 to 1970 were much larger (.0070 
to .0029) for reformed cities. Public safety/GNP measures show that al­
though, in per capita measures, unreformed governments spent more on 
public safety at each period, reformed cities spent a larger proportion 
of their economies on this category in 1960. The change period, however, 
was marked by a larger increase for the unreformed group. One could 
reasonably characterize unreformed cities as spending more than reformed. 
The measurement of the dependent variable is crucial, however. When 
ability to pay is taken into account, unreformed cities seem much more 
willing to commit resources to the public sector. Expenditures must be 
viewed as the reaction of political systems to characteristics of their
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Table 6-2.— Reformed and Unreformed Governments: Mean Values for
Expenditure Measures
Expenditure X Reformed 
(n=164)
X Unreformed 
(n=121)
Expenditure minus Aid (per capita)
1950 $ 48.28 $ 55.65
1960 82.56 94.97
1970 146.91 178.79
1950-1960 34.28 39.32
1960-1970 64.45 83.82
Expenditure on Public Safety/Per Capita
1950 $ 10.92 $ 11.53
1960 20.06 21.56
1970 38.28 42.15
1950-1960 9.15 10.03
1960-1970 18.22 20.58
Expenditure minus Aid/ GNP
1960 .0291 .0292
1970 .0320 .0362
1960-1970 .0029 .0070
Expenditure pn Public Safety/GNP
1960 .0070 .0067
1970 .0083 .0085
1960-1970 .0013 .0018
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environment, though, and the mere comparison of group means will not 
suffice. Expenditures must be viewed as functions of socio-economic 
conditions beyond considerations of economic base.
The Reaction of Cities to the Social 
and Economic Environment
The relative contribution of each socio-economic indicator to an 
explanation of city expenditures can best be gauged by multiple regression 
analysis. The multiplicity of control possibilities demands careful spe­
cification of each equation at each time period. Dependent variables will 
be specified in both aforementioned forms. Table 6-3 shows prediction 
equations for all cities at all discrete time periods. The total pre­
dictive power of the equations varies between an explanation of 40 to 
50 percent of the variance of both expenditure items at all time ..periods. 
The first coefficient (X^) for city-run schools in effect partiale out 
the effects of»city responsibility in this area. Interestingly enough, 
reformism, when entered as an interval independent variable, is virtually 
unrelated to the spending measures. Population (X^) is positively related 
to both dependent measures only in 1970, and increasingly so when expen- 
diture/GNP measures are explained. Larger cities orient a substantially 
larger proportion of their resources to both the total public sector and 
to public safety by 1970. Employee/population ratios show no consistent 
trends. Again, this variable has proven disappointing in its behavior.
Its use will be continued, but inferences regarding its effect will be 
of secondary consideration. Percent non-white (X^) is, of course, of 
great interest. While cities with larger non-white populations tended
Table 6-3,— ? réduction Eq^uatlons (Betas) for Expenditure minus Aid and Expenditure on Public Safety.
8
•g
OT _ C C -W
E O ' ^ O  <Ü C
DXDendiCure c: to «h o *h u  <u_ '  , f 3 *H 4J Q I W  s >,Dependent ps B o > , c 8 c i u  P,  uï I 1 ils §! s . l 1s  ^ £ ggg 2 g a .9 g 2 2
E x p e n d itu re  minus 
A id
P u b lic  S a fe ty
39.8%
49.0%
49.8%
41.1%
50.5%
1950  
1960 
1970  
G il 1960  
GOT 1970
1950 + .1 9 3 6 ^1 + .0 8 3 4 ^2 - .0 0 4 4 ^3 - .0 1 6 6 - .0 4 2 4 ^5 + .1 0 9 8 Xg - .2 9 2 1 ^7 - .0 1 0 9 ^8 + .4 8 6 9 ^9 42.6%
1960 1 . 1702 ^1 + .0 6 9 7 X2 + .0 5 3 4 ^3 + .1 2 9 7 *4 - .0 6 7 3 ^5 - .0 1 1 3 Xg - .3 4 1 5 ^7 + .0 6 4 0 ^8 + .  3885 ^9 44.5%
GKP
1970 + .2 2 5 5 ^1 T . 0051 + .1 7 1 0 X3 - .0 3 1 7 ^4 + .2 1 1 7 ^5 + .1 8 7 9 Xg - .2 0 9 4 ^7 + .1 3 0 2 ^8 + .4 1 8 6 %9 50.9%
1960 + .1 6 2 0 ^1 + .0 4 7 9 ^2 + .0 3 5 1 X3 - .0 9 8 7 ^ .0 7 5 6 S -.1201 Xg - .2 4 7 2 ^7 - .3 5 9 7 ^8 + .3 4 5 1 39.0%
GEP 1970 + .2 0 8 1 %1 ?«Q021 -2 + .3 7 4 6 % - . 1 6 1 0 ^4 + .1 3 1 2 % —.0247 Xg - .1 7 1 7 V - .1 9 2 3 *8 + .2 9 7 0  Xg 49.8%
U1
285
154
to spend less in both 1950 and 1960, betas Increased substantially 
for both 1970 equations. Unlike the situation with population, this 
measure Is less Important when expenditures are viewed as percentages of 
the city's economic base. Larger cities are forced to spend a larger pro­
portion of their wealth, but cities with more blacks Increased spending 
sharply In 1970, not In terms of community wealth, but raw dollars. At 
least when equations Involving all cities are concerned, size of popu­
lation begins to exert a substantial stress on community resources, 
suggesting that larger cities have become more Inefficient social units 
by this date.
The relationships between socio-economic change and expenditure 
reaction provides additional Insight Into the above pehnomena. As 
Table 6-4 shows, change In population, or growth. Is not substantially 
related to change In expenditure patterns. This merits closer methodo­
logical examination. While larger cities must seriously fact the problem 
of enlarging their public sector, growing cities exhibit no such tendency 
with controls for other Items. It Is not growth, but size, that places 
Increased demands on spending. Percent non-white, on the other hand, 
shows an opposite pattern, particularly on public safety spending.
Changes In non-white population were related to major Increases In fire 
and police spending both from 1950-1960 and 1960-1970. The Increases 
In the proportion of blacks caused substantial Increases In the amount 
of the communities' economy allocated to public safety. Again, with 
all cities considered together, city-run school captures a good part 
of the variance. The politlzatlon of the city In 1960 shows little 
relationship to spending patterns In 1970.
Table 6-4.— Prediction Equations (Betas): Change in Expenditure minus Aid and Change in Expenditure minus Public Safety.
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Table 6-5 shows change equations broken down by city-run versus 
non^city-run schools. Here the power of reformism as an interval 
variable can be gauaged, idiere the more "reformism" a city has can be
g
translated into effects upon a city's expenditure for each change period. 
Reformism is associated with a mobilization of less community resources 
from 1960-1970. Otherwise its effect is not substantial. The effect 
that population increase exerted from 1950-1960 on total expenditure 
for city-run schools suggests that population growth strongly affected 
the education portion of the budget during this period of urbanization. 
Changes in population and density also caused like budget increases for 
this group. From 1960 to 1970, however, this group of cities showed a 
relationship more closely tying spending increases to income increases.
Non-city-run systems' spending patterns are not tied to socio-economic 
change unless spending is considered relative to ability to pay. Here 
reformism becomes important, as do three change factors. City-run 
schools, though, are harder to account for with the GNP spending variables. 
Obviously more understanding of the nature of reformism can be gleaned 
from "switching" the controls for city-run schools and reformism. The 
"city-run" influence can be "controlled" by its use as a dummy variable, 
and separate analyses can be run for reformed and unreformed cities.
The differences in the functioning of reformed and unreformed poli­
tical systems for all discrete time periods are shown in Table 6-6. The 
city-run school coefficients (X^) are consistently high, and in effect, 
allow for comparison of all other coefficients of the equations. Socio­
economic variables are consistently better predictors of expenditures
Table 6-5.— Prediction Equations (BoCas): Changes in Expenditure- minus Aid for City-Run and Non-City-Run School Systems.
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Table 6-6."^Prediction Equations (Betas): Reformed and Unreformed Government Structures and Expenditure minus Aid.
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in unreformed cities. Each, year will be subject to separate comparison 
between the two government types; following this, trends will be examined. 
In 1350 reformed governments responded to increased density with in­
creased spending while their unreformed counterparts were likewise res­
ponsive to income and density. By 1960, both groups were less predic­
table with reformed structures increasing their spending in "older" 
cities (cities with older populations). Still less explanation is pos­
sible with our equations by 1970, with more densely populated reformed 
cities still spending more. Here unreformed cities increased spending 
in response to wealth and increased non-white populations. When cities' 
spending is viewed as a fraction of total economic activity, a slightly 
different picture emerges. Greater wealth has almost no effect on re­
formed cities, while higher income unreformed cities spend more. The 
former group spends less in older cities, both spend less in manufacturing 
cities and more in denser ones. By 1970, population size finally becomes 
important in unreofrmed cities. Population size had been noted (see 
Table 6-5) as being associated with an increased public sector for all 
cities; actually this phenomenon is common only in unreformed cities. 
Otherwise, 1970's equations resemble closely those for 1960.
As far as per capita expenditure minus aid is concerned, reformed 
cities tend to be less responsive than their unreformed counterparts to 
the socio-economic climate, and generally the latter spend more as wealth 
increases while reformed cities spend less. One particular functional 
expenditure merits close scrutinyi however, if the nature of systems 
extractive response is to be clear. This item, the largest single category 
after education, is public safety (fire and police).
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When public safety is viewed as the dependent variable, unreformed 
governments are still more responsive to the environment. The percent of 
explained variance ranges between 37 and 70 percent (see Table 6-7).
In 1950 the main "cause" of fire and police spending is density. This 
remains the case throughout all time periods for both city types. The 
same situation exists for older cities. Otherwise, major trends involve 
the percentage of non-whites in a city. Reformed cities' expenditures 
on public safety seem unrelated to this variable. Unreformed cities, on 
the other hand, show an increasing responsiveness to larger black popula­
tions. By 1970 the beta is .4172 as compared to .0496 for reformed 
structures. The GNP variables illuminate the complexity of the situation, 
though, for the effects of larger non-white populations is less influ­
ential for reformed cities while population size becomes important for 
unreformed cities. One must conclude that unreformed cities allocate 
more of their resources to the public sector in larger cities while 
expenditure on fire and police is more an internal budget decision direct­
ly related to larger proportions of blacks. This decision is not neces­
sarily tied to the community's economic base.
A different picture can be obtained involving both variable sets 
when changes in expenditures are related to changes in environment for our 
two dependent variables. The equations (Table 6-8) for per capita spend­
ing minus aid are less able to account for variance. From 1950 to 1960, 
reformed cities were more responsive to the influx of blacks, whereas by 
the 1960-1970 period, unreformed governments react strongly to increased 
income. It is the 1960-1970 change relative to the cities' ability to 
pay that is of the most Interest at this point, however. Here a new
Table 6-7.— Prediction Equations (Betas): Reformed and Unreformed Government
Structures and Expenditure-Public Safety
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Table 6-8.— Prediction Equations (.Betas) ; Reformed and Unreformed Government Structures and Changes in Expenditure minus Aid.
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9
independent variable, the percent of the population voting in 1960, 
is introduced. This measure tests a major hypothesis of this study, that 
unreformed cities will respond to electoral pressure to increase expen­
ditures for their public sector as reformed structures respond by de­
creasing theirs. Such is the case when the public sector commitment is 
operationalized as "expenditure minus aid." The beta for turnout for 
unreformed structures is .3936; that for reformed cities is -.1027.
Above and beyond social change, the cities respond as hypothesized (see 
Chapter III). We anticipated a movement toward a larger public sector 
within cities with unreformed structures when electoral involvement in 
these cities was high. In r e f o m e d  cities the opposite reaction to 
participation was envisioned.
Table 6-9 contains prediction equations for changes in public 
safety spending. Major attention must be paid to changes in the black 
populations. While the information in Table 6-7 led us to conclude that 
larger non-white populations among all cities seemed to cause more fire 
and police spending, the question remains, "How do the two city types 
respond to increases in the proportions of blacks in their populations?" 
Unreformed governments are very responsive, especially from 1950-1960. 
Although at discrete time periods the percentage of blacks was not 
strongly associated with an increased orientation to the public sector, 
the dynamics of black migration and increased allocation of community 
resources to public safety bring about a substantial relationship between 
increased black populations and increased fire and police spending for 
both governmental structures. But unreformed governments are consistently
Table 6-9.— Prediction Equations (.Betas) : Reformed and Unreformed Government Structures
and Changes in Expenditure-Public Safety
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more responsive to both this and other socio-economic changes. The 
proportion of the population voting in 1960 proved unrelated to police 
and fire increases.
Finally the total and functional expenditure picture from 1960 to 
1970 needs to be detailed. The concern here is with changes in spending 
measures as a function of community wealth, especially as these changes 
relate to the percent voting in 1960. Table 6-10 allows one to examine 
functional expenditure changes in this light. Total expenditures minus 
aid have already been discussed. Again note the coefficients of Xg. Func­
tional expenditures show differing reactions to different stimuli. Public 
safety increases can be attributable, as discussed previously, to increases 
in percent of a city's population composed of non-whites. Unreformed 
cities show no patterns in highway expenditures which can be related to 
changes in independent variables. Reformed governments respond to de­
creases in citizens' age with increased highway spending. Unreformed 
structures seem also to react to electoral turnout in 1960 with increased 
spending on sanitation whereas reformed cities spend more on sanitation 
as they become more dense and less wealthy, or in other words, as they 
become less middle class.
It is clear that reformism, though not significant in any equation 
as an interval variable, is a meaningful criterion by which to compare 
functioning political system. Unreformed cities are more responsive to 
socioeconomic conditions, both at each census period and through each 
change period. By 1970 larger unreformed cities were characterized by 
their commitment of greater shares of their economies to the public
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oectop. Also unreformed cities reacted more strongly to increases in 
the black population, especially in fire and police spending. Over 
time reformed governments reacted to change by allocating more goods to 
the public sector, especially when electoral involvement was initially 
high.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have compared two types of political systems 
relative to their response to socio-economic and political pressures. 
Unquestionably unreformed political structures are more responsive to 
changes in their environments, especially the migration of non-whites to 
these cities. These unreformed cities spend more and had to increase 
their public sectors when electoral involvement is higher. Reformed 
cities behavior is less predictable. They are not as responsive and 
are less efficient in their response to change. One must conclude that 
they are indeed representative of a middle class, or reform, ethos, which 
would seek to minimize the "politics" of managing a city.
The multivariate analysis employed here has attempted to 
explain the large, continued variation in city expenditure patterns with 
socio-economic indicators. We have shown that, although socio-economic 
variables are vitally important, they do not overshadow the importance 
of political systems' concerns. At the very least, it has been demon­
strated that our two political measures, turnout and reform, exert 
substantial influence upon the nature of urban policy outputs.
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NOTES
^These equations have been computer for expenditure minus aid.
See Appendix.
2
See Draper and Smith, Applied Regression Analysis.
3
Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American 
Cities." Also Cole, "The Urban Policy Process," implicitly recognized 
an additive model of reformed structures.
'^These are percent counctlmen elected at large, nonpartisanship, 
and city manager.
^With unstandardized regression coefficients, we are considering a 
one unit (one reformed characteristic) increase in reformism as increasing 
spending a given number of dollars. Standardized coefficients (beta 
weights) relate a standard deviation movement of independent variable to 
increase of the dependent variable measure in standard deviations. The 
latter measure allows an easy gauging of the relative importance of the 
independent variables in an equation and will be employed in this analysis. 
See Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 442-490.
^The methodological decision here is to consider reformism a trait 
made up of three equally important segments. The resulting dichotomy 
does not tell us which of the traits is most important or how the 
three interact. That is beyond the scope of this analysis.
^Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment."
8 *
The other predictors* effects are gauaged "independently," both
of each other and of X^.
9
This measure is for the county in which a city lies. Admittedly 
this can, at times, reflect inaccurately upon the political competition 
but is the best available measure across all 285 cities. Here our 
measure is the percent of registered voters voting in the 1960 presi­
dential election.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the preceding analysis demonstrate the applicability 
of many theoretical constructs to the study of urban politics. Ours has 
been a comparative study. Two systems, reformed and unreformed cities, 
have been shown to behave in different ways relative to a major function, 
the extractive function. As we stressed in Chapter VI, the uniqueness 
of our approach stems from the dynamic element of the analysis over time. 
Cities have also been compared relative to a performance criterion.
The study of urban policy was initially placed in perspective in 
Chapter I. Here the political ethos (reformism) controversy was shown 
to be a major research concern, along with the general question underlying 
all comparative policy research: "Do political variables exert any mea­
surable independent influence on policy when socio-economic forces have 
been taken into account?"
In Chapter II a theoretical perspective was developed within which 
to test the viability of reformism as a construct by which to compare 
urban political systems. It was discovered that one would find ample 
theoretical basis for expecting that cities with reformed political struc­
tures would tend to opt for smaller public economic sectors, or that re­
formed and unreformed structures would function differently relative to 
one major political task--the extractive function. The degree to 
which cities expanded their extractive efforts was demonstrated to
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represent the degree, to which a city chose to commit resources to the public, 
as opposed to the private sector. This public choice would be expected to 
vary with differing political environments. Hypotheses were constructed 
which represented the points of tangency between several heretofore un­
connected theoretical dimensions. Systems theory and structural- 
functional analysis were used as paradigms within which to operationalize 
a single comparative research effort, q,n effort testing propositions 
culled both directly from the urban policy literature as well as those 
transposed from the more esoteric public choice and positive theory 
perspectives.
Findings add much to our knowledge of the urban political milieu.
First the changing socio-economic environment was examined over a twenty 
year period. While the overall urban social and economic picture shows 
relative stability, important dynamic elements were isolated upon. In­
creased urban well being became a phenomenon related to the development 
of a suburban lifestyle, whereas previously increasing city wealth had 
been related to the increasing manufacturing activity within a city.
Chapter V concentrated upon the aggregate analysis of city spending 
patterns over the period from 1950 to 1970. Contrary to our expectations, 
cities showed no inclination to behave in a more similar. manner, either 
regionally or nationally. A great deal of variation continued into 1970.
To what can these continued differences be traced? We have shown that 
unreformed cities' varying behavior is consistently easier to predict 
from socio-economic measures. These cities are more responsive to their 
environment; not only do they spend more, but they react more strongly to 
changes in the racial makeup of their populations (notably increased
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proportions of bla,cks).. Again the key to this study is in the concept of 
reaction. It is not sufficient to discover that reformed and unreformed 
cities are, at any given time different; it is more important that they 
react differently to socio-economic and political change.
The reaction of unreformed cities is most striking when the in­
creased size of the "public" portion of the cities' economies is examined 
relative to the politicization of their citizenry ten years prior. Here 
the two types of urban systems show marked differences in their reactions. 
Unreformed cities increase their public sectors ; this increase is sub­
stantial and remains even after controls for socio-economic change.
Reformed cities, on the other hand, reduce their public sectors under 
the same circumstances.
These findings do much to underline the importance of the reform 
of urban political structures. Decision-makers in these cities apparently 
feel pressure to act in different ways from those in unreformed cities. 
Unreformed cities leaders apparently meet increased electoral pressure to 
maintain their office by expanding the public sector. This tendency is 
even more clearcut when the influence of socio-economic change has had 
its effect upon spending. Leaders in reformed cities apparently re­
spond to increased citizen participation by reducing their public sectors. 
This measurement of performance has shown the importance of political struc­
ture as a classificatory mechanism by which to examine the urban political 
system. Different political systems react to stimuli in different 
ways. At this point we shall evaluate the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
III. Finally, we will condlude by evaluating our findings relative to 
the public policy and ethos literature.
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Evaluation of Hypotheses 
Group 1
A. Since the literature indicates a greater responsiveness on 
the part of non-reformed governments, those cities with non­
reform structures will exhibit more response to socio-economic 
environmental change than their reformed counterparts, with 
regard to functional expenditures.
This hypothesis is confirmed. At almost all times it is easier to 
predict expenditures in unreformed cities from socio-economic measures.
B. Since reformed structures are more "efficient" than unreformed 
structures, increases in expenditures in the former will be 
more closely tied to increases in taxation.
Hypothesis B cannot be tested; correlations between taxing and spending 
measures are too high to allow for valid inference.^
C. City expenditure patterns will tend to become more alike within 
regions over time.
As discussed in Chapter V, this hypothesis must be rejected.
Group 2
A. Cities with reformed structures will show a tendency toward
a smaller public sector than those with unreformed structures. 
Table 6-2 shows that this statement is verified, especially by 1970.
B. As stress in the environment increases over time, cities will 
show a tendency toward an "equilibrium" government spending 
limit relative to their total.
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No evidence can be found to verify this hypotheses. The fact that 
population size is so heavily related to an increased public sector 
in 1970 indicates that no leveling off in public choice of increased 
spending can be found.
Group 3
A. The existence of more electoral involvement in the local 
environment should accompany that of unreformed structures.
This hypothesis has been verified. While mean turnout (1960) for un­
reformed cities was 63.5 percent, that for reformed governments was only 
47.0 percent.
B. The more competitive the local political environment, the 
larger the "public sector of the economy.
Co'rrelations between electoral involvement in 1960 and spending relative 
to the city's economy in 1970 and increases from 1960 to 1970 are .22 
and .15 respectively. This hypothesis is verified.
C. The less electoral involvement in the local environment, the 
less taxation (and expenditure) can be expected. (Reformed 
Structures)
Chapter VI has shown this hypothesis to be true (see Table 6-8). Re­
formed governments have reacted to competition with a decreased public 
sector.
D. If a greater amount of electoral involvement exists at time (A), 
expenditures should demonstrate an increase at time (A +  10). 
(Unreformed Structures)
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Chapter VI (Table 6-8) has also provided ample verification of this 
statement. Hypotheses C and D are extremely important. Their accep­
tance does much to validate the theoretical roots of this analysis. Re­
formed and unreformed systems react in different ways to both political 
and socio-economic pressures. The latter are indeed more responsive.
Their leaders meet increased pressure to maintain their office by 
expanding the public sector. This tendency is even more clearcut 
when the influence of socio-economic change has been controlled for. 
Leaders in reformed cities respond to increased participation by 
reducing their public sectors. This measurement of performance has 
shown the importance of political structure as a classificatory mecha­
nism by which to examine the urban political system. The approach has 
been, in effect, comparative. Different political systems react to 
stimuli in different ways; the reformed political structures' per­
formance of its "extractive" function is substantially a minimizing 
function. Distribution is carried out within the parameters of a minimal 
public sector. Unreformed structures seem primarily to perform a dis­
tributive function. Demands are more efficiently processed and less 
constraints are placed upon budget size.
Urban Policy Analysis 
In Perspective
Hopefully this exercise has provided more than a time series expen­
diture description. An auxilliary goal has been a meaningful operationali­
zation of the concept of the urban political system. The concepts of 
systems theory (augmented by those from structural-functionalism) have
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guided this study from the outset. The paradigm employed here has shown 
that there exists a valid intersection between systems theory, structural- 
functional analysis, public policy literature, ethos theory, and finally, 
public choice theory.
The study of public policy has long concentrated upon the impor­
tance of political system variables relative to socio-economic indi-
2
cators. Notable were the initial findings of Thomas Dye. His results 
tended to attribute little importance to political systems indicators for 
the American states. Others found certain political variables to be
3
important determinants of policy. Much the same confusion underlies 
the state of what has been labeled "ethos theory." Lineberry and Fowler*^ 
found that reformed cities were less efficient translators of socio­
economic inputs to expenditure outputs. Their conclusion that form of 
government is an important determinant of policy output is by no means 
left unchallenged. Cole^ and others, by utilization of different mea­
sures of policy output had left the viability of reform in question.
The debate over the importance of urban political structure rela­
tive to policy output is further clouded by the fact that one cannot 
sort out behavior attributable to structural differences from that 
attributable to causes which led the city to adopt a particular struc­
ture. No study to this point has sought to unravel, or at least control 
for, the multitude of possible interpretations of differences in urban 
political performance. Our position is that no testing of the importance 
of urban political structure is possible without consideration of the 
time dimension. The contribution of»our analysis has been its "control" 
for prior influences on choice of structure.
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Our measure of policy performance has been through a comparison 
of urban expenditure patterns. Although there is a great body of litera­
ture dealing with this subject, rarely are political variables even 
considered. Our findings have done much to demonstrate the usefulness 
of aggregate expenditure analysis to the more general study of urban 
policy. Multivariate expenditure analysis is the best method by which to 
gauge the importance of a plethora of predictors, both socio-economic 
and political. We have found that political variables are important; 
that reformed cities are less efficient translators of environmental 
pressures into policy outputs, that reformed structures tend to keep 
their public sectors smaller, and that reformed cities spend less 
following higher electoral involvement than their unreformed counterparts. 
From a larger public policy perspective, we have demonstrated the impor­
tance of both socio-economic and political system variables. Our metho­
dology has allowed a comparative perspective stressing the varying 
reactions of different political systems to socio-economic inputs.
This volume's contribution to the study of urban policy is signi- 
figant. We have found substantial differences between the performances 
of reformed and unreformed city structures. Generally those who main­
tained that unreformed cities' spending would be greater and more tied 
to inputs have been vindicated. Further differences, however, were 
demonstrated when electoral involvement of the citizenry was considered. 
Reformed cities not only act differently from unreformed cities, they 
react differently, and their differences do much to demonstrate the 
results of the reform movement. Politics has been removed to à certain
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degree from urban management in these cities. The extent to which this 
is healthy for a democracy is open to debate. Any democratic theorist 
who favors this development, however, must question the worthiness of 
a type of political system which is demonstrably less responsive to its 
environment.
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NOTES
^Correlations were consistently between .89 and .93 for each 
taxing-spending dyad.
2
Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, p. 4.
3
Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, 
and Welfare Policies in the American States."
^Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policy in American 
Cities."
^Cole, "The Urban Policy Process."
179
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books
Alford, Robert R. Party and Society. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963.
Almond, Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell. Comparative Politics. Boston: 
Little and Brown, 1966.
Bahl, Roy W. Metropolitan City Expenditures. Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1959.
Banfield, Edward C . , and James Q. Wilson. City Politics. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1963.
Bingham, Richard D. "Federal Grants to Local Governments : Patterns
of Use and Effects of Public Housing and Urban Renewal" (Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1973.
Blalock, Hubert M. Theory Construction. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1962.
Blalock, Hubert M. Social Statistics. 2d ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 1972.
Brazer, Harvey. City Expenditures in the United States. New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959
Brodbeck, May. Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New 
York: Macmillan, 1968.
Campbell, Alan and Seymour Sacks. Metropolitan America. New York:
The Free Press, 1967.
Charlesworth, James C. Contemporary Political Analysis. New York:
Free Press, 1967.
Coulter, Phillip. "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy: 
Problems in Theory and Research." In Urban Political Analysis, 
pp. 370-382. Edited by David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick.
New York: Free Press, 1972.
Curry, R. L. and L. L. Wade. A Theory of Political Exchange. Engle­
wood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1968.
180
Dahl, Robert. Who Governs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper
and Row, 1957.
Draper, N. R., and Elazar Smith. Applied Regression Analysis. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
Dubin, Robert. Theory Building. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
Dye, Thomas. Politics, Economics and the Public. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1966.
Dye, Thomas. Understanding Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1972.
Easton, David. The Political System. New York: Alfred Knophf, 1953.
Easton, David. A  Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John
Wiley, 1965.
Elazor, Daniel J. American Federalism: A  View From the States.
New York: Crowell, 1972.
Fabricant, Soloman. Trends of Government Activity Since 1900. New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952.
Greer, Scott. Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture. New York:
John Wiley, 1963.
Harmon, Harry. Modern Factor Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960.
Hawkins, Brett W. Politics and Urban Policies. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 
1971.
Hempel, Carl. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press,
1969
Hofstader, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
Horst, Paul. Factor Analysis of Data Matrices. New York: Holt, Rhine- 
hart, and Winston, 1963.
Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. New York: Anchor, 1954.
Kaplan, Morton. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964.
Key, V. 0. American State Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
Key, V. 0. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1951.
181
Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. The Quantitative Analysis of Political Data. 
Columbus; Merrill, 1974.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Levy, Marion. Structure of Society. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1952.
Lockard, Duane. New England State Politics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959.
Lyons, William; David Morgan and Michael Hall. "Multilevel Analysis 
in State Politics: A Reexamination." University of Oklahoma,
1974. (Typewritten).
Meltsner, Arnold J. and Aaron Wildavsky^ "Leave City Budgeting
Alone." In Financing the Metropolis, p). 312. Edited by John 
P. Crecine. Beverly Hills: Sage Press, 1970.
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York:
Free Press, 1949.
Mitchell, William. The American Polity. New York: Free Press, 1962.
Mitchell, William. Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories 
of Talcott Parsons. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
Netzer, Dick. The Economics of the Property Tax. Washington: 
Brookings, 1966.
OSIRIS. III. Ann Arbor : Center for Political Studies, 1973.
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1961.
Reynolds, Paul Davidson. A Primer in Theory Construction. New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
Ricci, David. Community Power and Democratic Theory. New York: 
Random House, 1971.
Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordershook. An Introduction to
Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1973.
Rummel, R. J. Applied Factor Analysis. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970.
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955.
1Ü2
Scott, Stanley and Edward Feder. Factors Associated with Variations 
1-n Municipal Expenditure Levels. Berkeley: Bureau of Public
Administration, 1957.
Scriven, Michael. "Logical Positivism and the Behavioral Sciences,"
In The Legacy of Logical Positivism. Edited by Peter Achinstein
and Stephen F. Barker. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969.
Sharkansky, Ira. Spending in the American States. Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1968.
Sjoberg, Gideon and Roger Nett. A  Methodology for Social Research.
New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
Tax Foundations Incorporated. Burdens and Benefits of Government 
Expenditure by Income Class, 1961 and 1965. New York: Tax
Foundations Incorporated, 1967.
The County and City Data Book. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1972.
Toulmln, Stephen. The Philosophy of Science. London: Arrow, 1962.
Wade, L. L. and R. L. Curry. A  Logic of Public Policy. Belmont: 
Wadsworth, 1970.
Wood, Robert. Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
Williams, Oliver P. and Charles R. Adrian. Four Cities: A  Study
of Comparative Policy Making. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1963.
Wood, Robert C. 1400 Governments. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1961..
Articles
Ahmavaara, Y. "The Mathematical Theory of Factoral Invariance Under 
Selection." Psychometrics 19 (1954): 27-38.
Aiken, Michael and Robert R. Alford. "Community Structure and
Innovation: The Case of Public Housing." American Political
Science Review LXIV (1970): 843-864.
183
Alford, Robert R. and Leo F. Schnole. "Forms of Government and Socio­
economic Characteristics of Suburbs." Administrative Science 
Quarterly (1963): 1-17.
An'ttJtt,. Thomas. "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State
Expenditures." Midwest Journal of Political Science XI (1967): 
27-43.
Auld, David and Gail Cook. "Suburban-Central City Exploitation 
Thesis: A  Comment." National Tax Journal XXV (1972):
505-599.
Bahl, Roy and Robert J. Saunders. "Determinants of Changes in State 
and Local Government Expenditures." National Tax Journal XVIII
(1965): 50-59.
Banfield, Edward C. and James Q. Wilson, "Political Ethos Revisitëd." 
American Political Science Review LXV (1971): 1048-
1063;
Banfield, Edward C. and James Q. Wilson. "Public Regardedness as a 
Value Premise in Voting Behavior." American Political Science 
Review LVIII (1964): 876-877.
Berolzheimer, Jose F. "Influences Shaping Expenditures for the
Operation of State and Local Governments." The Bulletin of 
the National Tax Association XXXII (1947): 170-175.
Booms, Bernard, H. "City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure 
Levels." National Tax Journal XIX (1966): 190-198.
Clark; Terry N. "Community Structure, Decision Making, Budget Making 
and Urba.n Renewal in 51 American Communities." American Socio­
logical Review XXXIII (1968): 576-594..
Cnudde, Charles F. and Donald J. McCrone. "Party Competition and Welfare 
Policies in the American States." American Political Science 
Review LXIII (1969): 858-866.
Cole, Richard L. "The Urban Policy Process; A  Note on Structural 
and Regional Influence." Social Science Quarterly LII
(1971): 654-667.
Coulter, Phillip. "National Political Development: Measurement and
Analysis." American Sociological Review XXVIII (1963): 253-
264.
Cutright, Phillip. "Non Partisan Electoral Systems in American Cities." 
Comparative Studies in Society and History (1963): 212-266
184
Dawson, Richard E. and James A. Robinson. "Inter-Party Competition,
Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States." 
Journal of Politics XXV (1963); 265-289.
Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems."
World Politics IX (1957): 323-400.
Fisher, G. W. "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government 
Expenditures." National Tax Journal XVII (1964): 57-74.
Golembiewsky, Robert T. "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party 
Strength." Western Political Quarterly XI (1958): 484-513.
Gunnell, John G. "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific 
Inquiry." American Political Science Review LXIII (1969): 
1233rl247.
Goldberg, Arthur S. "On the Need for Contextualist Criteria: A
Reply to Professor Gunnell." American Political Science Review 
LXIII (1969): 880-889.
Gray, Virginia. "Innovation in the States." American Political Science 
Review LXVII (1973).
Hawley, Amos H. "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government
Expenditures in Central Cities." Journal 5f Social Issues VII 
(1951).
Hinich, Melvin S. and Peter Ordeshook. "Plurality Maximization vs.
Vote Maximization: A  Spatial Analysis with Variable Partici­
pation." American Political Science Review.LXIV (1970):
772-792.
Hofferbert, Richard. "Ecological Development and Policy Change." 
Midwest Journal of Political Science X (1966): 464.
Kessel, John. "Governmental Structure and Political Environment.V 
American Political Science Review LXI (1962); 615-620.
Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. "Multidimensional Aspects of Local Political 
Culture." Western Political Quarterly XXIII (1970): 808-828.
Kurnov, Edward. "Determinants of State and Local Expenditures Re­
examined." National Tax Journal XVI (1963)i 252- 
255.
Leibert, Roland. "Municipal Functions, Structures and Expenditures." 
Social Science Quarterly.LIV (1974): 765-783.
185
Lipset, Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American 
Political Science Review LIII (1959): 69-105.
Lineberry, Robert L. and Edmund P. Fowler. "Reformism and Public
Policies in American Cities." American Political Science Review 
LXI (1967): 701-716.
Milbrath, Lester. "Political Participation in the States." In 
Politics in the American States: A  Comparative Analysis
Edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines. New York; Little 
Brown, 1965).
Morss, Edward R. "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and 
Local Expenditures." National Tax Journal XIX (1966):
95 -98.
Neenan, William "Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: One
City's Tale." National Tax Journal XXIII (1970): 117-
139.
Osman, John. "On the Use of Intergovernmental Aid as an Expenditure 
Determinant." National Tax Journal XXI (1968): 337-
444.
Osman, John. "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local 
Expenditure." National Tax Journal XXI (1968):
337-343.
Pogue, Thomas F. and L. G. Sgontz. "The Effects of Grants in Aid 
on State-Local Spending." National Tax Journal XXI (1968):
199-205.
Ramsey, David D. "Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: Comment."
National Tax Journal XXV '(’1972) : 599-605.
Rogers, Chester P. "Environment, System and Output: The Consideration of
A Model of Municipal Spending." Social Forces XLIV (1968): 127-136.
Sacks, Seymour and Richard Harris. "The Determinants of State and Local 
Expenditures and the Intergovernmental Flow of Funds." National 
Tax Journal XVII (1964): 75-85.
Samuelson, Paul A. "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditures." The Review of Economics and Statistics 36 
(1954).
Samuelson, Paul A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 37 (1955);
353-357.
186
Shapiro, Harvey. "Economics Scale and Government Finance." Land 
Economics XXXIX (1963): 175-183.
Sharkansky, Ira. "Environment, Policy Output, and Impact." In
Policy Analysis in Political Science. Edited by Ira Sharkansky. 
Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969): 61-77.
Sharkansky, Ira and Richard Hofferbert. "Dimensions of State Politics, 
Economics, and Public Policy." American Political Science Review 
LXIII(1969): 867-879.
Sharkansky, Ira. "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the 
American States." American Political Science Review LXI (1970): 
1066-1073.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and
Electoral Competition." American Political Science Review LXVI
(1972): 555-568.
Sherbenou, Edgar L. "Class Participation, and the Council Manager 
Plan," Public Administration Review XXI (1961): 131-135.
Spangler, Richard. "The Effect of Population Growth Upon State and 
Local Government Expenditures." National Tax Journal XVI 
(1963): 193-196.
Stephens, G. Ross and Henry J. Schmandt. "Revenue Patterns of Local 
Governments." National Tax Journal XV (1962):
432-437.
Stokes, Donald E. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." American 
Political Science Review LXVII (1963): 368-370.
Walker, Jack. "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States." 
American Political Science Review (1969): 888-899.
Weicher, John C. "Aid Expenditure and Local Government Structure." 
National Tax Journal XV (1962) : 573-585.
Wilensky, Gail. "Determinants of Local Government Expenditures."
In Financing the Metropolis. Edited by John P. Crecine.
Beverly Hills : Sage, 1970).
Williams, Oliver P. "Typologies for Comparative Local Government." 
Midwest Journal of Political Science (1961): 150-164.
Wolfinger, Raymond and John 0. Field. "Political Ethos and the Structure 
of City Government." American Political Science Review LX
(1966): 302-326.
Woo, S. K. "Central City Expenditures and Metropolitan Areas."
National Tax Journal XVIII (1965) : 337-35.3.
187
APPENDIX A
CITIES IN ANALYSIS SET
Alabama
Birmingham
Gadsden
Mobile
Montgomery
Tascaloosa
Arizona
Phoenix
Tucson
Arkansas
Fort Smith 
Little Rock 
North Little Rock
California
Alahambra
Alameda
Bakersfield
Berkeley
Burbank
Compton
Fresno
Glendale
Inglewood
Los Angeles
Long Beach
Oakland
Palo Alto
Pasadena
Pomona
Riverside
Richmond
San Bernadtno
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
San Leandro
San Mateu
Sacramento
Santa Ana
Santa Barbara
California (cont.)
Santa Monica 
South Gate 
Stockton 
Vallejo
Colorado
Colorado Springs
Denver
Pueblo
Connecticut
Bridgeport 
Hartford 
Meriden 
New Britain 
New Haven 
Norwalk 
Stamford 
Waterbury
Delaware
Wilmington
Florida
Fort Lauderdale
Jacksonville
Miami
Miami Beach
Orlando
Pensacola
St. Petersburgh
Tampa
West Palm Beach
Georgia
Albany
Atlanta
Augusta
Columbus
Macon
Savannah
Illinois
Aurora
Berwyn
Chicago
Cicero
Decatur
East St. Louis
Eutnston
Joliet
Oak Park
Peoria
Rock Island
Rockford
Waukegon
Indiana
East Chicago 
Evansville 
Fort Wayne 
Gary 
Hammond 
Indianapolis 
Muncie 
South Bend 
Terre Haute
Iowa
Cedar Rapids 
Council Bluffs 
Davenport 
Des Moines 
Dubuque 
Sioux City 
Waterloo
Kansas
Kansas City
Topeka
Wichita
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Kentucky Minnesota New York
Covington Duluth. Albany
Lexington Minneapolis Binghamton
Louisville St. Paul Buffalo
Louisiana
New York City
Mississippi New Rochelle
Baton Rouge Jackson Niagra Falls
Lake Charles Rochester
Monroe Missouri Rome
New Orleans
Independence
Syracuse
Troy
Maine Kansas City Utica
St. Joseph Yonkers
Portland St. Louis
Maryland
Springfield North Carolina
University City
Asheville
Baltimore
Montana Charlotte
Durham
Massachusetts Billings Greensboro
Boston Great Falls High Point
Brockton
Nebraska
Raliegh
Cambridge Winston Salem
Chicopee Lincoln
OhioFall River. Omaha
Holyoke Akron
Lowell Nevada Canton
Lynn
Reno CincinnatiLawrence Cleveland
Malden
Medford New Hampshire
Cleveland Heights 
Columbus
Newton Manchester Dayton
New Bedford Euclid
Pittsfield New Jersey Hamilton
Quincy
Somerville
Springfield
Waltham
Atlantic City
Bayonne
Bloomfield
Camden
Clifton
Lima
Lakewood
Lorain
Parma
Worchestor Springfield
Michigan East Organge 
Irvington
Toledo
Warren
Ann Arbor Jersey City Youngstown
Bay City Newark
OklahomaDearborn Passaic
Detroit Patterson Lawton
Flint Trenton Oklahoma City
Grand Rapids Union City Tulsa
Jackson
Kalamazoo New Mexico
Lansing
Pontiac
Albuquerque
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Oregon
Eugene
Portland
Pennsylvania
Allentown
Altoona
Bethlehem
Chester
Erie
Johnstown
Lancaster
Harrisburg
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Reading
Scranton
York
Rhode Island
Cranston
Paultucket
Providence
Warwick
South Carolina
Charleston
Columbia
Greenville
South Dakota 
Sioux Falls
Tennessee
Chattanooga
Knoxville
Memphis
Nashville
Texas
Abilene
Amarillo
Austin
Beaumont
Corpus Christi
Dallas
El Paso
Ft. Worth
Galveston
Houston
Laredo
Lubbock
Oddessa
Port Arthus
San Angelo
San Antonio
Tyler
Waco
Wichita Falls
Utah
Ogden
Salt Lake City
West Virginia
Charleston
Huntington
Wheeling
Wisconsin
Green Bay
Kenosha
Madison
Milwaukee
Racine
Wauwatosa
West Allis
District of Columbia
Washington
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APPENDIX B
PREDICTION EQUATIONS (BETAS); EXPENDITURE 
MINUS AID FOR ALL CONTROL GROUPS 
(1950, 1960, 1970, 1950-1960, 1960-1970)
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